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1  Introduction  
This study is about sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance in 
the Dutch financial sector. This chapter outlines the background of this 
study into corporate governance in the Dutch financial sector. Section 
1.1 starts with the background to this study. In section 1.2 three develop-
ments shape the context for corporate governance: globalization of 
financial markets, democratization of governance policy and prolifera-
tion of law on corporate governance. In Section 1.3 the history of 
corporate governance is outlined. This historical overview ends by 
sketching forces in conflict, resulting in tensions. Based on approaches 
from the scientific discourse on corporate governance, these tensions 
are explained in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 the research questions, 
objectives and relevance of the study are discussed. Finally, Section 1.6 
closes this chapter with a reading guide.  
1.1 Executive board and supervisory board in the spotlight  
We read about it in newspapers, see it on television and talk about it during 
birthday parties, but do we really know what it means to work every day as 
an executive at an organization in the financial sector?  
 
In recent years, corporate governance has been much in the public eye. 
Television programmes such as Zembla, Nova and Buitenhof devoted 
extensive attention to the role of executive board and supervisory board 
in the bankruptcy of the DSB Bank, the financial support provided to ABN 
AMRO, ING Bank, AEGON insurance and SNS Reaal by the Dutch 
government and investments in "immoral" products that were linked to 
illegal logging or the fabrication of cluster munitions. Moreover, the 
actions of former CEO of the DSB Bank, Dirk Scheringa and the former 
CEO of ABN AMRO, Rijkman Groenink, have long been topics of public 
discussion. Under their management, the banks flourished and earned 
big profits, but this period was followed by hard times and severe 
consequences. The DSB Bank eventually went bankrupt and ABN AMRO 
sold to the Belgian bank Fortis, the Scottish bank Royal Bank of Scotland 
and the Spanish bank Banco Santander and was ultimately taken over by 
the Dutch state. It should be emphasized that the financial crisis has 
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caused the activities of executives in the financial sector to be 
scrutinized. There was not only a financial crisis, and more specifically the 
crisis in the financial markets (credit crisis), but also a crisis of trust with 
respect to the financial sector. In the public debate, there appeared to be 
consensus on one topic: that the financial sector had failed, in particular 
at the executive level. This was supported by a documentary by Michael 
Moore (2009), Capitalism: A Love Story. This documentary told a story in 
which banks traditionally aimed to make profits, and that this type of 
policy at financial institutions resulted in the unfair distribution of the 
prosperity generated by capitalism. During the protests of the Occupy 
movement in October and November of 2011 in the Netherlands,1 the 
popular slogan “We are the 99%” symbolized the economic inequality 
between the richest 1% in the world and the remaining 99%. The 
demonstrators considered greed in the financial sector to be one of the 
most important causes of the global financial crisis that began in 2008. 
Other slogans of the Occupy movement included: “Banks get bailed out, 
we get sold out! This is what democracy looks like! Whose streets? Our 
Streets!” Also, terms from the media, such as the greed and bonus 
culture2, old-boys network3 and glass ceiling4 referred to the societal 
satisfaction about executive boards and supervisory boards in general 
and specifically those in the financial sector. Table 1.1 shows that in the 
 
1 On Saturday, 15 October 2011, demonstrations and manifestations took place in 
Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. In Amsterdam (on the Beursplein) and 
The Hague (on the Malieveld) tent camps were set up. Similar actions were also 
proclaimed in other cities in the Netherlands.  
2 The phrase greed and bonus culture refers to the societal dissatisfaction about the big 
salaries and bonuses that the financial sector continued to pay to its executives, even 
when the corporations suffered losses and jobs had to be eliminated.  
3 The old boys network refers to the phenomenon in which the top executives in the 
business community belong to a closely knit group. The members of the old boys 
network come into contact with each other not only on the executive boards and 
supervisory councils, but they also have mutual links of friendship and family. They know 
each other from the better families and have often known each other since their college 
days, during which they often acquired their initial experience in governance on the 
boards and committees of fraternities (Fennema & Heemskerk, 2008). 
4 The glass ceiling is a metaphor that refers to the invisible barriers (ceilings) that prevent 
women from attaining top-level positions in business and government. It distinguish itself 
from more visible barriers such as requirements for experience and education.  
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week that the present study was completed; corporate governance of 
the Dutch financial sector was still an important topic for discussion.  
 
Table 1.1 Newspaper articles about corporate governance in the Dutch financial 
sector in the week of 19th October 2015 
The question is whether sustainability can be permitted reduced the 
pension yields...  
Pension funds have been wholesalers of somber news. Due to the low coverage 
ratio, pensioners cannot expect any extras. But it is not all doom and gloom. In 
the coming years the country's largest pension fund will be significantly revise its 
investment portfolio (Trouw, 19 October 2015). 
 
‘Over-regulation must stop’ 
European policy makers can be proud of the measures taken to prevent a new 
financial crisis, but they are now threatening to go too far and saddle the 
financial sector with excessive regulatory pressure, argues Karel Lannoo, CEO of 
the influential Brussels think tank Ceps (Het Financieele Dagblad, 20 October 
2015). 
 
The international market for top executives does not exist  
Study concludes that the market does not justify increased incomes 
Despite major economic changes in recent decades, most of the top executives in 
the Netherlands are Dutch citizens who have spent their careers in their home 
country and have a Dutch network. Even in the small and open Dutch economy, 
there are few indications of the existence of an international market for top 
executives that is regularly referred to in the debate on executive pay (De 
Volkskrant, 22 October 2015).  
 
In the current public discourse on corporate governance, the number of 
incidents is a daily topic of conversation. This approach to corporate 
governance, which focuses on the number of incidents, can be referred 
to as the objective approach (Duijnhoven, 2010). A striking aspect of this 
approach is that rules, competencies, duties and responsibilities are 
considered as principles of good corporate governance. A question that 
periodically arises in the context of objective corporate governance is 
whether laws, regulations and codes help to prevent fraud and 
accounting scandals. In his study, Cools5 (2005) compared 25 fraudulent 
enterprises from various sectors and countries with 25 ”honest” 
 
5 Cools is a member of the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, professor 
of corporate finance on the Economic Faculty of the University of Groningen and 
Executive Advisor at The Boston Consulting Group. 
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companies of comparable size and activity; he came to the conclusion 
that laws, regulations and codes did not cause the “accidents”. In fact, 
the 25 fraudulent enterprises scored the same in this respect as the 
“honest” businesses. He found that the differences had to do with 
greed, egotistical behaviour and exploiting unrealistic expectations. Smit 
(2009) described how the Netherlands lost its most important bank to 
foreign owners6 due to the prideful, arrogant attitude of the bankers of 
ABN Amro, who wanted too much and communicated poorly with each 
other. Furthermore, various books have been written about the bank-
ruptcy of DSB and the megalomania of its founder, Dirk Scheringa 
(Conijn, 2010; De Groot & Van Gessel, 2009). In the studies and corporate 
biographies cited in these books, the following aspects were indicated as 
causes of the failure of the banks: lack of good interaction between the 
executive board, supervisory board and other actors in and around the 
boards of governance, lack of strategic focus, groupthink, power 
struggles, greed, vanity, arrogance and megalomania, indecision and lack 
of morality and decency. These causes indicate that factors other than 
laws, regulations and codes –such as the nature of the individuals, the 
network of personal relationships in which they participate, and the way 
in which they deal with each other– are decisive for that which takes 
place in the boards of governance in the financial sector. In accordance 
with the notion of Duijnhoven (2010), in the present study this attention 
to more implicit aspects is called the subjective approach. The present 
study focuses on the subjective approach of the executives, members of 
supervisory boards, works councils, employers’ associations, share-
holders’ associations and other actors in and around the boards of 
governance regarding matters of corporate governance.  
The background to this study was not only my curiosity about the world 
of the actors in and around the boards of governance, but also my 
fascination with the future manifestation of corporate governance. 
Researchers from various scientific disciplines have questioned the 
tenability of the current governance models. Management consultants, 
business consultants, economists and management gurus are of the 
 
6 The Belgian bank Fortis, the Scottish bank Royal Bank of Scotland and the Spanish bank 
Banco Santander. 
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opinion that the traditional hierarchical organizational structures are less 
and less suited to operating in a turbulent environment. In 2002, the 
renowned economist Drucker predictted that during the subsequent 15 
years not only would corporate governance models have to be revised 
and transformed, but also the corresponding organizational concepts 
and organizational instruments (Drucker, 2002). According to business 
administration scholars, the emergence of the concept of governance 
can be explained by the new political and administrative arrangements 
that can be observed and can be considered to be, for example, the 
reflection of the pursuit of more effective forms of governance (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). On the other hand, the emergence of the concept of 
governance (corporate or otherwise) can be seen as a reflection of a 
more fundamental change in attitudes on how political and admini-
strative processes must be given shape in present-day society (Kooiman, 
1993). Consequently, business administration scholars believe that the 
notion of corporate governance can become a new vocabulary with 
which academics and practitioners can discuss this topic (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003).  
My curiosity about the new vocabulary on corporate governance and the 
story of actors in and around the boards of governance led me to study 
subjective corporate governance in the financial sector. The core of the 
present study concerns the perception of corporate governance by 
actors in and around the boards of governance in the Dutch financial 
sector. A study of the perceptions of corporate governance should start 
with a brief history and current use of this concept.  
1.2 Existence of corporate governance 
Events in corporate governance occur in rapid succession. Consequently, 
actors in and around the boards of governance are confronted during 
their activities with a high level of complexity. To acquire insight into this 
acceleration and the institutional, societal and economic context of 
corporate governance, in the following section three developments are 
explained that have played a major role in this process: the globalization 
of the financial markets, the democratization of governance policy and 
the proliferation of law on corporate governance.  
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Globalization of the financial markets 
Globalization can be defined as a process of intensification of cross-
border social interactions due to declining costs of connecting distant 
locations through communication and the transfer of capital, goods, and 
people (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Important actors in the financial sector 
that play a role in this trend are the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank (Stiglitz, 2003; Klein, 2007). Multinational corporations that 
aim for permanent expansion are another important group of actors 
(Bakan, 2004; Klein, 2000). Went (2008) stated that investors and the 
multinational corporations are the strongest actors driving the globaliza-
tion process. The development of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) has played a major role in globalization. In his book The 
World is Flat (2005), Friedman vibrantly described the radical change 
resulting from the Internet and its enormous potential for people. 
Products are compared to each other and purchased and manufactured 
where this can be done the cheapest. This competition has resulted in an 
increase in takeovers and mergers in the world (and the financial sector is 
no exception). Besides the competition between financial institutions, 
the competition between countries is also increasing. For example, the 
Netherlands wants to compete with London, because it wants to show 
that it is the financial heart of Europe. Globalization results in rapidly 
changing interactions. As a result, concepts, trends and ideas influence 
each other and are more likely to be taken over by each other. Also 
globalization results in concepts, trends and ideas influencing each other 
and being accepted more rapidly. Regarding the content of corporate 
governance, this means that companies in Anglo-Saxon countries7 and 
Rhineland countries8 are becoming increasingly similar to each other 
(Peij, 2007). The growing similarity of the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon 
 
7 In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the shareholder has a dominant position. This can also be 
seen in the definitions of corporate governance in Anglo-Saxon countries, as exemplified 
by the description the American economists Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They describe 
corporate governance as “The ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment”. 
8 People who live in countries adjacent to the Rhine (including the Netherlands, Germany 
and Austria) think in terms of 'community' and take account of social factors such as 
nature, the environment and employment, and they have a long-term mentality (Bakker 
et al., 2005). 
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traditions has also led to the Rhineland two-tier systeem9 and the Anglo-
Saxon model with its one-tier-system10 (Garatt, 1996; Douma, 1997; 
Rhodes & Van Apeldoorn, 1998) replacing each other more and more 
often. This means that the job description of a chairman of the board 
sometimes changes accordingly (Peij, 2007). The rapidly changing 
interactions also result in a complex financial system. Interdependency 
and trust are two key concepts of this system. The interdependency 
between financial institutions became visible when governments 
worldwide11 began to lend billions to systemically important banks12 to 
defuse the crisis. The phrase “Too big to fail” was used frequently in this 
context because the collapse of the financial institution would have had 
severe consequences for the operation of and trust in the financial 
system.  
 
Democratization of governance policy 
In the 1990s, a shift took place in the literature on policy from govern-
ment to governance. According to Rhodes (2007) governance is used in 
contrast to government, to indicate that the policy is implemented 
differently. Due to the increasing complexity of society, the traditional 
top-down policy approach had to make way for a more flexible structure 
and a more decentralized policy with greater participation by various 
players (from civil society and elsewhere). Today, in contrast to 40 years 
ago, people no longer accept the proclamations of traditional authority 
 
9 In the Netherlands, we have traditionally had the two-tier system of corporate 
governance: the executive board is responsible for the daily management of the 
corporation, while an independent supervisory board (consisting of non-executives) 
monitors the executive board.  
10 The Anglo-Saxon countries have a one tier system: there is only a single board of 
directors consisting of executives as well as non-executives (the latter having a more 
supervisory role). The position of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is combined with that 
of the chairman.  
11 During the credit crisis the Dutch government rescued ING, SNS Bank, AEGON and NIBC 
with loans. In addition ABN AMRO was rescued by being taken over by the Dutch state. 
Subsequently, the SNS Bank was nationalized.  
12 The Financial Stability Board compiles an annual list with systemically important banks 
worldwide. A systematically important bank is a bank that is essential for the financial 
system and thus for the functioning of the economy and society. A bankruptcy of a 
systematically important bank has such severe consequences for the economy that 
governments rescue these banks if they are threatened with collapse. 
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figures such as teachers, pastors, politicians or bank directors. This 
change has been an important impulse for a different approach to mana-
gement, in which earning and building trust plays a dominant role in 
motivating employees. It should therefore be clear that a wealth of new 
and fashionable strategies such as empowerment, interactive policy-
making (Van Der Arend, 2007), citizen participation (Edelenbos & 
Monnikhof, 2001), horizontal forms of governance (Soerensen & Torfing 
2006; Teisman, 2005) and corporate social responsibility (Den Hond et al., 
2014; Lockett et al., 2006), have in fact all emerged from that stronger 
awareness of increasing participation and mutual responsibility.  
 
Proliferation of law on corporate governance  
Due to the financial crisis in 2008, international accounting scandals and 
other events in the financial sector, the legitimacy of the sector is under 
pressure. To restore trust in the financial sector, solutions are being 
sought in laws, codes and regulations. International examples include the 
publication of the Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004), 
Basel13 II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) III (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010, 2013 and 2014). In addition, 
existing institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
been given a more powerful, central role in the international financial 
system, and new institutions such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB)14, 
the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) and the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)15 have been established to oversee laws, 
codes and regulations. At the national level, under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Finance and the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), the interna-
tional and European guidelines have been implemented in Dutch legisla-
tion. This has been done not only through regulation by means of new or 
amended legislation, but also through self-regulation in the area of 
corporate governance. This began in 1997 with the recommendations of 
 
13 Basel II and III are international accords that regulate the supervision of solvency at 
internationally active banks and that are intended to prevent banks from getting into 
financial difficulties. 
14 The FSB was established to identify the vulnerable aspects of the international financial 
system and propose solutions. 
15 The ESFS and the ESRB were established to strengthen the supervision of banks in 
Europe. 
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the Peters Commission16 (Commissie Corporate Governance, 1997), after 
which the Tabaksblat Commission17 (Commissie Corporate Governance, 
2003) published the Corporate Governance Code. Following this, the 
Frijns Commission18 (Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code, 
2009) updated the Code. In 2013, the Dutch parliament also implemented 
the banker's oath for policymakers and supervisors of financial institu-
tions. The legislators decided to require a moral-ethical declaration in 
response to the doubts that arose during the years of the financial crisis 
regarding the activities of bankers and others in the financial sector. In 
this sense, the oath was also intended to help restore trust in the 
financial sector. The financial sector itself also took initiatives to help 
restore public confidence. Examples include the Banking Code (2010) 
formulated by the Dutch Banking Association (NVB) and the Code of the 
Dutch Pension Funds (2014) formulated by the Federation of the Dutch 
Pension Funds and the Labour Foundation19. Monitoring committees 
oversee compliance with all these codes.  
The globalization of the financial markets, the democratization of the 
governance structure and the proliferation of law on corporate govern-
ance are developments that have had a major impact on corporate 
governance in the financial sector. This section has shown that the 
financial crisis and the crisis of trust have played a major role in shaping 
the sector as it stands today. The history of corporate governance has 
also influenced its current implementation. The following section 
therefore outlines this history.  
1.3 Historical outline of corporate governance 
Nearly all authors in the Netherlands begin the story of corporate 
governance with the founding of the East India Company (VOC) in 1602 
(Gelderblom & Jonker, 2005; Frentrop, 2002). Although the concept of 
 
16 The official name for both the Peters Commission and the Tabaksblat Commission is 
the Commission on Corporate Governance. To distinguish these commissions, in the 
present study they are referred to under the names of their respective chairpersons.  
17 Idem 16. 
18 The Frijns Commission under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Jean Frijns, former chairman of 
the ABP Pension Fund and Professor of Investments at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
19 The Code Pensioenfondsen (Pension Funds Code) is part of the comprehensive process 
to modernize the Dutch pension system and make it sustainable for the future. 
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corporate governance did not yet exist, these authors saw the new 
method of financing used by the VOC as the starting point of its 
development: overseas trade was no longer being financed on an 
individual basis, but was supported by the VOC and its Board of Directors, 
de Heeren XVII. At that time, the executives of the VOC were required to 
account for their financial policy associated with this new method of 
financing only after a period of 10 years. The executives therefore found 
themselves in a certain position of power with respect to their financiers 
(Alchian & Demsets, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This power relationship between shareholders and executives is 
still a topic of discussion today. However, corporate governance has 
changed. Based on the following historical milestones, beginning in the 
1960s, this section addresses these changes in corporate governance.  
 
According to the historian Righart, in the 1960s the Dutch economy 
began to grow enormously and the people who had worked so hard for 
this also wanted to share in the emerging prosperity (Righart, 1995). In 
the public discourse, it became clear that there was no agreement about 
the distribution of economic benefits. As part of the discourse, the trade 
unions argued that the distribution was clearly unfair. For example, in his 
famous speech on 19 October 1968, the trade unionist Mertens stated 
that the real power was held by about 200 individuals in leading posi-
tions, who gave each other the top jobs. Although this statement was 
not based on solid facts20, the “the 200 of Mertens” quickly became a 
standard phrase in public discourse. To legally regulate these mutual 
relationships, the Dutch government established the Commissie Onder-
nemingsrecht (commission on Corporate Law) under the leadership of 
Verdam. The work of the Verdam Commission, following a recommend-
dation of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER)21, 
 
20 This statement was later investigated by a group of political scientists (Helmers et al., 
1975). In this case it concerned dual functions in the Dutch business community, i.e. 
multiple appointments of officers on the executive boards and supervisory boards of the 
largest enterprises and in governmental institutions and semi-governmental bodies. Of 
the 86 organizations that were studied, 84 were mutually linked by 873 dual positions, 
held by 195 individuals, only 5 fewer than Mertens had predicted.  
21 The SER is an advisory body consisting of businesspeople, employees and independent 
experts who advise the government and parliament on social and economic policy. 
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resulted in the structuurwet22 (Structure Act) of 1971. The new corporate 
structure was characterized by the central position of the supervisory 
board, whose tasks and competencies23 were expanded by the Act (1971). 
In this new structure, the shareholders’ association and the works council 
both had the right to veto each appointment to the supervisory board. 
This was an attempt to give employees and shareholders an equivalent 
legal position. The new Act laid the foundation for the legal concept of 
corporate governance, in which the leading roles were not limited to the 
shareholders and executives, as was the case during the VOC, but were 
expanded to include employees.  
The concept of corporate governance was actually not introduced until 
1977. This combination of words simply did not exist (Zingales, 1995). The 
concept of corporate governance is the successor to the concept of 
corporate control, which refers to the disciplining effect that the corpo-
rate takeover market has on managers. Following the wave of takeovers 
in the 1980s, however, it turned out that poorly performing enterprises 
continued to exist. In response, more attention was paid to the control 
of shareholders on company policy. Therefore, besides control via the 
corporate takeover market, the concept of corporate governance also 
refers to the function of the shareholders association in monitoring 
corporate governance. The replacement of the concept of control by the 
concept of governance indicates a shift from control by exit to control by 
voice. In the 1970s, the concept of corporate governance also acquired a 
more ethical connotation. At that time, the debate became dominated by 
specific issues such as trade with South Africa (due to the apartheid 
regime), and issues in the areas of the environment, children's rights, 
discrimination, human rights and climate. Later on, in the 1980s, the core 
theme became the ethics of corporate governance with an accent on 
morality and values in managing organizations, linked with the term 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Evan, 1990). According to 
 
22 Enterprises which in more than fifty percent of employees work abroad are not 
required to implement the full structure regime. As a result, most of the biggest Dutch 
multinationals (including ING, ABN AMRO) are not subject to this regime.  
23 It was primarily the supervisory board that acquired more competencies, such as 
appointing executives, adopting the annual accounts and approving key decisions such as 
mergers, major investments, dismissing large numbers of employees and issuing shares. 
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some, the stakeholder approach of Freeman (1984) was actually a 
counter-movement to the increasing dominance of the Anglo-Saxon 
approach in the 1980s.  
The 1990s were characterized by the combination of new technological 
possibilities, such as the use of mobile telephones, and rapid economic 
growth. Especially the second half of the 1990s was characterized by 
great optimism in the West. Due to this prosperity, faith in the market 
mechanism (as practiced in the USA) increased, also in the Netherlands. 
This period was dominated by terms such as privatization, commercial-
lization, managerialism, New Public Management and liberalization. Also 
during the 1990s, enterprises in Europe, just like those in the United 
States, were faced with the emergence of institutional investors. In this 
period, these investors initially took an activist role, with the aim of 
realizing changes in corporate governance at the enterprises in which 
they invested. As a result, the concept of shareholder value was intro-
duced in the 1990s, in which profit maximization is the ultimate goal. 
Beginning with the 1990s, the remuneration of executives was linked to 
the financial performance of the enterprise. This encouraged executives 
to focus on and devote themselves to achieving maximum market value. 
This served the interests of shareholders as well as executives. However, 
the pressure on executives, managers and employees increased as a 
result. In 1996, under the leadership of Peters24, the Dutch coalition 
government established the Dutch Corporate Governance Commission to 
investigate whether the balance between the supervisory board, execu-
tives and shareholders at the listed companies was sustainable. In 1997, 
the Commission presented its findings in a report: the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code. As a result, corporate governance was labelled as a 
system of etiquette for the corporation and its directly involved stake-
 
24 The official name for all three commissions –Peters Commission, the Tabaksblat 
Commission and the Frijns Commission– is the Commission on Corporate Governance. All 
of these commissions consisted of leading executives and academically qualified or 
experiential experts from banks, pension funds, stockholders associations, businesses, 
accounting firms and professors from academia. To distinguish these commissions, in the 
present study they are referred to under the names of their respective chairpersons. 
Peters was the former chairman of the board of Aegon. Aegon was originally a Dutch 
multinational company that offered customers life insurance, pensions and asset 
management products.  
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holders. The code emphasized the supervisory board and otherwise did 
not make any specific statements about the rights of shareholders or 
proposals to change the law. It also did not make any recommendations 
to bid farewell to the structure regime of 1971.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, De Jong et al. (2001) concluded that 
compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (1997) was poor. 
For example, they found that enterprises paid only limited attention to 
the operation of the supervisory board and provided little information 
about corporate governance in their annual reports. Moreover, the study 
showed that a number of businesses tried to comply with the code 
especially in terms of form, but that substantive compliance was limited. 
In response to these findings, the coalition government decided to 
appoint a new commission on corporate governance under the leader-
ship of Morris Tabaksblat25. The Tabaksblat Commission decided to take a 
much more Anglo-Saxon approach than the Peters Commission. It 
updated the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2003) with more than 
100 rules on topics such as duties, methods and remuneration of execu-
tives and members of corporate supervisory boards. In addition, the 
position of shareholders was strengthened. For example, the Code states 
that a member of a corporate supervisory board cannot hold more than 
five such positions in other organizations, that executive board members 
can be appointed for a term of no more than four years and that the 
golden handshake for departing executives can amount to no more than 
one year's salary. Subsequently, in December 2008, the Code was 
updated by the Frijns commission26 and has also been monitored annually 
by the monitoring commission on corporate governance. This commis-
sion also reports to the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of 
Security and Justice and the Minister of Finance.  
 
 25 In 1984, Tabaksblat became a member of the executive board of Unilever, and in 1994 
was appointed chairman of the board of this multinational. From 1999 to 2005, he held 
the position of chairman of the board of Reed Elsevier, and from 2000 to 2005 he was 
chairman of the supervisory board of AEGON and TNT NV.  
26 Frijns worked first at Statistics Netherlands (CPB), where he became deputy director. 
In 1988 he went to work at the ABP, the pension fund for public sector employees, where 
he became director of investments and member of the executive board. ABP is the 
largest pension fund in the Netherlands. He remained in this position until 2005. In 1995 
he was appointed professor of Investment Theory at Vrij Universiteit Amsterdam.  
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In recent years, the discussion on corporate governance has paid much 
more attention to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For example, 
the Burgmans Commission, which conducted a study in 2008 into the 
relationship between CSR and corporate governance (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2008), ascertained that the integration of CSR in 
operational management results in an improved connection with clients, 
investors and employees. According to the 2008 advisory report of the 
SER on CSR the definition of CSR varies, depending on time and place. 
The SER recommendation (2000) used the following definition: CSR is 
concern for the social effects of the functioning of the enterprise in 
which two elements determine whether one can justifiably use the term:  
– deliberately focusing the business activities on value creation in three 
dimensions (profit, people, planet), thus contributing to social prosperity 
in the long term; 
– maintaining a relationship with the various stakeholders based on 
understanding and dialogue, which provides answers to legitimate 
questions from society. 
Much is known about CSR (Den Hond et al., 2014; Lockett et al., 2006), 
especially in multinational enterprises (Maignan & Ralston, 2002); the 
business advantages of CSR (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Carroll & Shabana, 
2010); civil society involvement (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007); and the 
politicization of CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Various studies have 
examined the relationship between CSR and governance. For example, 
Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) concluded in their study that 
there is a clear two-way interaction and increasing overlap between 
corporate governance and CSR. Saconni (2006) concluded that CSR is an 
expansion of the corporate governance model. Other researchers have 
suggested that an integral approach should be taken towards sustaina-
bility, risk management and governance (Lenssen et al., 2014).  
 
This brief historical overview shows that corporate governance is a broad 
concept. Corporate governance not only concerns the shareholders and 
owners, but other stakeholders as well, such as employees, interest 
groups, the media and society itself. In addition, corporate governance is 
no longer limited to the economic distribution of profits, but also 
involves laws and regulations, ethics and corporate social responsibility. 
Within this broad concept of corporate governance, in which many 
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actors and themes play a role, there are also various tensions. Based on 
scientific approaches to corporate governance, the following section 
focuses on these areas. 
1.4 Tensions in corporate governance  
The two dominant scientific approaches to corporate governance are the 
principal-agent approach and the stakeholder approach. Tension can be 
observed not only between these approaches, but also within them. As 
tensions are central in this study, an overview of important theoretical of 
tensions in corporate governance is given below.  
The dominant theory in the scientific discourse on corporate governance 
is the principal-agent theory (Alchian & Demsets, 1972; Berle & Means, 
1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The principal-agent 
theory centres on the relationship between the agent, who makes 
decisions on behalf of the principal (shareholder). This relationship does 
not always proceed smoothly because the interests of the shareholder 
do not always correspond with those of the executive board. In his 
famous book The Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776: 700) formulated this 
problem clearly:  
 
The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the 
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
company frequently watch over their own.  
 
In other words, the shareholder aims for the highest possible yield on his 
or her invested capital. Based on this self-interest, the theory describes 
the behaviour of the principal as follows: the principal attempts to 
monitor the behaviour of the agent and to find incentives that motivate 
the agent to keep an eye on the interests of the principal. In principle-
agent theory, the agent must pass the ultimate test: whether they have 
attained the desired financial result and whether this is in line with the 
plans and prognoses to stay ahead of the competition. In case of 
disappointing financial results, the shareholders can decide to fire the 
executive board. The executive board is expected to make every effort 
to achieve the desired financial results for the enterprise, but they must 
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also take account of the interests of other actors whom they need to 
achieve these financial results.  
 
In the literature, this broad perspective of considering the interests of 
other actors falls under the stakeholder approach. One of the founders 
of the stakeholder approach, Freeman, defines a stakeholder as: “any 
group of individuals who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 47). In contrast to the principal-
agent approach, the stakeholder approach concerns not only the 
creation of shareholder value, but also has the aim of creating value for 
all stakeholders involved with the enterprise. The tensions within the 
stakeholder approach is more comprehensive than that in the principal-
agent approach. In the literature on the stakeholder approach, essential-
ly three categories of stakeholders are defined: the shareholder, the 
direct stakeholder and the community state welfare dimension 
(Waldman et al., 2006). The latter category concerns the responsebility 
of corporate governance for society in general. Furthermore, the 
stakeholder approach is subdivided into the instrumental approach and 
the normative approach (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In the instrument-
tal approach, shareholders, stakeholders and the community welfare 
dimension are defined as individuals or groups that provide an important 
contribution to the continued existence of the enterprise (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). Jansen (1998) referred to target-utility ethics or utilita-
rianism, in which efficiency thinking is dominant.  
 
The first category, the shareholders, assume that the executives pursue 
economic values such as profit maximization. The principal-agent 
approach is based on a particular view of reality: rational selfinterest. 
One criticism of this school of thought is that in reality a decision-maker 
does not operate rationally, in the sense that he or she knows every-
thing, considers everything and makes the best choice. The term 
bounded rationality of Simon (1961) applies to this situation. The instru-
mental reasoning of the stakeholders, the second category, is that each 
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stakeholder contributes to the aims of the enterprise27. There is mutual 
dependence between the stakeholders, and a balance is usually esta-
blished between them. This mutual dependency, on which the power of 
stakeholders is based, is the consequence of three related aspects: the 
position of the stakeholders, their degree of irreplaceability and the 
extent to which they are organized and aware of their power (Hickson et 
al., 1971; Pennings & Goodman, 1977). On the basis of this balance, it is 
generally assumed that a temporary dominant coalition emerges 
(Thompson, 1967). In this approach, corporate governance is seen as the 
representative of the dominant coalition. It determines the direction of 
the organization. It should be noted that these characteristics can differ 
according to the situation. For the third category, the community state 
welfare dimension, in the instrumental approach corporate governance 
cannot afford to disregard society. In fact, one could say that the 
continuity of the enterprise depends largely on the perception that 
emerges in society concerning the reputation of the enterprise (Boot & 
Soeting, 2004).  
Besides the instrumental approach, Donaldson and Preston (1995) also 
distinguished the normative approach. Corporate governance not only 
has to deal with economic aspects such as financial value, but also with 
intrinsic value. For the first category, the shareholder, the literature on 
the principal-agent approach has paid much attention to the normative 
interaction between the executive board and the shareholder. It assumes 
a negative view of humanity, in which the executive is lazy, risk-averse 
and operates primarily on self-interest instead of on the interest of the 
organization (Corbey, 2010). The second category, the stakeholders, is 
used in the normative approach to interpret the function of the 
organization, including the identification of the moral and philosophical 
guidelines for the operation and management of the organization. 
Relevant studies have linked concepts such as corporate social 
 
27 Customers are important stakeholders because they purchase the products of an 
organization for a specific price. The government issues permits and makes laws on what 
is and what is not permissible. Furthermore, employees provide labour and knowledge to 
an organization, for which they are rewarded. The latter develop power as a stakeholder 
when they organize themselves into a trade union, which in this approach is also 
considered to be a stakeholder.  
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performance and responsibility to the third category, the community 
state welfare dimension (Caroll, 1979; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 
1991). According to this theory, the executive board –which represents 
the organization– must take account of the interests of many parties in 
society and behave as a responsible member of society. As a foundation 
for this normative approach, the social justice theory of Rawls (1971) has 
usually been cited (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984). In this system of 
ethics, moral obligations are derived from the principle of justice. In this 
context, Jansen (1998) referred to deontology or duty-based ethics. 
Rawls defined a just society as a society in which: “all social values –
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect 
are distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of 
these values is to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls, 1971: 62). Lindblom 
(1994), followed by Deegan (2002), defined legitimacy as agreement 
between the social values that are propagated by the activities of the 
enterprise and the social values of society as a whole. For the executive 
board, much of their tensions come from sources beyond their control. In 
contrast to the stakeholder approach, in the normative approach the 
community state welfare dimension is not directly visible and the 
compass does not point to formal rules.  
From the foregoing explanation of the tensions, it can be concluded that 
the approach taken here links up with the view of the World Bank, which 
stated that corporate governance “aims to ensure a balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. 
The corporate governance framework is there to encourage the efficient 
use of sources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship 
of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests 
of individuals, corporations and society” (Sir Adrian Cadbury at the Global 
Corporate Governance Forum, World Bank, 2000). Table 1.2 provides an 
overview of the views concerning the tensions.  
 
Table 1.2 Theoretical overview of the most important tensions in corporate 
governance 
Category/ Approach Instrumental approach Normative approach 
Shareholder 
(characteristics: 
economic values)  
Corporate management must 
focus on maximizing the yield 
for the shareholders (economic 
values) and efficiency. 
The normative act 
between the actor 
and the shareholder is 
most important. 
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Stakeholder 
(characteristics: 
economic and 
intrinsic values, 
manageable, 
tangible and formal 
institutions are 
important) 
In this approach, corporate 
management is seen as the 
representative of the dominant 
coalition. It determines the 
direction of the organization. 
Questions which are 
central here are:  
How is the function of 
the organization 
interpreted? 
How are the moral 
and philosophical 
guidelines for the 
implementation and 
management of the 
organization 
interpreted? 
Community state 
welfare dimension 
 (characteristics: 
intrinsic values, 
uncontrollable, 
elusive and formal 
institutions are 
subordinate)  
Corporate management 
cannot allow itself to disregard 
society. In fact, one could say 
that the continuity of the 
enterprise depends largely on 
the perception that emerges in 
society of the reputation of the 
enterprise.  
The two main 
questions are:  
Are the social values 
such as freedom and 
the foundation of 
self-esteem applied to 
everyone? 
Is there agreement 
between the values 
propagated by the 
executive board and 
the values of society 
(legitimacy)?  
 
Tension exists not only between the various approaches, but also 
between the various categories. For example, society at large demands 
sustainability, while at the same time investor communities increasingly 
demand profit over the short term (Steijvers, 2008). The present study 
concerns how the actors in and around the boards of governance deal 
with these tensions in practice. In the following section, this central 
theme is developed into research questions, aims and the relevance of 
the research.  
1.5 Research questions, aims and relevance 
If a study focuses on the way in which actors give shape to the tensions 
in corporate governance, then particular focus is required on how people 
in everyday life talk about and cope with these tensions (that are related 
to corporate governance). This means that if one wants to know more 
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about the ways in which people give shape to corporate governance, 
then one is compelled to delve into how people in everyday life make 
sense to this concept. In this study, executives, members of supervisory 
boards, employers’ associations, works councils and shareholders’ 
associations, as well as other actors surrounding corporate governance, 
are viewed as participants who are capable of deliberately influencing 
their social-cultural environment. The research scope focuses on the 
executive board and the supervisory board. For the purposes of this 
study, I have called the combination of these two actors “the boards of 
governance”. The research scope is shown below in Figure 1.1. To 
improve the readability, in the present study the formulation actors in 
and around the boards of governance is used instead of identifying all 
these actors. Where relevant for this study, however, the actors are 
identified. Corporate governance is considered to be a dynamic concept: 
participants in and around the boards of governance in the financial 
sector interact and exchange their beliefs about corporate governance, 
and in this way create governance themselves (Section 2.1). Building on 
this view, the present study is consistent with the generally accepted 
definition of corporate governance: “Corporate governance is about 
management and control, about responsibility and influence and about 
accountability and supervision” (Commissie Corporate Governance, 
2003).  
 
Figure 1.1 The research scope of this study 
 
The present study focuses on the experience and interaction of actors in 
and around the boards of governance concerning corporate governance: 
When is an enterprise well- managed and why? When do things go wrong 
and why? How can the boards of governance deal with complex issues? 
How do the boards of governance operate? How do they interact with 
Boards of governance 
 
Executive Board 
Supervisory Board 
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their stakeholders, which aspects of this interaction go well and which do 
not, and which systems play a role in this process? Which practices are 
successful and which practices impede good governance? To answer 
these questions, the sensemaking of participants in and around 
corporate governance must be studied based on the assumption that 
sensemaking can be both a source of change and a source of 
preservation and continuity. This leads to the central research question 
of the study:  
 
How do actors in and around the boards of governance in the financial 
sector make sense of tensions in corporate governance and how do 
these tensions manifest themselves in practice at a pension fund and a 
bank?  
 
This study focuses on two case studies in the financial sector: a pension 
fund (BPF) and a bank (Florabank). To ensure the anonymity of the 
organizations, fictional names have been used (Section 3.4.2). The 
selection of the case studies is the result of a combination of substantive 
and practical reasons. The most important substantive reason is that the 
financial sector is very diverse. A pension fund and a bank can be defined 
as two extremes. For example, within the financial sector a bank is seen 
as the most commercial organization and a pension fund as the least 
commercial. The differences between this bank and this pension fund 
primarily concern the management models. The executive board of BPF 
consists of representatives of employer and employyee organizations 
(Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.2), while the executive board of Florabank consists 
of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the 
Chief Operations Officer (COO) (Section 5.2.3). Besides the substantive 
reasons, there is also a practical reason for choosing these two case 
studies. I had difficulty gaining access to organizations in the financial 
sector for the purposes of my study. The bank and the pension fund gave 
me permission to conduct my research (Section 3.4.2).  
The anthropological point of departure of this study lies in both the 
methodology and the research object. Anthropologists have a broader 
perspective on human society than other disciplines. They also believe in 
combining these various scientific approaches to study the others, and 
therefore make use of current theories and approaches from other 
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disciplines, such as sociology and psychology. Even when anthropologists 
focus on only a single aspect of society, they do this from the perspective 
that this aspect is part of a complex totality and which must be 
understood accordingly (Kloos, 1991). They also assume that the 
substantial socio-cultural differences in human societies which can be 
observed in time and space are only variations on certain themes. 
Anthropological research is therefore contextually determined and 
bound to unique situations. The context refers to the circumstances in 
which something is done, in response to which a story was told and what 
the previous history was (Ten Have, 1977). This holistic perspective and 
the attention to context gives anthropology added value relative to 
other disciplines. For example, in her book Fool's Gold (2009), Tett, the 
British anthropologist and reporter for the Financial Times, concluded 
that a sacrosanct belief in the self-regulating ability of the free market 
blinded people to the bitter reality that everyone could see approaching. 
She stated in an article in The Guardian (Barton, 2008) that it was not her 
financial knowledge, but her anthropological approach that led her to 
these conclusions: “I happen to think anthropology is a brilliant 
background for looking at finance. Firstly you’re trained to look at how 
societies or cultures operate holistically, so you look at all the bits move 
together. And most people in the city don’t do that” (Barton, 2008: 12). 
The Dutch journalist and anthropologist Luyendijk (2015) also reported 
on his anthropological research into the financial world in the city of 
London.  
The anthropological contribution with respect to the research object is 
the attention for culture (Tennekes, 1995). Culture is chosen because the 
explanations of poor corporate governance have been frequently sought 
in the cultural perspective. According to Lückerath-Rovers (2011), the 
increasing prominence of this cultural approach has multiple causes. 
Firstly, this is because the financial crisis has been attributed largely to 
the shortcomings of corporate governance including the high degree of 
groupthink, intellectual myopia and the apparent undesirability of dissent 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
2009, Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund 
(IEO), 2011). Secondly, more is being written and discussed about the 
importance of the culture of corporate boards of governance (executive 
board and supervisory board or supervisory council). For example, based 
Introduction 
 
37 
 
on interviews with employees of Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and other organizations in the 
financial sector, the American anthropologist Ho (2009) concluded that 
investment bankers strive for higher shareholder value not only for 
ideological reasons, but that the culture of Wall Street also makes an 
important contribution. More is also being said about the importance of 
the culture of management and supervision. For example, the DNB has 
established a new expertise centre on Culture, Organization and Integ-
rity28 to give more shape and content to the supervision of behaviour and 
culture. Furthermore, the De Wit commission29, a commission of inquiry 
of the Dutch Parliament, which conducted a study into the problems in 
the financial system and their causes, stated in its final report that a 
change in culture is essential. The third cause is that the functioning of 
members of executive and supervisory boards –due to the increased 
availability of public information– can be evaluated much more 
frequently by society, and conclusions, correct or incorrect, can then be 
quickly drawn (Minichilli, Grabielsson & Huse, 2007).  
 
As mentioned previously, the majority of studies on corporate govern-
ance are about objective corporate governance. Few studies have 
focused on the subjective perceptions (lifeworld) of actors in corporate 
governance. This study focuses on the theoretical descriptive and 
explanatory aspects of the lifeworld of actors in and around the boards 
of governance. The theoretical aspect lies in the question of how the 
concept of sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance can be 
operationalized in the literature. The descriptive aspect focuses on the 
question of how actors in the financial sector deal with tensions within 
corporate governance in practice. Finally, this leads to the explanatory 
aspect, which centers on the question of which factors play a role in 
these tensions. These theoretical, descriptive and explanatory aspects of 
this study can be transposed into the following three research questions: 
  
 
28 DNBulletin 12 April 2011. 
29 The De Wit commission is chaired by Jan de Wit, a Dutch politician for the Socialist 
Party. De Wit is a former lawyer and solicitor.  
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1. How is the concept of sensemaking of tensions in corporate 
governance operationalized in the literature? 
2. How do actors in and around the boards of governance of BPF and 
Florabank deal with tensions in corporate governance?  
3. Which explanatory factors can be identified in and around the 
boards of governance in the financial sector that elucidate the 
tensions in corporate governance?  
 
The aim of this study is to understand how actors in and around boards 
of governance make sense of corporate governance, taking into account 
the specific context in which they operate. Although various combina-
tions are possible, in scientific studies on corporate governance, essen-
tially two scientific perspectives are applied. These perspectives were 
also applied by Van der Laan (2009). He calls it the economic perspective 
and the behavioural perspective. When viewed from the economic 
perspective, corporate governance is primarily concerned with the 
design of the contracts, laws and regulations that have the aim of 
improving corporate performance and achieving good governance. The 
various studies that have been conducted from this perspective have 
resulted in a number of strong policy recommendations, which are 
increasingly being implementted as hard and soft laws and regulations 
(Van der Laan, 2009). In these studies, it is not recognized that social 
forces influence the decisions of the executive board, while studies 
conducted from the behavioural perspective do recognize social forces 
at both the micro and macro level. Microsocial forces refer to 
interpersonal influence tactics. An example of such interpersonal tactics 
is flattery by executives, which can influence the likelihood that top 
managers will be placed in top executive positions in the future 
(Westphal & Stern, 2007). These social techniques need not be in conflict 
with good governance; when costs and benefits are considered, such 
tactics may even be superior to contract-based solutions (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1998). At the macro level, it is acknowledged that there are 
social forces with which the enterprise is intertwined with other 
organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), but also that the outcome of the 
executive board is a result of negotiation processes between the parties 
involved. In the present study, corporate governance was not 
approached from the economic perspective or the behavioural 
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perspective, but from the social-constructivist perspective. This means 
that the actors in and around the boards of governance were 
investigated. Consequently, the chapter on theory (Chapter 2) does not 
contain a summary of economic behavioural theories, but the chosen 
narrative approach, as a component of the social-constructivist perspect-
ive, is explored. Very few scientific studies into corporate governance 
have used this narrative approach (Brown, 2005). Moreover, no narrative 
studies at all have been conducted into two case studies in the Dutch 
financial sector.  
From a societal perspective, empirical research into corporate govern-
ance is called for. Particularly striking is that discussions about the influ-
ence of stakeholders in society are being conducted without much 
insight into the everyday perceptions of actors in and around the boards 
of governance. Preliminary interviews have shown actors in and around 
the boards of governance primarily have a need for knowledge about 
how they should interact with each other. By taking this approach, the 
present study has linked up with the pursuit of democratic principles 
such as participation, justice and equality (Rhodes, 2000; Van Kersbergen 
& Van Waarden, 2004). Besides the fact that the democratic principles 
lend this study a certain degree of societal relevance, this aspect also 
provided the motivation for me to begin the study. Essentially, this 
motivation is linked with the pursuit of democratization and the 
participation of actors in and around the boards of governance.  
1.6 Reader's guide 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship between the structure of the 
present study and the research questions. At the beginning of each 
chapter, the research questions that are answered in that chapter are 
listed. The second chapter describes the literature study. The third 
chapter focuses on the philosophical and methodological considerations. 
The results from the case studies of BPF and Florabank are presented in 
the fourth and fifth chapters, respectively. The six chapter contains the 
analysis of these case studies, and the seventh chapter presents the 
conclusions. 
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2  Making sense of corporate governance 
As indicated in the previous chapter, this second chapter provides an 
answer to the first research question: How is the concept of sense-
making of tensions in corporate governance operationalized in the 
literature? Section 2.1 describes the increasing attention to the cultural 
perspective on corporate governance and the cohesive social constructi-
vist stance of this study. Section 2.2 zooms in on the narrative approach 
that has been adopted to investigate corporate governance. Besides 
focusing on the theoretical background of the narrative approach, the 
consequences of using this approach to study corporate governance are 
also discussed. In Section 2.3, corporate governance is viewed through a 
narrative lens. This leads to three types of stories that are used to view 
corporate governance: the grand narratives, the subordinate narratives 
and the counter narratives. In Section 2.4, the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation is presented. Three narrative concepts –worldview, 
institutional framework and mode of practice– are linked to each other. 
In Section 2.5, the conclusion of this theoretical chapter is presented. 
The combination of three types of stories (Section 2.3) and the three 
narrative concepts (Section 2.4) leads to a narrative table. This narrative 
table is the result of this theoretical chapter and is used as the starting 
point to study sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance 
(Section 2.5).  
2.1 A cultural perspective on corporate governance  
In the debate about corporate governance, essentially two approaches 
can be distinguished: the rational approach and the cultural approach. 
The rational approach in turn consists of three dominant theories. The 
first is the game theory30 and the second and third are respectively the  
 
30 Game theory was developed by Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1944). It provides a 
framework or matrix within which strategic interaction between 'players' is studied. The 
central question in game theory is whether it makes sense to cooperate or to strive for 
quick profits. The premise is that players want to maximize their utility. 
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agency theory31 and transaction theory32. These three theories are all 
based on rational and utility-centric philosophy. In recent decades, more 
criticism has been leveled at this rational approach. Decisions are not 
taken purely on the basis of rational choices for the optimal solution 
(Simon, 1961), but also on the basis of greed, opportunism and self-
interest (Kogut & Zander, 1996), political considerations and events such 
as the formation of coalitions. Emotions like anger, shame, sadness and 
joy (Moghaddam & Studer, 1998) can play a role as well. Moreover, the 
rational approach does not take social knowledge into account. In the 
theoretical debate, a gradual shift is therefore taking place from a 
rational approach to a cultural perspective regarding corporate 
governance.  
Notably, relatively more research has been conducted on cultures in 
various countries, especially in developing countries, but relatively little is 
known about organizational culture within the financial sector in general 
or more specifically about actors in and around the boards of governance 
in the Dutch financial sector. Historically, anthropology is the field of 
science that has studied culture (Tennekes, 1995). As stated in the first 
chapter, organizational anthropology is the point of departure of the 
present study. Anthropology links up with the social-constructivist 
perspective. The organizational anthropologist Bate (1997) clarified this 
perspective by explaining the connection between the social and 
constructivist aspects. In a review article on the various organizational 
anthropological studies, he described the anthropological perspective as 
thinking about organizations from two worlds: the constructed world 
 
31 Agency theory emphasizes that the implementation of a union between a principal 
(owner or shareholder) and an agent (manager or director) does not always go smoothly 
because the interests of the shareholder do not correspond with the interests of the 
executive (Alchian & Demsets 1972; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). 
32 The transaction cost theory of Williamson (1975, 1981, 1985) is based on the premise 
that the costs of coordinating economic activity are decisive in the choice between 
market mechanisms and hierarchical organization. The choice between market and 
organization will be determined by which of these two alternatives involve the lowest 
transaction costs. Williamson (1975) has defined five factors relevant to making decisions 
about transactions: opportunism, small numbers, uncertainty, complexity and informa-
tion impactedness (Williamson, 1975). These factors have to do with the way 
organizations view their transaction costs and revenues. The motives that arise from this 
process are primarily geared to costs (budget-oriented), such as risk sharing, achieving 
economies of scale/efficiency and cost reduction. 
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and the social world. The Dutch anthropologist Koot (1995) stated that in 
the constructed world people themselves make sense of their 
organization, which means that they determine "to what extent they can 
accept new conceptions of reality and values to guide their behaviour" 
(Koot, 1995: 33). People make sense in their stories about their life 
situation and their relationships with others. The American anthropolo-
gist Geertz (1973) referred to the presentations of reality (interpretation 
frameworks, basic assumptions) and the prescripttions for reality (norms 
and values) on the basis of which people think and act. Bate (1997) used 
the term 'social world' to refer to the human aspects of the organization. 
He viewed organizations as social units consisting of people who talk, 
interact and negotiate with each other. Mead (1934), one of the founders 
of interactionism, also referred to the importance in theory of sense-
making (symbol) on the one hand, and the social context (interaction) on 
the other. During interactions in the relationship with significant others, a 
system for sensemaking emerges; as a result the interaction is under-
stood and structured. 
According to Weick et al. (2005), the process of sensemaking does not 
involve an accurate and verifiable answer, but a plausible argument. The 
researcher must empathize with the process of sensemaking of the 
actor, and place herself in the role and the mind-set of the subject. In this 
context, Veenswijk (1996) refers to shared sensemaking frameworks and 
value orientations. Sensemaking is the process of creating situational 
awareness and understanding in situations of great complexity and 
uncertainty. It is a motivated, continuous effort to understand connec-
tions between people, places and events in order to anticipate their 
processes and act effectively (Klein et al., 2006; Weick, 1995). As a result, 
it is important to study the interactions between actors in and around 
the boards of governance because this is where meanings are construc-
ted that subsequently determine the actions of the people involved. 
Berger and Luckman (1966) introduced the term social construction for 
this process. They assumed that the world is essentially meaningless, and 
is given meaning only by the observer. In other words, reality is a 
construction that takes place in a social context. The social context refers 
to the total environment or a specific situation in which sense is made of 
something. The present study focuses on the general context of the 
financial sector and specifically on two case studies, that of a bank and 
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that of a pension fund. In the present study, corporate governance is not 
viewed as a static concept, but as a dynamic one: people interact and 
exchange meanings about corporate governance, and they create corpo-
rate governance themselves.  
The social constructivist perspective reveals the importance of studying 
the process of sensegiving and sensemaking. In the scientific literature, 
discourse analysis is used to study this process. In this study into the 
sensemaking of the tensions in corporate governance, I essentially 
looked through a discursive lens at reality. According to Merkus (2014), 
the study of stories is very suitable for analysing the process of 
sensemaking, for two reasons. Firstly, plausibility is more important than 
accuracy: stories do not have to be accurate, as long as they are plausible 
and persuasive. Secondly, this makes it possible to tell multiple stories, 
which may be deviating and even conflicting about the same pheno-
menon in reality, without having to indicate that one story is 'truer' than 
the other. The objective of the narrative approach is to investigate the 
possibilities of discourses to produce and reproduce social reality. The 
researcher describes and analyses possible patterns, ideas and concepts 
that circulate in a social environment, and attempts to discover stable 
patterns that can signify something in the context in which they occur 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1993, 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). A 
discourse in this sense (in the framework of sensemaking) is therefore 
not part of language use itself. It is only a pattern in language use. Stories 
are thus seen as a cognitive framework that guides individuals in making 
sense of their experiences. However, narrative construction is not always 
based on text or statements, as argued by Bruner (1991). Actions (Chase, 
2005), material objects (Doolin, 2003) and images (Gaggiotti, 2012) are 
frequently used to build stories as well (Clandinin & Connelly, 1994).  
2.2 A narrative approach to corporate governance  
There are two approaches to discourse analysis: the linguistic approach 
and the narrative approach. The linguistic approach was inspired by De 
Saussure (1966), Wittgenstein (1976), Derrida (1967, 1972) and Chomsky 
(1957), and is closely related to linguistic theory. This approach makes 
language the topic of research by studying processes in the interpret-
tation of speaking and writing (Duijnhoven, 2010); it focuses on how 
people make sense. The linguistic approach analyses language at the 
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micro-level. Language users create meaning by relating their own texts 
and those of others to three contexts: the network of previously 
expressed texts, the surrounding world and social relationships. 
Adherents of the narrative approach, such as Boje (1991), Burke (1969), 
Czarniawska (1998), Gabriel (2000, 2004) and Gergen (1999), are not 
concerned with how people create meanings, as in the linguistic 
approach, but what people do with meanings: causing change and 
stopping change in textual, practical and social contexts. However, the 
boundary between the linguistic and narrative approach is not clearly 
demarcated (Pijnenburg, 2004), and the approaches do not exclude each 
other. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in this study, following the 
examples of Alvesson and Karreman (2000), Chia, (2000) Grant et al. 
(2004) Grant and Iedema (2005), Hardy et al. (2000), Keenoy et al. (2000) 
and Oswick et al. (2000), the narrative approach is emphasized.  
The narrative approach can be explained on the basis of the three layers 
of meaning. These are the analysis levels of organization discourse 
distinguished by Fairclough (1995), who was one of the founders of 
discourse analysis. He distinguished between discourse as text, discourse 
as discursive practice and discourse as social practice. The text dimen-
sion, also known as the micro-approach, concerns the analysis of text 
characteristics. The discursive practice and social practice dimensions are 
also known as the macro-approach. The discursive practice specifies how 
texts are produced and understood, thus investigating how text is 
generated, distributed, consumed and interpreted (Blommaert & 
Bulcaen, 2000). The social practice dimension concerns the cultural, 
sociological and ideological frameworks within which the interactions 
take place; it consists of discourses and other social elements that are 
part of a social practice (such as people and the material world). The 
social practice is bounded by norms and values, culture and patterns of 
expectation. This framework influences our use of language. In his work, 
Fairclough sought to explain how social structures give shape to dis-
courses and how this preserves or changes social practice. This dimen-
sion centres on the relationship between discourse and power. The 
narrative approach came about as a result of the researcher zooming in 
on the text or zooming out on the environment, and by connecting the 
micro-level and macro-level together (Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough 
postulated that during a discourse analysis, the researcher moves from 
Chapter 2  
48 
 
one analysis level to another at various times in order to arrive at a 
complete picture of interaction in a societal or ideological context. In the 
present study, I have focused primarily on the macro-level, especially the 
change between the discursive and social practice.  
Studies based on the narrative approach centre on discursive construc-
tions and institutionalization processes. In studying discursive construc-
tions, the researcher studies sensemaking of certain phenomena and 
how the given meaning are institutionalized. In other words, why is it 
that corporate governance exists in practice as it does? One example of a 
study based on the narrative approach to corporate governance is that 
of Brown (2005). When studying a report about the collapse of Barrings 
Bank, Brown discovered that the use of a certain type of language 
ensured that a public myth was created to limit the fear of the public. In 
addition, an explicit attempt was made to maintain the legitimacy of the 
Bank of England, the City of London and the existing regulatory 
structures. These types of studies are often classified as organizational 
discourse analysis. Alvesson and Karreman (2000), Chia (2000), Grant et 
al. (2004), Hardy et al. (2000), Keenoy et al. (2000) and Oswick et al. 
(2000) engaged in the discursive construction of organizational and 
institutionalization processes, and these studies are therefore sometimes 
classified as organization discourse analysis. I have based my research 
primarily on these studies. Hatch and Yanow (2003) argued that these 
studies are an attempt to conceptualize the organization in a more 
dynamic way. To them, the terminological shift from organization to 
organizing (Weick, 1995), embedding organizational stories in a specific 
sequence (Czarniawska, 1997) and the focus on the process rather than 
the content (Boje, 1991) are an indication of a fundamental reorientation 
in organization research.  
 
Hence, the ultimate theoretical contribution of this dissertation is two-
fold: through empirical study the development of more knowledge and 
understanding of corporate governance within the financial sector, and a 
conceptual improvement by developing a conceptual framework that 
can analyse the tensions of corporate governance. To analyse sense-
making, in this study I used a narrative lens, which is explained below.  
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2.3 Stories and narratives: the narrative lens  
In the literature about the narrative approach there is no consensus 
about the distinction between stories and narratives (Boje et al., 2004). 
Czarniawska (1998), Yanow (2000), Boje (2001) and Veenswijk (2006) 
have conceptualized the relationship between stories and narratives. 
Gabriel (2004) even argues that defining stories and narratives only 
serves to limit the concept. However, in the present qualitative study, a 
clear definition of both concepts is important to understand their role. 
Boje (2001) states that stories are built in a fragmented fashion that is 
difficult to interpret; stories become narratives only after they are 
chronologically ordered in a conscientious fashion (Metz, 2003). More-
over, Boje (2001) indicates that a narrative is intended to place the ‘soup’ 
of the collected stories into some kind of perspective. As explained by 
Weick (1995: 66): “[narratives] impose a formal coherence on what is 
otherwise a flowing soup”, while Bartel and Garud (2009) argue that 
narratives already have a plot and structure”. However, other authors 
use stories and narratives interchangeably (Bryant & Wolfram Cox, 
2004). For the purpose of the present study, I have adopted the 
definition of Flory and Iglesias (2010: 116-117): “Narrative is the reflective 
product of looking back and making sense of stories constructed to make 
sense of life”. Rhodes and Brown (2005) introduced the concept of 
narrative sensemaking, which emphasizes that stories and narratives are 
involved with creating a coherent snapshot of what is happening in 
organizations and which guides the actions of its members (Martin, 1992; 
Weick, 1995). This vision has a number of important advantages. For 
example, the narrative label can be attached to the personal, 
organizational or societal levels of narratives (Gabriel, 2004). In addition, 
multiple stories can be combined into narratives.  
An important term that has not yet been discussed in the context of the 
present study is storymaking. Storymaking is inextricably linked to sense-
making, which is in turn inextricably linked to language and communica-
tion. As part of storymaking, meaning is assigned to stories (Czarniawska, 
2004). Assigning meaning to stories is required to establish a framework 
of reference for future stories and actions (Boje, 2001; Gabriel, 1995; 
Ezzy, 2000; Ricoeur, 1984; Sonenshein, 2010; Vaara et al., 2006; Wagenaar 
Hartendorp, 2000; Weick et al., 2005). The most important function of a 
story is that it suggests unity (Hajer, 1995; Van Tatenhove et al., 2000). 
Chapter 2  
50 
 
Various authors have argued that stories are a powerful management 
tool for change (Humphreys & Brown, 2002; Doolin, 2003). Stories about 
organizations have the power to define good and bad behaviour. As a 
result, they influence the organizations' stories and the actions within 
organizations (Vaara et al., 2006). This is why stories that circulate in the 
public domain can support or impede stories and behaviour in organiza-
tions (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). The power and politics of stories 
focuses on the role of language and stories in the pursuit of hegemony 
and legitimacy (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Mumby, 1987, 2004). Stories can 
also ensure that people are better able to cope (a term from the 
narrative literature) with uncertainties. People can cope with situations 
by creating a story about the situation. As a result they can understand, 
in real time or in retrospect, their standpoint and actions and those of 
others in this specific situation (Brown & Humpreys, 2003; Czarniawska, 
1997; Gabriel, 2000; Hopkins, 2003; Tangherlini, 1998; Weick, 2001).  
The above may seem to indicate that stories are static, but the opposite 
is true. Some stories are told only once, while others are told multiple 
times and change over time (Tesselaar et al., 2008). Stories are not only 
descriptive but also prescriptive: they tell us what is important, what we 
must pay attention to, what we should be worried about and what will 
happen if we don't take action (Forester, 1999). At the same time, stories 
can be unpredictable, characterized by inconsistency and many paradoxi-
cal ingredients (Yanow, 2006a). Stories thus have a certain observability 
(Czarniawska, 1992; Boje, 2001), but that does not mean that they are 
always visible and recognizable. They can also be vague, implicit, 
unobserved, ambiguous or misinterpreted (Gabriel, 2000; Czarniawska, 
1997). There are various types of stories. Duijnhoven (2010) makes a 
distinction between four types of stories. The first type of story is 
associated with every problem: the basic construct or basic story, also 
referred to as a grand narrative, which is accepted to a greater or lesser 
extent. The second type of story is the reactive story or counter-story 
also referred to as a counter narrative. The third type is the story that is 
deliberately generated for research purposes, such as stories in 
interviews and observation reports. The fourth and final type of story 
consists of texts that are based on the interpretation of the researcher. 
Duijnhoven (2010) concludes that with this latter type of story, the 
discursive power of academic texts must not be underestimated. In the 
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methodological chapter (Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.5), Type 3 and Type 4 
stories are discussed. Type 1 and Type 2 stories, i.e. the grand narratives 
and the counter narratives, are used in the theoretical framework of the 
present study. Every problem has a grand narratives or a basic story that 
is accepted to a greater or lesser extent. Besides these two types of 
stories, following the example of De Heer et al. (2010), I have added 
another type of story: the alternative interpretation, which I refer to as 
the subordinate narratives. These narratives are subordinate to the grand 
narratives. The more powerful the grand narratives, the less room is 
available for subordinate narratives. On the other hand, a powerful basic 
construct also elicits counter stories, or counter narratives, more quickly. 
By looking through this narrative lens and making a distinction between 
grand narratives, subordinate narratives and counter narratives, we can 
acquire insight into the expressive power and appeal of grand narratives. 
De Heer et al. (2010) refer to this as narrative power.  
 
Looking through the narrative lens is therefore looking at three types of 
narratives and how they relate to each other. Within these three types of 
stories –grand narratives, subordinate narratives and counter narratives– 
I have examined three narrative concepts, which are explained below. 
2.4 Narrative concepts  
The three narrative concepts are based on the macro-approach, also 
known as the discursive and social practice of Fairclough (1995: 98) 
(Section 2.2). The discursive practice specifies how texts are produced 
and understood, thus investigating how text is produced, distributed, 
consumed and interpreted (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). This does not 
concern structuring by means of framing or textualization or institu-
tionalization; it is about manifesting. Relational meanings exist not only 
in textual patterns, discourse coalitions and institutions, but they can also 
be found in tangible actions and interactions of people. The concept of 
manifesting therefore points to the semantic function of attitude, 
gesture, appearance, images, style and all other ways to create meaning 
without using a coded system of symbols such as language. The discur-
sive practice is studied based on worldview and mode of practice. These 
concepts are explained in detail below. The social practice dimension 
refers to the framework within which the interactions take place, and is 
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delineated by aspects such as norms, values, culture and expectation 
patterns. In this way language use allocates responsibilities, expecta-
tions, status, praise, guilt, rejection, stimuli, barriers, options and oppor-
tunities for the persons involved: senders, receivers, addressees, auditors 
and third parties (Te Molder, 1995; Tilly, 2002). This framework, in turn, 
influences the language use on a specific topic. In the present study, the 
social practice is studied based on institutional framework, applied to 
actors in and around the boards of governance of BPF and Florabank. 
These institutional framework are explained extensively below. In the 
present study, the three narrative concepts are viewed as constructivist 
concepts; this concerns not what these narrative concepts are, but what 
they do. From the anthropological perspective of the present study, the 
focus is indeed on the symbolic context within which the actions people 
can be understood. In this constructivist vision, the narrative concepts do 
not have will-delineated content. The three narrative concepts are 
mutable and are a result of continuous processes of social interaction. 
These concepts are a way to look at how actors in and around the boards 
of governance negotiate about the meaning and interpretation of 
corporate governance. The combination of these concepts were derived 
from Koerten (2011). Although the key concepts such as actors, 
environment and practice are the same, the narrative concepts in both 
studies differ. The concepts do not have a specific sequence, but for 
purposes of readability I have used the above sequence in the remainder 
of this dissertation.  
The first narrative concept, the worldview, refers to actors or groups. 
Bruner (1996, p. xiv) argues that through narratives, cultures create and 
express their worldviews and provide models of identity and agency to 
their members. In their studies on written texts in Business Management, 
such as in the Harvard Business Review, Gabriel (2000, 2004) and Boje 
(1991, 2001) give examples of the worldview held by top managers. The 
worldview is about the existence of the actor also expressed as being. 
The question here is the following: who are the actors in and around the 
boards of governance? Their background, their upbringing and their 
reference framework are aspects that impact a person's thinking. The 
interest in this narrative concept is related to the fact that a person's 
view of humanity determines their thinking and behaviour within 
organizations (Kaats & Opheij, 2008).  
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The institutional framework is the second narrative concept. People act 
within pre-determined scripts. The institutional framework provides 
guidance for taking action within a specific space, but is also an obstacle 
to action. The actors are guided by the institutional framework. The core 
assumption of the institutional framework is that there is a dynamic 
interplay between individual and macro-phenomenological levels of 
analysis. Institutional frameworks are the products of shared beliefs and 
values in a community of individuals (Weick, 1995). These institutional 
frameworks say something about values in the organization. The choice 
for this concept is related to the following questions: Do actors have 
different organizational frameworks in different organizations, or are 
they the same? Hence, are there observable differences between the 
organizational framework of a bank and those of a pension fund?  
The third narrative concept, mode of practice, refers to what Koerten 
(2011) called the reflection of practice. This concerns the narrative 
patterns from which people take action. Weick (1979) has shown that the 
actions of managers (executives) create the raw material for organizing. 
According to Weick, managers or executives can therefore take action 
without knowing exactly why, and then wait until things become clear. 
However, the present study focuses less on the narrative patterns and 
more on the intention of the practice or the action. This narrative 
concept is about acting. 
 
Figure 2.1 is a schematic presentation of the above-mentioned three 
concepts, which are strongly interrelated. This figure was derived from 
De Heer et al. (2010: 15); although the figure is the same, the narrative 
concepts in both studies differ. The concepts in this figure are based on 
Bruner (1996), Gabriel (2000, 2004), Boje (1991, 2001), Weick (1995), and 
Koerten (2011). In the present study, based on discussions with the actors 
involved and on document analysis, the narratives of corporate 
governance within a bank and a pension fund are explored. These 
narratives not only concerns events and the behaviours of actors in and 
around the boards of governance, but also provide information about 
norms, values and basic assumptions that affect corporate governance 
within the corresponding bank and pension fund. In the narrative model 
of the present study, explicit attention is paid to various experiences and 
beliefs of people regarding corporate governance. The narrative model 
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takes account of the ambiguities and tensions within and between the 
various stories and narratives about corporate governance.  
 
Figure 2.1 The narrative model of this study  
In summary, by looking to the actors who are involved with corporate 
governance, their organizational environment and the intention with 
which they act, the tensions in corporate governance can be ascertained 
and studied. To provide more insight into how the narrative concepts 
have been investigated in the present study, each of these concepts is 
operationalized below. 
2.4.1 Worldview  
Groups of employees develop beliefs and assumptions about the daily 
course of affairs, how to deal with corporate management and the 
behaviour during changes. According to Schein33 (1985, 2006), these 
underlying assumptions are the foundation or essence of the organiza-
tional culture. Because they are implicit, the underlying assumptions, 
unlike the upper levels of artefacts and espoused values, are extremely 
difficult to change. The underlying assumptions are deeply rooted and 
develop slowly; they often disappear from conscious awareness. Schein 
 
33 Schein is known for his organizational culture model and provides guidance for 
achieving a change in culture.  
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(1985, 2006) stated that challenges or problems are times when the 
organizational culture is put to the test, and when new basic assump-
tions can emerge. These are also times during which stories are created 
that are told by new leaders. Basic assumptions are regarded the 
ultimate sources of values and actions. The Dutch anthropologist 
Tennekes used the term 'conceptions of reality', which refers to people's 
knowledge of the reality in which they live and the possibilities that are 
available to them (Tennekes, 1995).  
To investigate the basic assumptions and conceptions of reality of 
corporate governance, it is important to identify the lens with which one 
is currently looking at reality; this is known as the worldview. In the 
present study, the worldview of corporate governance has been divided 
into two ideal types. These ideal types are Weberian constructs, of which 
the components together represent the essence of a particular pheno-
menon (Weber, 1972a, 1972b, 1978; Zijderveld, 2000). The ideal types do 
not exist in social reality, but can manifest themselves to a greater or 
lesser extent. Insight into the simultaneous effect of these various ideal 
types can provide a valuable contribution. This was endorsed by Parker 
(2000) in the paradox he formulated his book Organizational Culture and 
Identity:  
 
All organizations are the same, in the sense that they often share 
common categories of understanding –cultures of management or 
cultures of masculinity for example– but all organizations are also 
different because of their local combination and articulation of 
these categories (Parker, 2000: 82).  
 
By using both ideal types, researchers can map out the tensions and 
provide a theoretical yardstick. Below is a description of the two ideal 
types of the worldview of corporate governance. 
The first ideal type is based on the assumption that the executive board 
determines the strategy, the objectives and the guidelines, as well as 
makes the choices, and the rest of the organization endorses these 
choices and follows them carefully. Monitoring and supervision are 
primarily focused on this basic principle. Other characteristics of this 
Newtonian thinking are control, rationality, competition, optimization of 
capital, linear thinking, creating order and limitation (Bommerez & 
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Hoppenbrouwers, 2007). By looking at reality via the Newtonian world-
view, one assumes closed models in which the alternatives and 
conditions are known. 
The second ideal type is based on the assumption that it is not always 
possible create a model of an organization. This has to do with the 
steadily increasing complexity and dynamics in society, such as the 
developments and possibilities related to the Internet. According to 
estimates, more information becomes available each year via the 
Internet than all the information in the past 5000 years. Designing a 
model that accounts for such complex conditions and rapid develop-
ments is difficult, if not impossible. Although Bommerez and Hoppen-
bouwers (2007) present chaos theory as an alternative to the Newtonian 
worldview in this research the term holistic worldview is used. Chaos 
theory is based on the idea that everything is a component of a larger 
whole and that the whole is more than the sum of the individual 
components. Although the Newtonian worldview doesn’t contradict 
chaos theory, it takes a broader perspective, nearby matching the scope 
of the Newtonian worldview. Other important elements in this holistic 
worldview concern the optimization of people and capital, sensation, 
freedom, unpredictability, mutual relationships, openness, understan-
ding and flexibility (Bommerez & Hoppenbrouwers, 2007). Although it 
appears that this thinking is disordered, this is not true; it relies very 
heavily on the self-correcting, self-organizing and self-correcting capa-
city34 of people. In this ideal type, differences, conflicts, power and 
interests are part of the day-to-day reality. Power no longer remains with 
the manager, but disseminates to individuals and the environment. 
Continually varying groups of individuals become established around 
specific themes that appeal to them. It is not management that governs 
the organization; one governs the organization by providing individuals 
with the maximum amount of freedom (Fox, 1966). In the second ideal 
type, holistic worldview, order and balance are created by mutual 
dependency. Various interest groups are in conflict, but they cooperate 
 
34 Tetenbaum (1998) described five principles that establish the basis for the control and 
initiation of self-organization: organizing and sharing knowledge and information, 
organizing creativity and innovation focusing on teamwork and projects, organizing 
diversity and ensuring strong core values.  
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at the same time. This process is based on a struggle between 
sensemaking and harmonization of the meaning.  
2.4.2 Institutional framework 
In Sections 2.2 and 2.4 the relationship between the social practice of 
Fairclough and the institutional framework is explained. According to 
Fairclough, it is precisely the social practice that leads to change. 
Therefore this dimension was included in the present study. Social 
practice concerns the idea of contextualization, the situational context, 
the institutional practices in which events occur and the larger whole of 
society and culture. There is an interaction between social structures and 
the internalized mind-set of individuals. This refers to the interaction 
within the actor-structure debate (Giddens, 1979, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977, 
1984). Behaviour and structure are indeed related to each other. Due the 
socialization process and other aspects, individuals rely on the social 
structure for support, but with their actions they can also change this 
social structure. The social structure not only imposes limitations on 
actions, but it also makes actions possible. Like Giddens (1984), in the 
present study I have focussed on the emancipated actor with limited 
freedom and with personal responsibility. By taking action, actors can 
change things in the surrounding world. Their freedom of action is 
constrained by limitations, which may or may not be acknowledged, and 
also by the unforeseen and unintended consequences of individual 
action. 
In this context, Koerten (2011) stated that in this changing world, we are 
searching for reliable anchors. These anchors are beliefs that give us 
stability in our thinking (Bergson, 1946; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Weick, 
1995). According to Koerten (2011), these anchors are the foundation of 
how to act. A study conducted by Garfinkel (1984) shows that people are 
aware of these anchors, that they provide confidence, and when they are 
not used correctly, people become uneasy. These anchors ensure that 
we know which action is required in a specific situation. For example, 
consider how bankers in the higher echelons are dressed or how they 
speak to each other during meetings. These anchors can be viewed as a 
space for action. The present study focuses on organizational anchors. 
The organizational anchors create an institutional framework. This 
framework affects the behaviour of people within the organization. It 
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derives its sanctioned effect from “various types of carriers, including 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts” (Scott 
2001: 48). The reliance on such carriers distinguishes institutions from 
frameworks of sensemaking: these frameworks exist only as patterns in 
language use and thought, while institutions are expected to establish 
patterns such as laws, values and categories (in symbolic systems), 
governance systems, regimes and identities (in relational systems), 
protocols and professions (in routines) and objects that already 
correspond to these patterns (artefacts) (Scott 2001)35.  
One way to identify the institutional framework is to look at the process 
of institutionalization. As part of institutionalization, text is transformed 
into something material, but also into something symbolic, relational and 
routine. Scott (2001) described regulative, cognitive and normative 
characteristics of institutions.  
 
In Table 2.1, the characteristics of institutions such as ordering mecha-
nisms, mechanistic philosophy, indicators and legitimacy base are speci-
fied as regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive processes of institu-
tions. DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Scott (2001) and Selznick (1948) have 
all concluded that the three processes must be studied simultaneously. 
Each process has different forms of legitimacy. In the regulatory process, 
rules about utility compel compliance, otherwise sanctions are imposed; 
in the normative process, it is a social obligation to live up to the binding 
expectations such as certification and accreditation; and in cultural 
processes, shared beliefs and practices ensure that the generally 
accepted, shared belief is complied with through imitation. In summary, 
by looking at the process of institutionalization, the institutional 
framework of BPF and Florabank can be identified. 
 
 
 
 
35 This demonstrates the usefulness of a narrow, precise definition of discourse, whether 
this applies to language-in-use or frameworks of sensemaking (pattern in language). If 
that does not happen, then discourse analysis and institutional analysis become 
competitive theoretical approaches in the definition of concepts. Even a narrow 
definition of the concept of framework of sensemaking (or discourse) as a virtual pattern 
in language leads to some overlap with the concept of institution. 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of institutions (Scott 2001: 52) 
Characteristics 
of institutions 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Compliance Utility Social obligation Generally accepted, 
shared belief 
Organizing 
mechanism 
Regulative 
rules 
Binding 
expectations 
Constitutive schemes 
Mechanisms Force Normative Mimetic (imitative) 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Normative 
Certification 
Accreditation  
Shared beliefs and 
practices 
Legitimacy base Legally 
enforced 
Morally 
governed  
Comparable, visible to 
others and culturally 
supported.  
 
The regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive characteristics show that 
habits, morals and interests –as unintended side effects– produce and 
transform unequal relationships. The following example is from practice. 
An executive has the habit of always informing the participants’ council 
afterwards and not beforehand. This habit produces or reproduces the 
relationship between the executive and the participants’ council. The 
everyday reproduction proceeds more or less subconsciously according 
to the following mechanism: ‘that's just how we do it.’ In other words: 
habits, morals, solidarity and interests are not intended to distribute the 
decision power unequally, but as a matter of course to stabilize this 
power as the status quo. Changes in habits, morals and interest usually 
take place unintentionally over the long term; such changes are the 
mechanisms that make it possible to change or destabilize social 
inequality. Bader and Benschop (1989) state that there are mechanisms 
which focus explicitly on maintaining or changing the unequal status quo. 
They refer to aspects such as convention, justice and legitimacy. These 
mechanisms are based on clear rules in the strict sense of the word, for 
example norms that claim to be valid and binding. One example is the 
right of consent of the works council regarding an important 
organizational change or the appointment of the Director. This right of 
consent ensures that a works council has control over major issues that 
affect individual employees. These mechanisms take effect emphatically 
in the foreground only during crisis situations, when the balance of 
Chapter 2  
60 
 
power is subject to explicit discussion. In that case they can focus on 
assurance or on change. And when changes take place, they usually 
occur unintentionally and over the long term. According to Koerten 
(2011), however, anchors can play a role in the analysis of change. They 
must be identified in order to shed light on how they connect with the 
other narrative concepts (Koerten, 2011).  
2.4.3 Mode of practice 
In contrast to classical organizational thought, in which the manager can 
take action only if it is clear what the problems are for which he must 
have a solution, Weick (1979) has shown that the actions of managers 
(executives) create the raw material for organizing. According to Weick, 
managers or executives can therefore take action without knowing 
exactly why, and then wait until things become clear. Weick's (1979) 
most important message is that we must view organizations as processes 
in which people act together to give shape and meaning to that which 
they create in interaction with each other. At the same time, Weick 
emphasizes the evolutionary character of the processes and the retro-
spective character of the sense of purpose: that which develops by 
means of evolution is understood afterwards. To operationalize the 
action afterwards (acting responsibly), in the present study I looked at 
either the justification of the action or the argumentation of the actors. 
Justification is a rational process that takes place when actors include an 
argument in their story that is intended to persuade other actors. To 
operationalize this process, in the present study I used the discourse 
ethics of Habermas (1984, 1987). However (Habermas acknowledges this 
himself) the term discourse ethics is poorly chosen, because it concerns 
morality, not ethics. Therefore, it is better to refer to the "discourse 
theory of morality". Nevertheless, Habermas has continued to use the 
term discourse ethics because it has become so common, focussing on 
the moral issues and disregarding the ethical issues that continue to exist 
at the level of the private contextual worldview. Due to my search for 
insight in the present study, I chose the moral issues in part because they 
make the claim of universality, and the ethical issues do not. Habermas 
assumed two ideal types of responsible action: strategic action in the 
systems world and communicative action in the lifeworld (Habermas, 
1987).  
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The systems world is a set of structures that people have developed to 
achieve objectives. In the systems world, people act strategically to 
achieve the objective or the result. Relationships are instrumental, and 
utility is an important value. Strategic action has the objective of causing 
a change in another person. This can be both positive (directive, guiding) 
and negative (manipulative). Strategic action is result-oriented. By acting 
strategically, it is possible to cause a certain discourse to prevail above 
another discourse. In her dissertation, Berendse (2013) discussed the 
discursive strategies with which actors attempt to make a specific 
repertoire of stories dominate and marginalize other stories. She 
presented three discursive strategies: stories about the past, present and 
future, stories about success and failure, and humorous stories. Other 
strategies, referred to as coping strategies, include denial of disturbing 
events, justifying dysfunctional events or explaining oddities as 
exceptions to which the general rule does not apply. Due to the variety 
of discourses, controversies occur, and discourses with opposing ideas 
and interests clash (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). Much of this power 
struggle is equivalent to a language dispute. The language dispute has 
rhetorical elements with which other participants can be persuaded 
about the correctness of a specific discourse, but this does not have to 
be an entirely objective truth (White, 1990). These attempts to influence 
other actors are a component of verbal persuasion (Chilton & Schäffner, 
1997). This often occurs by means of manipulative language use (Hajer, 
2000). By persuading and manipulating other participants, a discourse 
can become more dominant and can guide the decision-making process. 
Discourses and methods of persuasion are characterized not only by the 
language use of the proponents; symbols, figures, facts and so forth can 
also be exploited to manipulate decision-making (Stone, 2002). These 
means are carefully selected to give shape to the discourse and to 
influence the decision-making process. For example, this is also done by 
‘impartial’ actors, who attempt to create order in the social chaos 
(Torgerson, 2003). It is difficult to analyse the influence of a discourse on 
the decision-making process due to the abstract character of the 
concept. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify differences in discourse 
and forms of verbal persuasion. Proof of the dominance of a discourse 
becomes manifest when specific actors are compelled to conform to an 
idea or viewpoint that deviates from their original interest (Hajer, 2000). 
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In the lifeworld, in contrast, communicative action is central. Habermas 
viewed ‘communicative action’ as the basic form of social interaction 
(Kunneman, 1985). He placed this concept in opposition to 'strategic 
action', which focuses on achieving the objective and on one's own 
success. In his writings, Habermas expresses a preference for relatively 
open possible exchange of arguments in a world in which power 
relations play as small a role as possible. 
Parties on both sides of the discussion assume that what they are saying 
is valid. This mode of practice is essentially unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. After all, one cannot estimate how people will respond to 
the action, what will occur as a result of the action or what significance 
can be attributed to the action. Moreover, the practice cannot be 
reversed. When claims are challenged, one must shift to discourse. This 
should also have the character of a dialogue. However Habermas' theory 
focuses on rational thought processes. According to Habermas, actors 
can in principle reach rationally-grounded consensus when they continue 
to act communicatively provided they do so in a world where power 
relations play as small a role as possible. Accordingly, he advocated 
providing space for the story of the other. Within an organization, 
creating space for communicative action and a dialogue where power 
relation are (temporarily) minimized not only increases the quality of 
stories, but also improves the quality of social interactions, and corporate 
culture as a whole. In this context, it is interesting that Boje (2001) stated 
that a storytelling organization is a contrived construction of 
instrumentally recounted realities in which the counter stories destroy 
the official stories. Indeed, Boje (2001) asserted that managementstyle 
controlling stories and counter stories destroy each other. In the present 
study, it is important to distinguish these types of stories in order to 
acquire more insight into the tensions in corporate governance.  
Besides the two ideal types of Habermas, the four conditions that 
Habermas (1987) used to create an ideal discussion situation are 
explained below. This ideal discussion situation refers indirectly to the 
process of producing, disseminating, consuming and interpreting text or 
to the discursive practice. During the interaction between actors in and 
around the boards of governance, meanings are indeed exchanged. In 
the present study, the normative insights of Habermas have been used as 
theoretical handles. First of all, Habermas stated that the communication 
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must not be disturbed by external factors. All actors must have an equal 
opportunity to participate in the discussion. Secondly, not only the 
assertions, conclusions, explanations, interpretations, ideas and sugges-
tions of all actors must be heard, but also their questions, doubts and 
criticisms. Thirdly, during the discussion between the actors, no power 
relationships should exist that could cause specific arguments to be 
deliberately avoided or to acquire an unassailable character. Finally, all 
actors must be honest in their intentions, so they cannot manipulate 
each other. This concerns preventing the coercion that could emerge 
from the structure of communication. It is only when all of these 
conditions are met that there can be a critical-rational (fair) discussion 
situation in which all arguments are weighed rationally against each 
other. Habermas referred to this as communicative symmetry.  
2.5 Towards a conceptual framework  
The literature study into the sensemaking of tensions in corporate 
governance resulted in a theoretical framework which centres on stories 
and narratives. The social constructivist point of departure of the present 
study has ensured that corporate governance is viewed as a process of 
providing meaning and sense of purpose in the dynamics of everyday 
interactions in and around organizations. Providing meaning and sense of 
purpose are key to the narrative approach, which is the approach in this 
study. In this narrative approach, stories and narratives not only provide 
data for analysis, but are the core of the theoretical part of this study. 
From the above it is clear that stories and narratives in this study can be 
considered as narrative constructions that are continually subject to 
change. In this study I have looked at the grand narratives, subordinate 
narratives and the counter narratives of corporate governance. The three 
types of stories are a means to look at how actors in and around the 
boards of governance make sense of corporate governance and which 
tensions play a role in this process. In other words, by studying the 
stories of actors in and around the boards of governance, one can come 
closer to the process of sensemaking of tensions in corporate 
governance. By linking this narrative lens to three narrative concepts –
worldview, institutional framework and mode of practice– one can 
acquire more insight into the process of sensemaking in corporate 
governance.  
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The worldview concerns the assumptions that form the basis of the 
perception, thinking and action of actors in an organization. To investi-
gate the assumptions of corporate governance, it is important to know 
through which lens one is currently looking at reality; this is the 
worldview. The worldview is divided into two ideal types: Newtonian 
thinking and holistic thinking. The institutional framework offers a certain 
stability and predictability, but also offers renewal. To identify the 
anchors, in this study I used the process of institutionalization. The 
theory of Scott (2001) on the regulative, normative and culture-cognitive 
characteristics of organizations concerns the effect of the various 
characteristics and the changes that take place in the social practice. 
Mode of practice refers to the reflection of practice. Actors can take 
action to confirm their roles, but they can also take action to change 
things. According to Weick, executives should not think too much about 
the cause of the practice, but simply take action and determine after-
wards whether it worked or not. To operationalize this reflective action, 
in the present study I used the two ideal types of responsible action 
(Habermas, 1987): strategic action in the systems world and communi-
cative action in the lifeworld.  
 
By linking the three types of stories to the narrative concepts, a narrative 
table is created, which serves as a theoretical point of departure for the 
analysis (Table 2.2). This narrative table is the conceptual framework of 
this study. This means that this study focuses on the data collection 
through three types of narratives, namely grand narratives, subordinate 
narratives and counter narratives. Within these types of narratives this 
study will focus on three narrative concepts: worldview, institutional 
framework and mode of practice. Although this narrative table can 
elucidate the sensemaking of the tensions in corporate governance at 
BPF and Florabank, this theoretical approach also has limitations. First of 
all, this conceptual framework is a simplified representation of reality. 
Although it can be used to identify fields of tension and provide a 
theoretical yardstick, this framework has the potential limitation of 
paying insufficient attention to the complexities of reality. Secondly, this 
theory also comprises a philosophical idea, both implicitly and explicitly. 
This also is not a full representation of reality. Thirdly, although it seems 
that the present study was focused on observable stories, it actually 
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concerned invisible stories. This means that much attention had to be 
paid to data collection and data analysis. Fourthly, in this type of 
qualitative research, the researcher herself is an important instrument. 
Without a methodological framework, personal preferences could 
compromise the research. Therefore the next chapter presents an 
extensive methodological framework in which the research methods and 
the methodological consequences of the social-constructivist perspec-
tive and the narrative approach are addressed.  
 
Table 2.2 Conceptual framework of this study  
Case study BPF Florabank 
Type of 
narratives 
World
view 
Institutional 
framework 
Mode of 
practice 
World
view 
Institutional 
framework 
Mode of 
practice 
Grand 
narrative              
Subordinate 
narrative             
Counter 
narrative              
 
In summary, by developing a conceptual framework this section has 
answered the first reseach question of this study: How is the concept of 
sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance operationalized in the 
literature? This conceptual framework is the theoretical basis of the study 
and is used primarily to analyze the findings. This conceptual framework 
returns In Chapter 6, in which the analysis is presented.  
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3  Research methodology  
In the previous chapter the first research question of this study was 
answered based on a review of the relevant literature. This chapter is 
about the philosophical foundations on which this study was based and 
their methodological consequences. Section 3.1 outlines the philosophi-
cal stance of this study according to ontological and epistemological 
standpoints. Section 3.2 focusses on the organizational anthropological 
research design and the qualitative data collection and data analysis 
strategy. The methodological consequences of the choices from the 
previous sections, the research aim and research questions are 
discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 addresses the ethical considera-
tions. Section 3.5 focusses on data collection and data analysis, and the 
quality of the data is discussed in terms of reliability and validity. 
Section 3.6 focusses on the reflections about and limitations of this 
study. This chapter, like the previous chapters, closes with a synthesis.  
3.1 The interpretive scientific paradigm 
Chapter 2 has zoomed in on the central topic of this study: corporate 
governance. The chapter introduced the narrative approach and focus on 
the sensemaking of tensions of corporate governance. This section 
explains the philosophical foundations on which the methodology was 
based. The starting point of this study (Section 2.1) is consistent with the 
social constructivist perspective: social reality is constructed through 
interactions between people. The importance of this way of thinking is 
not so much that it looks at the justification of scientific knowledge 
claims, but at the social and psychological aspects of the paradigm. One 
of the most renowned philosophers, Kuhn (1962), places science in a 
historical and sociological context. Scientists do not describe a world, 
they create one; according to Kuhn, we should understand science as a 
social construct. In this context it is important to understand and unravel 
corporate governance in the financial sector. The research aim is there-
fore to acquire insight into the sensemaking about corporate governance 
by actors in and around the boards of governance (Section 1.5). Kuhn 
(1962) also proposed the idea that science does not evolve gradually, but 
changes abruptly by means of paradigm shifts. Therefore, various actors 
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in and around the financial sector are the research entities of this study. 
As can be read in Section 2.1, the present study differs from other studies 
on corporate governance due to its specific philosophical assumptions 
regarding the character and distinguishability of organizational reality 
and other social realities (Yanow, 2000; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006a, 
2006b; Ybema et al., 2009). Based on the two philosophical approaches 
for understanding the reality that is to be studied ontology and episte-
mology. This section discusses each of these in turn.  
Ontology is the first philosophical standpoint from which to view science. 
This standpoint provides insight into how researchers look at reality. 
Snape and Spencer (2003) distinguished three ontological positions: 
realism, materialism and idealism. Based on Snape and Spencer, Table 3.1 
clarifies these three ontological positions. In the present study, these 
positions are considered to be extremes on a continuum, as many 
intermediate variants are possible. All kinds of positions are also possible 
within realism, but in the present study I have used this simplified 
classification. 
  
Table 3.1 Three positions in ontology (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 11) 
Ontological position Description 
Realism Realism argues that an external reality exists 
independently of the beliefs and views of people.  
Materialism Materialism also claims that there is a real world, but 
reality consists only of its material characterristics, 
such as economic relations, or its physical 
characteristics.  
Idealism Idealism argues that reality can be known only by 
means of the human spirit and socially constructed 
meanings.  
 
When the description of the three positions is related to the central 
topics of this study –sensemaking, sensegiving and interaction– then it 
becomes clear that idealism is the most suitable ontological position 
from which to view reality. Berger and Luckmann (1966) emphasized the 
shared or collective aspect of the process of constructing reality. In the 
present study, the following ontological position is taken: the reality of 
corporate governance is constructed by the actors in and around the 
boards of governance. Sensemaking about corporate governance is an 
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ongoing part of the socially constructed meanings in interactions. In the 
present study, reality is considered to be subjective. This provides insight 
into the various realities of the actors in and around the boards of 
governance at the actor level. In this way it is not only possible to 
observe the processes of sensemaking, sensegiving and interaction 
separately, but also in relationship to each other. The social behaviour of 
people is a product of what they think about the events around them and 
the meanings that they attribute to the behaviour of others. The present 
study also endorses idealism, in contrast to the majority of studies on 
corporate governance. Most studies have endorsed the materialistic or 
realistic position. Notable examples include studies on the effectiveness 
and performance of corporate governance (Larkcer, Richardson & Tuna, 
2007; Peni & Vähämaa, 2011). 
 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions are closely related, due 
to the fact that ontology has consequences for the explication of 
knowledge development (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006b). According to 
Martin (2002), epistemology concerns the nature of reality, “how we 
know about how things are” (Martin, 2002: 30). In response, Snape and 
Spencer (2003: 13) argued that epistemology concerns the manner of 
knowing and learning in the social world and focusing on questions such 
as “how can we know about reality and what is the basis of our 
knowledge?” In accordance with Snape and Spencer (2003), in Table 3.2 
an epistemological dichotomy is used to describe the relationship 
between the researcher and reality, i.e. positivism and interpretivism. 
Again, these are two extremes on a continuum where many intermediate 
variants are possible. Since the focus is on understanding the world of 
corporate governance, how actors in and around the boards of 
governance construct corporate governance, idealism is the ontological 
stance, which supports this study. 
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Table 3.2 Epistemological classification (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 16) 
Tradition Positivism Interpretivism 
Basic 
assumptions 
about reality 
The world is not affected by 
the researcher. 
Facts and values are 
different. 
The researcher and the social 
world influence each other.  
Facts and values are 
indistinguishable.  
Result Observations give the final 
word (observable social 
reality). 
Findings are influenced by the 
perspective and value 
assessment of the researcher.  
Aim Minimize the influence of the 
researcher within the study; 
the investigator assumes the 
role of the objective analyst.  
No objectivity is possible. 
There is no object of research, 
there are research subjects. 
The task of the researcher is 
to figure out this subjective 
reality.  
Research 
methods 
Use generalizations based on 
scientific laws, similar to 
research performed in the 
exact sciences. Use 
structured methodology to 
facilitate replication 
(repeatability, laws, 
hypothesis testing).  
One assumes the complexity 
and uniqueness of a particular 
circumstance and individual. 
This raises questions about 
the generalizability of 
research that tries to capture 
the rich complexity of social 
situations. Generalizability is 
not important.  
 
The social constructivist perspective of the present study has a direct link 
with interpretivism. The word says it all: interpretivism means searching 
for the interpretations that people give to social phenomena or 
situations. Instead of individual structures in the minds of people, social 
reality is understood only when it is constructed in social interaction 
(Czarniawska, 2001; Fine et al., 2009; Marshak & Heracleous, 2005; 
Veenswijk, 2001; Yanow, 2006b). In line with this, Swanborn stated that 
individuals do not respond initially to the direct actions of people with 
whom they interact, but to the presumed meaning behind the actions 
(Swanborn, 1981). The supporters of the interpretative approach share 
an appreciation for the role of language. They consider language as a 
form of communicative action that is constructed rather than reflective, 
representative or instrumental (Heracleous, 2004; Philipps & Hardy, 
2002). This focus on language has also increased the interest in the 
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narrative perspective by the supporters of the interpretative approach. 
The ontological and epistemological position of the present study is 
expressed through the application of the narrative approach that is 
central to the data analysis and data presentation (Section 3.5). 
3.2 The research design: an organizational anthropology 
approach  
The research design of this study is grounded in an organizational 
anthropology approach. Consequently, this study is qualitative in nature 
in accordance with idealism and takes on interpretivism as a philo-
sophical standpoint. In order to understand how actors in and around the 
boards of governance interpret and make sense of corporate govern-
ance, an organizational anthropology approach was chosen. In contrast 
to many other scientific disciplines, organizational anthropology pays 
much attention to history, context and processes (Bate, 1997). The 
context in organizational anthropology studies refers to the circum-
stances in which something is done, in response to which a story was 
told, along with the previous history (Ten Have, 1977). In light of the 
central research question, the decision whether or not to include context 
is crucial. In Chapters 4 and 5, the two case studies with their correspond-
ding context are described. There is also a specific focus on the history 
and processes of both case studies (Section 4.2.1 and Section 5.1.2). 
Based on Smith's (1998) definition, the aim of this anthropological study 
is to use a very accurate qualitative data set to unravel the culture or the 
way of life of actors in and around the boards of governance. This study 
focuses on the thinking, beliefs and actions of the actors in and around 
the boards or governance.  
Besides its holistic viewpoint (Section 1.5), anthropology has two ways of 
looking at reality: from an emic and etic perspective (Martin, 2002). Etic 
stands for an external perspective and emic for an internal perspective. 
Various authors have indicated that a distinction should be made 
between these two extremes (Martin, 2002; Schein, 2006). In accordance 
with the anthropologist Narayan (1993) in her article entitled “How 
Native is a 'Native' Anthropologist?”, in the present study I have assumed 
that anthropologists are never completely insiders or outsiders. These 
are intertwined movements. At the same time, the perspectives alternate 
as well.  
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In the present study, I have explored the daily lives of actors in and 
around the executive board, which is the emic perspective. In this 
process, I looked at how people experience power relations and how 
actors in and around the boards of governance give sense to and make 
sense of corporate governance. In this way I collected the routines, 
relationships, stories and rituals that determine sensemaking. In 
following Beltman (2011) Table 3.3 illustrates the six steps of the research 
process. The qualitative character of the research and the emic 
perspective are further clarified in the explanation. The steps are not 
shown in chronological order and were often conducted in parallel with 
each other.  
 
Table 3.3 The six steps of the research process 
I Design the study The aim of this study was to understand corporate 
governance in the financial sector (Section 1.5). The 
central research question required a thorough 
qualitative approach, in which corporate governance 
is seen as a social phenomenon (Section 2.1). 
Keywords relating to the philosophical approach of 
the study were interpretive and social constructivist; 
these led methodologically to a qualitative study.  
II Conduct and report 
on the literature study 
In Chapter 2, answers are provided to the first 
reseach question based on an extensive study of the 
relevant literature. The literature study involved 
scientific books, professional journals and articles 
about researching sensemaking.  
III Gain access to the 
field 
Many attempts were made to gain access to the 
lifeworld of the financial sector (emic) (Sections 3.3, 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2). All organizations, participants and 
informants were approached personally and 
informed about the study. Anonymity turned out to 
be an important precondition for cooperating with 
the study. Consequently, anonymity is discussed 
extensively in the section about ethical 
considerations (Section 3.4).  
IV Collect data Qualitative data collection methods were used to 
elucidate the lifeworld of the actors in and around 
the executive board. The study was divided into two 
phases: a context study (Section 3.3.1) and a case 
study (Section 3.3.2). In both phases, the researcher 
sought the emic perspective of the research entity. 
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The context study involved in-depth interviews, 
observations and document analysis. During the case 
study phase, in-depth interviews and document 
analysis were performed. Important types of data 
included field notes, transcripts of the interviews, 
observational notes and descriptions, annual reports, 
other documents about corporate governance and 
newspaper articles. 
V Interpret and 
analyse data 
This step of the study involved analysing and 
interpreting the data (Section 3.5). The focus of the 
analysis was on the 'notable features' that appeared 
in the data collection methods. When interpreting 
the data, member-check was used, in which three 
informants were asked if they agreed with the 
descriptions, interpretations and conclusions 
(Swanborn, 1981), with the aim of enhancing the 
internal validity (Section 3.5). 
VI Publish data in 
book form 
This study was written in accordance with the vision 
of Creswell (2013) as an “objective report of 
information about the culture-sharing 
group”(Creswell, 2013: 490). Personal beliefs and 
prejudices were kept in the background and 
appeared in the reflections on and limitations of the 
study (Section 3.6).The results of the study are 
presented in narratives of corporate governance 
(Chapter 6). In Section 3.5 the qualitative 
characteristics of the study are explained critically in 
terms of reliability, validity, trustworthiness and 
generalizability. 
 
The chosen organizational anthropology approach has methodological 
consequences for the data collection of this study. This is addressed in 
Section 3.3.  
3.3 Methodological consequences 
The ontological and epistemological stance and the organizational 
anthropology approach had consequences for the research methodlogy. 
This study into the sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance 
takes an organizational anthropology approach and is therefore explora-
tive-qualitative in character. It is about identifying the guiding principles 
of corporate governance and improving the understanding of the reality 
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construction about corporate governance. In line with De Sonnaville 
(2005) and Kaats and Opheij (2008) in their study about executives, the 
present study did not have the aim of making representative, 
generalizing conclusions. The choice for a qualitative research method 
was based on a number of considerations, which are related to the 
choice for the social constructivist-interpretive approach of this study. 
The basis of the interpretive approach is that various perceptions of 
reality exist. Investigating the concrete lifeworld of groups is also done 
by means of qualitative research. To study the lifeworld of the actors in 
and around the boards of governance, various data collection methods 
were used, which are described below.  
 
Observer and participant in the research field  
The aim of ethnographic research is for researchers to reconstruct the 
experiences, beliefs and concepts of the respondents from their own 
perspective. In the period from March 2007 to August 2011, I collected 
data to gain insight into the world of the respondents. During this 
process I therefore expressed much empathy for each individual in the 
group that I studied. The problem with this approach, however, is that 
the previous experience and conceptual frameworks of the researcher 
influence the reconstruction of the events and of the processes that 
occurred during the study. In this study, the researcher also included her 
previous experiences. She previously worked as a call center agent for 
ABN AMRO and wrote her master’s thesis on the relationship between 
organizational culture and employee engagement in the Dutch banking 
sector (Steijvers, 2002). Section 3.6 contains a brief reflection on the 
consequences of these earlier experiences for the present study.  
 
Therefore, according to Smith (1998), it is important for a researcher to 
find a balance between participating in the group being studied and 
standing outside this group (Smith, 1998). During the present study, I 
visited conferences and seminars for members of executive and 
supervisory boards. In this context, I participated in the worlds of actors 
in and around the boards of governance. In these situations I observed 
the respondents, who were unaware that they were being observed. 
Hence, I was both an observer and a participant. When holding the 
formal interviews at BPF and Florabank, I was both a participant in the 
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interview and an observer of the respondents. These interviews usually 
had a very open structure. Efforts were made to enable the interviewee 
to speak as freely as possible, after which I probed specific topics such as 
the areas of tension or problems that were occurring.  
 
Notes during the fieldwork 
An important aspect of anthropological research is the attention to the 
context of the study. The context refers to the circumstances in which 
something was done, in response to which a story was told, along with 
the previous history (Ten Have, 1977). In light of certain research aims, 
the decision about whether or not to include the context can be crucial. 
Consequently, anthropologists pay much attention to formulating 
(putting into words) what they have seen, heard or thought. Schatzman 
and Strauss (1973) made a distinction between three types of notes. 
Observation notes are registrations of what people have observed, 
theoretical notes are about ideas that people have developed, and 
methodological notes record which procedures were followed or are 
planned. Ten Have added a fourth genre: reflexive notes, in which 
researchers describe their own reactions (Ten Have 1977). In this way, an 
ethnographic text takes account of the complexity of everyday situations 
(Ybema et al., 2009b). This makes ethnographic research methods well 
suited to presenting the context, which is often lacking in other types of 
research (Bate, 1997; Pettigrew, 1985). For this purpose, I have used the 
term “thick description” (Geertz, 1973), which means that I transcribed 
the interviews literally, but also took notes about the surroundings, the 
attitudes of the participants and the atmosphere during the interviews.  
 
Zooming in on text and zooming out on the environment  
To study the interactions between the actors in and around the boards of 
governance and in the environment, it was stated in Section 2.2. that the 
narrative approach came about as a result of the researcher zooming in 
on the text or zooming out on the environment and by connecting the 
micro-level and macro-level (Fairclough, 1992). By iteratively alternating 
between 'zooming in' and 'zooming out', the organizational anthropolo-
gical approach helps to show that work practices do not take place in a 
vacuum and that the organizational lives of people are shaped not only 
by individual agency, but also by historical circumstances (Nicolini, 2009). 
With the aid of the antroplological approach, in which one alternates 
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between zooming in and zooming out, researchers can contribute to the 
central debate in the social sciences on agency and structure.  
 
By alternating between the role of participant and observer, between 
the various types of notes and by zooming in on text and zooming out on 
the environment, data was collected in various ways. Miles and Huber-
man (1994) referred to this as data source triangulation. Data are 
collected by means of various sampling strategies at various moments in 
time in various social situations involving various people. In qualitative 
research, triangulation is a generally accepted method to improve the 
quality of a study. Besides this form of triangulation, the present study 
also used methods triangulation, data type triangulation and analysis 
triangulation. Methods triangulation means using several methods to 
collect data, such as interviews, document analysis and observations. 
Data type triangulation follows from methods triangulation, because this 
involves various types of data such as interview transcripts, notes of 
observations and documentation such as annual reports and policy 
memoranda. Analysis triangulation concerns the use of various analysis 
techniques to look for meaning within a data set. Maso and Smaling 
(1998) stated that methods triangulation and research triangulation are 
ways to promote internal reliability, while source triangulation and 
methods triangulation primarily increase the internal validity. This is not 
only to confirm the findings, but can also ensure divergence, i.e. by 
providing divergent perspectives. Analysis triangulation therefore 
increases the validity primarily by providing more complex insights and 
deeper or broader understanding. By using this type of triangulation, the 
researcher uses different lenses to look at the same data set, or parts 
thereof.  
In the remainder of this section, the three basic types of material 
collection in qualitative research –interviews, document analysis and 
observations– are explained. The fieldwork was split into two phases. 
The first phase was an explorative context study, and the second phase 
consisted of two case studies: BPF and Florabank. Both phases are 
explained in succession in the subsections below, but the phases took 
place primarily in parallel between March 2007 and August 2011. The 
study has a cross-sectional character. Cross-sectional research can in this 
case best be explained by a metaphor: the study took a snapshot of 
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corporate governance at a specific point in time. With the present study, 
the researcher did not want to make any conclusions about the impact of 
specific changes, but about the way in which the members of the execu-
tive board and other actors make sense of the tensions in corporate 
governance. However, when the changing context appeared to play a 
role at a specific time, this was verified among the participants and 
noted. One similarity between the context study and the two case 
studies is that was difficult to gain access to the respondents. During the 
interviews, a number of respondents indicated that the topic was 
sensitive due to the public scrutiny resulting from the financial crisis. The 
respondents also emphasized that everything that was published could 
have a negative impact on the functioning of the organization. However, 
some respondents indicated that the reason for cooperating with the 
study was that certain matters had been taken out of context and 
exaggerated in the media. This situation certainly had an impact on 
gaining access to the field. The subsections below address how this 
approach sometimes bore fruit and sometimes did not. A deliberate 
choice was made to report this because the process of gaining access 
shows that the research field, i.e. the executive level of the financial 
sector, is closed and that access can be gained only under strict 
conditions, and sometimes not even then. The process of gaining access 
to the financial sector also shows how the executive network in the 
financial sector works or doesn't work.  
3.3.1 Phase I: Context study  
The context study was exploratory in nature. The aim of this context 
study was to acquire knowledge and understanding of the sensemaking 
about corporate governance in the financial sector. In addition, the 
context study also had the aim of identifying various developments in 
corporate governance. The results that have emerged from the context 
study formed the basis for the second phase, which focused on two case 
studies. In this way, the findings from the first phase were used as input 
in the second phase, for example to develop the interview protocol and 
to design the two case studies. The following research methods were 
used to conduct the context study: interviews, observations and docu-
ment analysis. 
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Interviews during the context study 
Before the potential respondents were approached, the profile that the 
respondent had to meet was considered. The main criteria were that 
they were a member of the executive board or held a position in which 
they were in direct contact with a member of the executive board, and 
that they worked at a bank or pension fund. With the aid of experts from 
the field, e-mails were prepared in which potential respondents were 
invited to participate in the study by means of an interview. Notably, 
many actors in and around the executive board, especially the members 
of the executive board itself, did not respond to this email. To improve 
participation in the interviews, the informal network and the snowball 
effect were used. At the same time the interview profile was modified. 
For example, via the network of the researcher, a strategic advisor in 
corporate governance for a pension fund was interviewed. This respon-
dent then brought the researcher into contact with a member of the 
executive board of a pension fund. However, it was still difficult for the 
researcher to gain access to the top executives, but successful contact 
was made occasionally. Access to a top executive of the pension fund 
was gained through a brief e-mail arranged by the CEO of Florabank.  
 
In total, 13 in-depth interviews were held, ranging from 1.5 to 2 hours 
long. Six respondents were interviewed who worked in the banking 
industry and six who worked in the pension industry. Furthermore, one 
respondent, a professor of governance, was interviewed in order to des-
cribe the context and the developments from a scientific perspective. 
Table 3.4 lists the job titles of the respondents and the type of organiza-
tion in which they worked, with the corresponding code that was linked 
to these respondents. Appendix I contains a more extensive summary of 
the personal characteristics of the respondents and the dates on which 
the interviews took place.  
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Table 3.4 The job titles of respondents interviewed in the context study 
No.  Job title Organization Code 
1 Corporate Director Bank CDB1 
2 Director Bank DB2 
3 Head of Administrative Affairs Bank HBB3 
4 Member of the executive board Pension fund BP4 
5 Head of Administrative Affairs Pension fund HBP5 
6 Member of the Works Council Bank LOB6 
7 Member of the executive board Bank BB7 
8 Investment Advisor for the 
executive board 
Bank ABB8 
9 Manager Accounting & Reporting Pension fund MAP9 
10 Strategic Advisor Corporate 
Governance  
Pension fund SAP10 
11 Member of the executive board Pension fund BP11 
12 Member of participants council Pension fund LDP12 
13 Professor of Governance University HGU13 
 
To ensure an optimal response, the interview was held at a location 
preferred by the interviewee. Nearly all respondents preferred to hold 
the interview in their own office. As a result, the researcher also had an 
opportunity to observe the workplace. These observations are discussed 
under the heading Observational Research. As an introduction to the 
questions from the interview, the respondents were informed about the 
central topic of the study. At the same time, the framework of the study 
was explained briefly. Furthermore, the respondents were informed 
about the type of questions they could expect and how the interview 
would proceed. It was also explained that the identity of the respondents 
would be protected by referring only to their job titles, and that the 
information would be treated confidentially. The interview protocol 
consisted of a number of themes that were used to formulate the 
theoretical framework. These themes are the following: personal details, 
developments within the executive boards in the financial sector, 
members of the executive board within the financial sector, the actors 
surrounding the executive board, the culture of the Dutch financial 
sector and of their specific organization, and authority and control in and 
around the executive board in their specific organization. After this, 
questions were prepared for each theme. These themes and questions 
were deliberately not sent in advance in order to prevent the respon-
dents from giving socially desirable answers. Because the researcher 
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intended to compare the interviews with each other, a number of 
themes with open key questions were used. These were intended as 
guidelines for the interview, but were primarily used to probe the 
answers in detail. In addition, within the themes, no pre-planned 
sequence of questions was followed. The respondents were thus given 
the opportunity to express their standpoints, opinions, ideas and 
thoughts on the issues they considered to be important regarding 
corporate governance. As a result, the respondents often discussed 
personal and emotional aspects as well. These aspects are important 
because the topic of corporate governance in this study is considered to 
be a sensitizing concept. Besides the use of open key questions, other 
techniques were used, including requesting clarification of certain 
answers of the respondents. For example, during the interviews the 
researcher reformulated some questions if she was uncertain what 
respondents meant. Another technique to improve the reliability of the 
study is the use of a tape recorder. To prevent the loss of the context and 
the situation in which the questions were answered, while transcribing 
the interviews these aspects were reported as objectively as possible. 
 
Observations 
In this study, the observations were qualitative in nature and were 
intended to discover how people make sense of their actions (Saunders 
et al., 2011). By means of observation, insight was acquired into the 
symbolism that is used by actors in and around the boards of governance 
in the financial sector. Bernard (1998) described two additional advan-
tages of observation. The first advantage is an enhancement of the 
quality of the data that are collected during fieldwork. The second is an 
enhancement of the quality of the interpretation of the data. There was 
sufficient justification for the researcher to use observations, but here as 
well the provision of access to participate in the meetings was an 
obstacle. No organization gave the researcher permission to attend 
meetings between the executive board and the internal supervising 
authority (supervisory board). According to the members of the 
executive board, the reason for this had to do with the fact that 
confidential information was exchanged, which prevented any outsiders 
from being present. The study has shown that there is no room for 
negotiation in acquiring access to meetings between the executive board 
and the surrounding actors. All the executive boards refused permission 
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to attend these meetings. This attitude had consequences for the quality 
characteristics of the study (Section 3.5); although the researcher was 
not permitted to make observations of interactions between members of 
the executive board and the surrounding actors, she was able to use two 
other types of observation. The first type of observation was made at 
locations where actors in and around the executive board periodically 
appear, such as their own workplaces, the office building and a gentle-
men’s club. These observations took place at the same locations where 
the interviews were held. The second type of observation was made at 
meetings during which verbal communication about corporate govern-
ance took place by members of the executive board and the supervisory 
board such as seminars and conferences. Table 3.5 shows that the first 
five observations were of the first type, and the second five were 
observations of verbal communication. Appendix I contains a more 
detailed summary with data. 
 
Table 3.5 Observation locations or meetings for the context study 
No. Description of the location or 
meeting where the 
observation was made 
Organizations Code  
1 Workplace of a member of the 
executive board 
Pension fund WBP1 
2 Reception area Pension fund RP2 
3 Reception area Bank RB3 
4 Workplace of members of the 
executive board 
Bank WBB4 
5 Gentlemen’s club Banks and pension 
funds 
HBP5 
6 Seminar "Investing in society", 
organized by the ABP pension 
fund 
Pension fund SP6 
7 Meeting with local residents Bank BO7 
8 Symposium “Supervisors in 
class” organized by the 
National Registry for 
supervision 
Banks and pension 
funds 
SBP8 
9 Presentation of Governance 
Toolkit for pension funds 
organized by the National 
Registry of supervision 
Pension funds TP9 
10 Symposium Corporate 
Governance handbook 
Banks and pension 
funds 
SBP10 
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For all types of observations, the researcher assumed the same type of 
role: that of the observer. The researcher acted only as an observer and 
did not interact with the group. However, the seminars and conferences 
were frequently followed by a reception, and that gave the research the 
opportunity to ask questions. All observations focused on the symbolism 
of the financial sector. This was based partly on the classifications of 
Dandridge, Mitroff and Joyce (1980), which make a distinction between 
material symbols, verbal symbols and symbols concerning behaviour. 
During all observations, this symbolism was used when possible, but the 
various types of observations emphasize different aspects. For example, 
in the first type of observation, primarily material symbolism was used to 
observe the subjects. The building architecture, workplace decorations, 
clothing and the entrances to buildings were primarily observed. With 
the second type of observation, the observer paid attention primarily to 
verbal symbolism, such as the jargon, standard expressions, jokes and 
anecdotes of members of the executive board and the surrounding 
actors. In both types of observation, the researcher also observed the 
behaviour of the members of the executive board and the surrounding 
actors.  
 
Document analysis 
In the present study, the qualitative research method was used for the 
document analysis. This methodology was initially used to acquire insight 
into the institutional context of corporate governance. In addition, it was 
used for collecting background information to obtain a picture of the 
context, but document analysis was also used to triangulate the results 
that were based on other data, such as the above-mentioned interviews 
or observations. A distinction can be made between written material and 
non-written material (Saunders et al., 2011). The written material that was 
collected during the study included social and financial annual reports, 
charters, regulations, corporate principles, organograms, corporate 
websites and memorandums, periodicals and newspaper articles. Non-
written material that was used in this study essentially involved TV and 
radio broadcasts: television broadcasts such as Tegenlicht, Zembla, talk 
shows such as Pauw en Witteman during which members of the execu-
tive board or other actors such as representatives of the DNB regularly 
participate, and radio broadcasts such as BNR and Radio 1. The docu-
ments were selected in various ways. For example, some respondents 
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referred to documents such as the reports of the Goudswaard and Frijns 
parliamentary commissions, and other documents were found by 
searching for information about corporate governance on the Internet. 
Non-written material was found primarily because the researcher herself 
carefully followed the television and radio broadcasts on executives in 
the financial sector or she was tipped by friends and acquaintances about 
the broadcasts. 
 
During the document analysis, acquiring access to the documents was 
not a problem. All documents were publically available or could easily be 
requested from the relevant organizations. However, when using this 
research method it was particularly a challenge to make a good selection 
of the document material. During this process the researcher had to 
assess whether the documentation was suitable. The researcher made 
this assessment based on two assumptions. First, by assessing whether 
the documents were suitable to answer the central research question of 
the study. Second, the researcher looked at the source of the data. 
Dochartaigh et al. (2002) referred to this as the authority or reputation of 
the source. For example, during the document analysis the researcher 
used a reasonably large number of reports from large, well-known orga-
nizations such as the DNB, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Market (AFM), the European Commission and Basel I and II, as well as 
reports from well-known parliamentary commissions such as Tabaksblat, 
Frijns and Goudswaard. This systematic approach increased the validity 
and reliability of the selection of documentation. The relevant docu-
ments were all given codes and digitally archived as much as possible, 
after which they were included in the data analysis (see Section 3.5). 
3.3.2 Phase II: Case studies 
Phase II of the field research focused on the members of the executive 
board and the surrounding actors in a specific organizational context. In 
view of the importance of the context in social constructivist research, a 
multiple case study approach was chosen. Robson defines a case study 
as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investiga-
tion of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002: 178). By using 
multiple (two) case studies, it was possible to conduct an in-depth study 
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of the social reality of members of the executive board concerning 
corporate governance. These case studies are presented in Chapters 4 
and 5. This concerns a multiple, non-comparative case study approach; 
this is because the sensemaking about corporate governance of 
members of the executive board was the central focus. The case studies 
were selected based on a combination of substantive and practical 
reasons (Section 1.5). One practical reason is the fact that it was difficult 
to gain access to organizations in the financial sector. This request for 
access involved not only the issue of whether or not the member of the 
executive board wanted to cooperate with the interview, but also 
whether he or she gave permission to the organization as a whole to 
cooperate with the research. In total, 20 attempts were made to gain 
access to various organizations. The initial contact with the organization 
was made in one of two ways: formally or informally. In the formal 
approach, an e-mail was prepared with the aid of informants in the field 
so that members of the executive board could become interested in the 
theme of this study. This formal approach was not successful. The 
informal approach made use of the network of the researcher herself 
and various informants. These discussions were sometimes promising 
but did not always lead to the desired result. Some respondents also 
indicated later on that it could have had to do with the fact that the 
members of the executive board did not want to take any risks that could 
lead to negative publicity for themselves or their organization. These 
exploratory conversations led to a follow-up meeting on five occasions. 
Subsequently, various aspects were coordinated, and work took place on 
a concrete research proposal for the organization, but on these 
occasions as well, permission for cooperation was not granted; the 
reasons for these refusals were often unclear. The following example 
illustrates this situation: a member of the executive board of a large bank 
advised the informant to contact the head of the Secretary of the board 
at the bank. Following an exploratory meeting with the head of 
executive affairs and a member of staff from this department, several 
meetings were held that led to a research proposal. After the new 
research proposal was completed in consultation with the above-
mentioned member of staff, the researcher received an e-mail with the 
notification that the member of staff, following consultation with 
colleagues, did not see any benefit for the bank and declined to 
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participate in the study. Reflecting with my informant about how to take 
the right approach to gain access to the financial sector, we wondered if 
we should have made contact at a different level of the organization or if 
we should have spoken first with the member of the executive board 
directly. This example says nothing about the reasons for the denial, 
because the actual reason for denying access to the organization 
remained vague, but it does say something about the fact that it is 
difficult to gain access; we also had the impression that it was perhaps 
better to acquire contact through the members of the executive board 
themselves. 
At BPF and Florabank, however, the exploratory discussions did lead to 
successful contact. Notably, at both organizations the informant was 
acquainted with the members of the executive board and at both 
organizations access to the organization was requested directly at the 
executive level; no use was made of internal intermediaries. At BPF, 
contact was first sought with the Secretary of the Board, who introduced 
the proposal at the executive board meeting, after which official per-
mission was granted to cooperate with the study. In particular, the 
chairperson of the supervisory council asked many questions preceding 
the interview about the anonymity of the study and the fact that no 
financial information would be included in the report. By e-mail, 
additional assurance was provided that the data would be treated 
anonymously. For this reason, the names of the respondents and organi-
zations have been fictionalized. The chairman of the supervisory council 
also requested confirmation by e-mail that permission would be acquired 
from BPF before the study was published. At Florabank, the unofficial 
decision to cooperate with the study proceeded more smoothly. This was 
possibly because the CEO and the informant had known each other 
previously and because the CEO was also very interested in the results of 
the study. Two collection data methods were used for the case studies: 
in-depth interviews and document analysis; these methods are explained 
further below. 
 
In-depth interviews 
The in-depth interviews were held with actors in and around the 
executive board of BPF and Florabank. Table 3.6 lists the job titles of all 
respondents from the two organizations. Appendix II provides an 
extensive summary of the background of the respondents.  
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In both case studies, the selection process of the respondents proceeded 
differently than the researcher had initially planned. At the BPF, an 
exploratory meeting first took place with one of the members of the 
executive board, after which a proposal for the entire executive board 
was prepared; this proposal included information about the study and 
the job titles of the respondents who wanted to talk with the researcher. 
This memorandum was presented at the executive board meeting and 
approved. Through the director of the executive office, the researcher 
acquired the names and telephone numbers of the individuals con-
cerned. All respondents were then contacted first by e-mail and then by 
telephone, and were asked if they wanted to participate in the study. All 
individuals but three participated in an interview. For one individual, the 
reason for not participating in the interview was lack of time, the second 
individual worked for an external office with a different policy, which 
prevented participation in research about their clients, and the third 
individual did not explain the reasons for declining participation. At 
Florabank, gaining access to the respondents proceeded differently.  
 
Table 3.6 The job titles of the respondents in the interviews for the case studies 
N0. Actor Job title Organiza-
tion 
Code 
1 Executive board BPF 
(employers organization) 
Chair BPF VWGF1 
2 Executive board BPF 
(employee organization) 
Board Secretary  BPF SWNF2 
3 Executive board BPF 
(employers organization) 
Member BPF LWGF3 
4 Executive board BPF  
(employee organization) 
Member BPF LWGF4 
5 Executive Office  Director  BPF DBBF5 
6 Pension Administration Account 
Manager 
BPF ACPF6 
7 Portfolio Management Account 
Manager 
BPF ACVM7 
8 Investment Advisory 
Committee 
Member BPF LBACF8 
9 Participants Council Chair  BPF VDRF9 
10 Supervisory Council Chair BPF VRvTF10 
11 Executive board CEO Florabank CEOF11 
12 Executive board CFO Florabank CFOF12 
13 Executive board COO Florabank COOF13 
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14 Daily management of 
Netherlands branch 
Managing 
Director 
Florabank ADF14 
15 Depository Receipt 
Holders  
Foundation 
President 
Administration 
Office 
Florabank VAAOF15 
16 Supervisory Board Chair of 
Supervisory 
Board 
Florabank VRvCF16 
17 Works Council Chair of Works 
Council 
Florabank VORF17 
 
Permission was not granted by the full executive board, but was limited 
to the chair of the board. During two exploratory meetings with the CEO, 
the researcher herself specified the individuals whom she wanted to 
interview. The CEO declined permission to contact two of these indivi-
duals. This justification was that he was "afraid" that an interview with 
these respondents would lead to unrest because sensitive issues were 
involved. Notably, one of the respondents at the bank, who knew how 
the respondents were selected, referred to the selection method as 
being characteristic of the CEO. He emphasized that the CEO did not 
have any malicious intent, but that his drive for direction and control 
played a major role. In Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.5 this attention for direction 
and control is addressed in more detail. Clearly, the role of the members 
of the executive board in the selection of respondents impacted the 
validity of the study (Section 3.5). However, it must also be emphasized 
that this concerned only two respondents at Florabank who were not 
involved with the study.  
 
Similar to the interviews in the context study, the respondents were 
informed before the interview about the topic of the study, what kind of 
questions they could expect and the interview process; the aim was to 
establish trust. The interview questions were divided into the same 
themes as the interviews in the context study. Similar to the exploratory 
meetings, there was no planned sequence of questions, and the partici-
pants were given the opportunity to express their standpoints, opinions, 
ideas and thoughts about issues concerning corporate governance that 
were important to them. Also during these interviews, various techni-
ques were used such as asking open questions, probing the answers and 
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moving from general to specific topics. The respondents were asked to 
make a drawing of corporate governance in and around the executive 
board in the financial sector. They were also requested to fill in a matrix 
which ranked the authority of the various actors, along with how much 
time –divided into formal an informal time– the actor spends with the 
actors concerned and the way in which they have the most contact with 
this actor; the respondents could choose between face-to-face contact, 
e-mail, fax or other communication media. The matrix was used primarily 
as an aid to acquire insight into the relationship and interaction between 
the various actors in daily practice. The idea to use this approach 
emerged from the in-depth interviews during the context study, when 
some respondents spontaneously began drawing the situation in the 
organization to clarify matters. The characteristics of the in-depth inter-
views for the case studies are shown in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7 The case study interviews: characteristics and techniques 
Selection of the interviews  The executive board played a major role in the 
selection of respondents at BPF and Florabank.  
Choice of location Choice of location for interview with respondent. 
To ensure an optimal response, the interview was 
held at a location preferred by the interviewee. 
Most interviews were held at the office of the 
respondents, some interviews at other locations 
such as gentlemen’s club or at the home of a 
member of the executive board. 
Duration of interview The usual duration of the interview was 1.5 hours, 
but some lasted 2.5 hours. Information about the 
interview and the topics that would be discussed 
was sent to the respondents in advance.  
Basis of the questionnaire Semi-structured questionnaire with themes linked 
to the central research question. 
Interview techniques Open questions, probing the answers, from 
general to specific. The first part of the study 
concerned, among other things, corporate 
governance in general; the second part primarily 
concerned the specific situation of the 
respondent in the organization context, and 
using the matrix and drawing.  
 
Document analysis 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) stated that “document analysis is either 
conducted to understand their substantive content or to illuminate 
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deeper meanings, which may be revealed, by their style and coverage” 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 35). For this study, a combination of both analyses 
was used to provide a valuable contribution to the data collection 
process. During the interviews, the respondents referred to financial and 
social annual reports, charters, regulations, corporate principles, organo-
grams and other documents, such as reports of parliamentary commis-
sions. In addition, research was conducted on the Internet. The history, 
structure, image, policy and symbolism on the Internet site of the bank 
and pension fund were analysed and studied. The disadvantage of this 
document material turned out to be the lack of the context in which 
specific statements were made, measures were implemented and other 
events occurred. Hutjes and Van Buuren (1992: 79) added that document 
material does not provide any insight into the conditions under which the 
material was created. Therefore, in this study documents were used in 
combination with the in-depth interviews.  
 
All research data was transcribed. The notes of the observations, the 
transcripts of interviews in the documents were stored as documents in a 
folder structure. In addition, a cover document contained the date, the 
topic of the data, the author of the document and the type of document. 
This cover document was used when conducting fieldwork and analysis. 
In addition, theoretical and methodological notes were taken 
(Schatzman & Strauss, 1973: 99) about the ideas that were developed 
and the procedures that were followed in the study. This structured 
method for processing data benefited the quality of the data analysis, 
partly in terms of reliability and repeatability.  
3.4 Ethical considerations 
In 2012, the Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) 
amended The Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice (VSNU, 
2012). Compared to the first publication in 2004, the code has remained 
largely the same. The code prescribes five principles that academic 
scientific practitioners (lecturers and researchers) should take into consi-
deration, individually, with respect to each other and with respect to 
society. These five principles are scrupulousness, reliability, verifiability, 
impartiality and independence. The first overarching principle is that 
every scientific practitioner is bound to the frameworks established by 
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Dutch and international legislation. A second overarching principle is 
transparency: every scientific practitioner must demonstrate, or be able 
to demonstrate, how he or she puts these principles into practice. In this 
chapter, the researcher has sought to make these principles transparent. 
This has consequences for the quality of the data, which primarily 
involves reflection on the reliability and verifiability of the study. 
Lombarts (2011) ascertained that these five principles are very similar to 
the six techniques that Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2009) proposed to 
increase the reliability of research: thick description, reflexivity, triangu-
lation, an audit or audit trail, negative case analysis and member 
checking. Several of these techniques have been used in the present 
study and are discussed in this chapter. In the context of research, ethics 
predominates over correctness in the behaviour of the scientific 
practitioner with respect to the rights of those who will be affected by 
the research. In the VSNU code of conduct, this aspect is expressed 
under the heading scrupulousness as follows: 
  
Every scientific practitioner demonstrates respect for the people 
and animals involved in scientific teaching and research. Research 
on human subjects is only permitted upon their freely given 
informed consent and if there are no or just the slightest of risks. 
The privacy of subjects involved is sufficiently protected. If 
research on humans or animals poses any kind of risk, the 
significance of the research must justify taking that risk (VSNU, 
2012: 4).  
 
When conducting research within the financial sector, it turned out that 
the subjects experienced difficulty in providing access. According to 
Saunders et al. (2011), this could have been the result of various causes. 
For example, the individual may not have seen any added value in the 
study, the topic is sensitive, or the individual might have been concerned 
about the confidentiality of the information or doubted the competency 
of the researcher. Of course, other events which did not have anything to 
do with the study itself could have also played a role. When queried 
about the underlying reasons, it turned out that the confidentiality of the 
information was a primary reason for doubt among the respondents. 
Consequently, when requesting access, the researcher referred to the 
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code of conduct (VSNU, 2012). By indicating that the researcher was 
bound to the ethical provisions in this code, it was possible to offer a 
certain degree of comfort and assurance to the respondents; as a result 
it was possible to address certain topics more frequently and in greater 
depth. Furthermore, the anonymity of the respondents, subjects and 
informants was assured by anonymizing the organizations and only 
reporting the job titles in general terms (for example a member of the 
executive board of a bank or a member of the participants council of a 
pension fund). While conducting the interviews, respondents requested 
several times that no financial data be reported in the study, as this could 
be damaging. Several times they also asked for the recording to be 
stopped because they wanted to share confidential information that they 
didn't want used in this study. These requests were granted, of course, 
to avoid harming the trust between the researcher and subjects, but they 
did have consequences for the reliability of the research (Section 3.5). 
3.5 Data analysis, interpretation and representation 
Within social constructivism there are major differences in research 
approaches. This study is consistent with the tradition of discourse 
analysis (Section 2.2). In a discourse analysis, patterns, ideas and 
concepts that are potentially key to efforts at sensemaking in a specific 
period are analysed (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1993; Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). In this study, I aimed to identify the dominant 
narratives on corporate governance that “circulated” in the period 
between March 2007 and August 2011. Researchers who study discourse 
analysis use a wide range of approaches, such as narrative analysis, 
critical discourse analysis and ethnography. These researchers also have 
various scientific backgrounds, such as linguistics, sociology and history 
(Duijnhoven, 2010). Various meanings can be attributed to the concept of 
discourse analysis, depending on the discipline and theoretical scope 
(Burr, 1995; Gee, 1999; Wetherell et al., 2001). A common aspect of all 
approaches is that text plays an important role. Text can be defined here 
as written material, photographs, architecture, fashion and symbols 
referring to discourse (De Koster, 2007). Actually, just about everything 
that has meaning is seen as "text". There are many traditions of 
discourse analysis, but the social constructivists belong to the action 
tradition in which the process of sensemaking is studied.  
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Roughly speaking, within the social constructivist approach two types of 
interpretations can be distinguished: the micro approach and the macro 
approach. The micro approach to analysis is concerned with the question 
of how certain discourses are used and with which aim and effect. This is 
the action orientation of text: talk-in-interaction is key. This type of 
research is usually performed on transcripts of natural conversations and 
interactions, primarily involving the interaction between researcher and 
respondent. The narratives can be traced by studying how the narrators 
(interviewees) are engaged in corporate governance, the arenas and 
venues in which they tell stories and the public that they appeal to. The 
macro approach to discourse examines which discourses are available in 
our society and what their implications are for people in this society. 
What is the significance of a specific discourse for the experience of 
corporate governance? Hence the discourse not only provides sense, but 
is also shaped by practices. What is said is related to who says it; a 
pattern occurs not only in the stories, but also in the storytellers, which 
provides some stability. According to Hajer (1995: 60), in that case there 
is a discourse coalition: “a discourse coalition is the ensemble of a set of 
storylines, the actors that utter these storylines and the practices that 
conform to these storylines, all organized around a discourse”. In 
discourse analysis, the researcher zooms in on the text and zooms out on 
the environment, and links the micro and macro levels together. 
Fairclough (1992) postulated that during a discourse analysis, the 
researcher moves from one analysis level to another at various times in 
order to arrive at a complete picture of interaction in a societal or 
ideological context. The analysis focuses on the relationship between 
discourse and how people think and feel, what they do (practice) and the 
material context within which this process takes place. Because Michel 
Foucault was one of its main sources of inspiration, this approach is often 
referred to as the Foucauldian discourse analysis (Carabine, 2001). 
 
To structure the data analysis, Creswell's (2013) six steps for analysing 
and interpreting qualitative data were used. Before the six steps of 
Cresswell are explained, three remarks should be made about the 
analysis and interpretation of qualitative data. First, it should be noted 
that the researcher does not claim to generalize, but wants to offer 
insight into the sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance. 
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According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003), qualitative research can be 
generalized, but the framework in which this happens requires more 
clarity. They stated that there are a number of important principles to 
bear in mind when generalizing from qualitative data: encompassing 
diversity, the nature of the phenomenon being studied (and not the 
statistical significance of the relationship), level of classification, 
assigning meaning and interpretation, checks on research design and 
conduct, display of research methods, noted limitations and validation of 
the inference. These principles were applied to the present study, but the 
question remained whether a case study –as a unique product– is 
representative of a broader social context. Expressed in process terms, 
this means the following: does a case study generate knowledge about 
the single, usually complex, case or does it lead to more general know-
ledge? In view of the various contexts of the organizations studied, the 
present study is not representative of the entire financial sector in the 
Netherlands; as a result, the results of this study are not generalizable. 
However, based on the analysis, (Chapter 6), it is clear that the 
sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance at BPF and Florabank 
is nearly identical. Although follow-up research should be conducted, on 
this basis one could postulate that the results of this study are generali-
zable to the entire financial sector. 
The second remark about the analysis and interpretation of qualitative 
data is that three levels of analysis can be distinguished in this study: the 
contextual level (the context of the financial sector in the Netherlands), 
the institutional level (the banks and pension funds, such as BPF and 
Florabank) and the individual actor level (the members of the executive 
board and surrounding actors). However it must be emphasized that the 
various data collection methods could be applicable to all levels. For 
example, the data that emerged from the in-depth interviews were used 
not only to make statements about the daily practice of the members of 
the executive board and actors surrounding the executive board, but 
also about the contextual and institutional level. The third remark is that 
the unit of analysis concerns the aggregation level of the collected data 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The unit of analysis is determined by the 
central research question and the research questions that emerge from 
the central research question. Although the cultural practice and 
strategic practices involved a single group –actors in and around the 
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boards of governance– the actors of the organizations within the 
financial sector were also studied separately. This was the case with the 
interviews and the observations. 
 
1 Preparing and organizing the data  
Sensitizing concepts are the starting point for generalizing and analysing 
the data. Constant interaction between data collection and theory, or 
between production, analysis, and theory, serves to test, improve and 
verify the sensitizing concepts (Blumer, 1954). This method is broadly 
similar to the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), in which constant alternation between theory and 
practice plays an important role. The development of a theory takes  
place through a combination of induction and deduction. In this study, 
the sensitizing concepts were constantly confronted with the empirical 
data sources, concepts were compared with each other, it was deter-
mined which dimensions and indicators of key concepts emerged from 
the data sources, and finally the theoretical concepts were compared 
with each other (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 1995). This study adopted 
the principles of the grounded theory approach and resulted in a simulta-
neous and iterative process of collecting, structuring and analysing data. 
The following subsections zoom in on how the data were processed, 
unravelled and made ready for interpretation.  
 
2 Exploring and coding the data 
All field notes, documents, newspaper articles, matrices and drawings 
were searched and categorized by providing them with general labels 
(topics) such as laws and regulations, seeking balance between stake-
holders, moral awareness and so on. Along with these topics, the 
researcher also noted the origin of the data and from which organization 
and person that information originated. This could be the bank, pension 
fund, the government, the DNB or the media. The remaining data that 
was not relevant at that time was saved for later. All the documents were 
read and labelled several times. This process emphasizes the iterative-
inductive nature of this research approach (O'Reilly, 2005). During this 
process the researcher attempted to organize her thoughts systema-
tically by writing memos, ideas about empirical descriptions, lists of 
metaphors, relationships, tensions, the chronology of events, and so on.  
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It became clear that the labels could be reduced to three types of logic: 
actor logic, institutional logic and logic of practice. In Chapters 4 and 5 
the three types of logic of BPF and Florabank are presented in the 
various stories. The data in the three types of logic are then analyzed. 
This involved the use of zooming in and zooming out (Nicoloni, 2009). 
The data were coded. By continually studying the codes, three grand 
narratives emerged from the study, with corresponding subvariants and 
counter-narratives. Initially, four grand narratives emerged from the 
data. This was because one of the subvariants –corporate governance 
acting in accordance with the social view– was initially regarded as a 
grand narrative from the study. By repeatedly studying and comparing all 
the data, it turned out that this was not a grand narrative, but a 
subvariant. The process is similar to solving a puzzle: you keep trying until 
the entire puzzle fits together.  
 
3 Describing the findings and establishing the themes 
The salient features of the codes and themes were first examined, 
followed by a detailed description, per method, of the data. For each 
method a summary was produced containing passages, quotes, sen-
tences, drawings and matrices. This analysis, following the recommend-
dation of Creswell (2013), was layered. The first layer consisted of 
abstractions of raw data in the form of notes, documents and drawings. 
In the second layer, prominent features and themes were identified. In 
the third layer, the data were fed back to the theoretical framework. The 
findings from the narrative concepts led to a description of the 
sensemaking about the tensions in corporate governance. 
 
4 Representing and reporting the findings  
In this phase, the results were shown in clear representations in the 
context of the research questions and the theoretical foundations. For 
this purpose, the matrices suggested by Miles and Huberman (1984) 
were used, in which the inputs are formed by the topics. The data were 
coded and placed in the cells of the matrix. The data for each organiza-
tion were placed together to acquire insight into the differences 
between BPF and Florabank. This approach was used to analyse the data 
from the interviews. The matrices were developed to improve the 
reliability and validity of the results. The data matrices are the source of 
the reliability of the study, and as Bijlsma-Frankema and Droogleever 
Chapter 3 
98 
 
Fortuijn (1997) stated correctly, this shows the analytical steps that were 
taken to draw conclusions.  
 
5 Interpreting the significance of the findings 
In ethnographic research, interpretation and analysis are not seen 
separately from each other. The data were interpreted according to the 
procedure described by Creswell (2013), The researcher steps back and 
forms some larger meaning about the phenomenon based on personal 
views, comparisons with past studies, or both (Creswell, 2013). The 
central research question and the subsequent questions that emerged 
from the central question are answered in Chapter 7. Suggestions for 
further research and reflections are discussed in Sections 3.6 and 7.4. 
Martin (2002) argued that criteria such as reflexivity are crucial to the 
assessment of qualitative research. This is due to the close relationship 
that the researcher had with the respondents and informants within the 
study. Reflexivity is defined as "‘the depth of insight offered by the 
researcher into his or her own effect on and relation to the data being 
collected,” (Martin, 2002: 226). Creswell (2013) urged researchers to 
reflect on their role in studies such as this: “Researchers should reflect 
upon their own biases, values and assumptions,” (Creswell, 2013: 187). In 
this study, reflexivity is seen more as looking back at oneself, as a process 
of self-reflection for the researcher. During the entire study, the 
researcher maintained a reflective dialogue with three informants to gain 
clearer insight and to find patterns in the literature study and the data 
collected during the fieldwork. To this end, reflection took place continu-
ously throughout study; as a result not only the validity of the research 
was improved, but also the controllability, manageability, reliability and 
validity.  
 
6 Validity and reliability of the findings  
In this chapter, the reliability and validity of this study have been men-
tioned several times. The general definition of validity is “the extent to 
which the instrument measures what it purports to measure”. The two 
main types of validity of this study are content or face validity and 
construct validity. Face validity can best be assessed by asking the 
question whether the measure appears at first glance to be a good 
measurement instrument. For the content of face validity, experts were 
interviewed, theory was studied and data was verified in the various 
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phases. Although this took place systematically, Hair et al. (2003) stated 
correctly that this approach involves a level of subjectivity. To determine 
whether corporate governance was used consistently and correctly in 
accordance with the theoretical framework of the study, construct 
validity was pursued. Two strategies were used to develop construct 
validity. First, the informants were approached, i.e. the member check 
(Bijlsma-Frankema & Droogleever Fortuijn, 1997). They were asked to 
check the processed data and the tentative results. Second, the entire 
study was subjected to a continuous formal audit. This research audit 
was conducted separately by three academics. These experts individually 
audited all actions and procedures during the study. This audit procedure 
concerned not only the validity of the study, but also its accountability, 
reliability and credibility. 
Various strategies were used to improve the validity. For example, 
frequent meetings were held with fellow researchers, supervisors, 
informants and respondents to gain feedback on the data collection and 
its interpretation. The researcher was able to present the matrices that 
were developed for the study, which allowed the data to be shown in a 
structured fashion. Inconsistencies were explored during the feedback 
meetings, during which the accuracy and completeness of the study 
were also confirmed. Triangulation was applied to the three data 
collection methods and to reflect on the theoretical framework. In 
addition, data matrices were used in the form of the narrative model 
(Section 2.5). This turned out to be very useful. Four of the five functions 
of a qualitative data matrix, as described by Bijlsma-Frankema and 
Droogleever Fortuijn (1997), were applicable to this study. First, the data 
in the matrices provided an overview of the most important initial 
findings and allowed for data reduction. Second, the matrices provided 
an overview of the level of completeness. Empty or incomplete cells 
were identified; as result decisions for further data collection and modify-
cation or data reduction could be made. Third, the variation between the 
respondents within the same case study, the origin of the documents 
and the observations could be found quickly, which enabled an initial 
interpretation of the matrices in the context of the research question. 
Fourth, by comparing and analysing the various matrices, anomalous 
findings could be localized and explained. Regarding this last function, 
Bijlsma-Frankema and Droogleever Fortuijn (1997) referred to the 
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possibility of generating hypotheses based on the matrices. Although 
patterns were found and confirmed, formulating hypotheses was not an 
aim of this study, although it did lead to this.  
With respect to qualitative research, reliability concerns the question of 
whether different researchers would have acquired the same infor-
mation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Related to reliability are interview 
bias and respondent bias. In particular, respondent bias could have 
impacted the study. During several interviews it became clear that some 
respondents were hesitant about sharing sensitive information with the 
researcher. They sometimes requested the researcher to stop the tape 
recorder or stated explicitly that the information was not intended for 
the public. One respondent even said the following: 
 
At the beginning of the study I didn't actually know what I could or 
could not say, but during the discussion it became clear you would 
indeed treat the interview confidentially (Bank Director).  
 
As researcher, I had the feeling that I periodically had to prove my 
credibility and gain the trust of the respondents. I attempted to minimize 
this risk of respondent bias by sending an e-mail that immediately 
emphasized that the interviews would be handled confidentially. By 
being open, I attempted to gain their trust. For example, through my 
informant (whom they all knew) I informed the respondents at the 
pension fund that the executive board had given me access. At the 
beginning of the interview I then emphasized that the interviews would 
be handled confidentially. I also indicated that I complied with to the 
guidelines of the VSNU, which describe the rules for integrous scientific 
conduct (VSNU, 2012). To improve the reliability, various data collection 
methods were used (in-depth interviews, document analysis, and 
observations). Boeije et al. (2009) also refers to this as methodological 
triangulation. During the present study, the researcher aimed to have the 
interviews proceed in the same way, but that was not always feasible; 
some respondents responded differently to certain questions than 
others. However, it can be noted that by using the questionnaire, the 
interview acquired a common thread. Preceding the interviews, two pilot 
studies were conducted with a fellow researcher and an informant; as a 
result, possible defects in the questionnaire could be repaired (such as 
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routing and double questions). Furthermore, during the interview more 
than one question was asked about the same topic; as a result the 
consistency of the answers given by the interviewee could be examined.  
3.6 Reflections on and limitations of the study  
The aim of this study was to acquire insight into the tensions in corporate 
governance in the financial sector. This is why two case studies were 
conducted. Since these organizations are not representative of the entire 
financial sector, based on this study it is not possible to make conclusions 
about the extent to which the tensions occur in the financial sector in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, the choice for a narrative approach means 
that little insight was acquired into the actual effect of corporate govern-
ance. To make conclusions about the effect of corporate governance, the 
study could be expanded in two ways. First, the effects that are to be 
measured must be specified. Second, an interesting follow-up study 
would be to look at how democratic corporate governance is perceived 
to be. Based on the analysis conducted in the present study, it was not 
possible to measure such effects; clearly, this would have been a useful 
and important addition.  
Interpretive research always takes place from a specific perspective; it is 
not possible to approach, present or analyse a narrative in a value-free or 
theory-free fashion. Martin argued that criteria such as reflexivity are 
crucial to the assessment of qualitative cultural research. Reflexivity is 
defined as the depth of understanding that the researcher has about his 
or her own influence on, and relationship with, the data that are being 
collected (Martin, 2002: 226). Creswell (2013) also urged the researcher, 
prior to conducting studies such as this one, to consider his or her own 
prejudices, assumptions and values (Cresswell, 2008: 58). During the 
study, as an outsider, I realized that my image of the executive world in 
the financial sector was initially coloured largely by the societal debates. 
In particular, the negative reports in the media, such as those about the 
greed and bonus culture, initially coloured my image of the executive 
world in the financial sector. It should be noted that during the in-depth 
interviews, almost all respondents from both BPF and Florabank 
immediately discredited or qualified certain images from the media. For 
example, nearly all respondents at BPF and Florabank emphasised that 
they receive no bonus or incentive. Many of my prejudices and inaccurate 
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images were thus rectified by the respondents themselves. My image of 
actors in and around the boards and governance has changed during the 
study. The respondents themselves not only played a major role in this 
change, but during the study I also became aware that the position and 
interests that you represent as a researcher are very decisive. Although I 
worked previously at ABN AMRO and had also done research in the 
Dutch banking sector, after completing the present study I had a very 
different image of the actors in and around the board of governance. I 
believe this is because I was not previously familiar with the 
administrative level, despite my knowlege of the financial sector. I have 
gained more insight into the tensions encountered by members of the 
governance board and other actors around the board. This made me 
realize that the everyday practice in the sector is sometimes experienced 
very differently than it is presented in the media.  
Further reflecting on my role as a researcher, I frequently had the feeling 
that I was an outsider, especially when gaining access to case studies and 
during the participatory observations. However, when I was able to 
actually talk with them, the interviewees were very open.  
 
In general, it can be stated that qualitative research has value because it 
gives people the space to tell their stories, with extensive attention to 
their motives and perception. However, the disadvantage of qualitative 
research is that it is bound strongly to specific times and situations. 
People tell different stories in different phases of their lives. Insights and 
beliefs change continuously, and the participants themselves do not stay 
the same. When interpreting qualitative research, it is important to 
continuously be aware that the described narrative is only a snapshot. 
Temporary situations (e.g. the attention in the media for a specific event) 
can colour a narrative. As a result, certain aspects can be emphasized 
that otherwise would not be, which creates a distorted picture for the 
reader. 
In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the severe difficulty of acquiring access to the 
financial sector is described. One limitation of the present study was that 
no permission was acquired to make participatory observations during a 
board meeting. Furthermore, during the study I was also aware of the 
effect of the presence of an outsider on the statements of the respon-
dents. The probability that socially desirable behaviour will sometimes be 
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displayed is high, and this provides a distorted view of reality. Although 
various measures were taken to put the respondents at ease and to 
reassure them that the data would be treated anonymously, this could 
have affected the validity of the research.  
 
Another limitation of this study is that interviews were held only with 
actors in and around the boards of governance. However, it was a 
deliberate choice to not involve customers and the media in the research. 
The aim was not to acquire insight into the perspective of the customers 
or the media, but to explicate the narratives about corporate governance 
from the internal actors in and around the boards of governance. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the narratives on corporate governance 
could have been enriched by the inclusion of other narrators (such as 
opinion leaders) and various media (television, Internet). Such studies 
could also provide insight into the topic of power and the struggle for 
dominance in public debates.  
3.7 Synthesis  
In this chapter, the philosophical and methodological consequences of 
this study are delineated. This chapter answers the second part of the 
research question for this dissertation: On which philosophical founda-
tions and methodological considerations is this study based?  
 
In Section 3.1, the philosophical assumptions of this study are explained 
on the basis of ontological and epistemological positions. This study can 
be described as idealistic-interpretive research. Idealism refers its social 
constructivist point of departure, which means that one assumes that 
social reality is constructed in interaction. This point of departure has a 
direct link with interpretivism. The word says it all: interpretivism means 
searching for the interpretations that people give to social phenomena 
or situations. In line with this, Swanborn stated that individuals do not 
respond initially to the direct actions of people with whom they interact, 
but to the presumed meaning behind the actions (Swanborn, 1981). The 
supporters of the interpretative approach share an appreciation for the 
role of language. The ontological and epistemological position of the 
present study is expressed through the application of the narrative 
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approach that is central to the data analysis and data presentation 
(Section 3.5).  
In line with idealism and interpretivism as the philosophical standpoints 
of this study, Section 3.2 shows that the research design is grounded in 
the organizational anthropology approach. Besides its holistic viewpoint 
this study looks through an emic perspective (Martin, 2002). This 
provides insight into the sensemaking of actors in and around the 
executive board. The six steps of the research process are the following: 
making the research design, conducting and describing the literature 
study, acquiring access to the field, collecting data, interpreting and 
analysing data and presenting the findings in book form.  
 
In line with the ontological and epistemological standpoints as well as 
the organizational anthropology approach, Section 3.3 has shown that 
this study is explorative-qualitative in character. It is about identifying the 
guiding principles of corporate governance and improving the under-
standing of the reality construction about corporate governance. To 
study the lifeworld of the actors in and around the boards of governance, 
data source triangulation, methods triangulation, data type triangulation 
and analysis triangulation were used. The fieldwork was split into two 
phases. The first phase was an explorative context study, and the second 
phase consisted of two case studies: BPF and Florabank. The following 
research methods were used to conduct the context study: interviews, 
observations and document analysis. For the case studies on a pension 
fund (BPF) and a bank (Florabank), in-depth interviews and document 
analysis were used.  
 
Section 3.4 shows that this study complied with the code of conduct for 
scientific practice (VSNU, 2012). The code contains five principles: 
scrupulousness, reliability, verifiability, impartiality and independence. 
Lombarts (2011) ascertained that these five principles are very similar to 
the six techniques that Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2009) proposed to 
increase the reliability of research: thick description, reflexivity, triangu-
lation, an audit or audit trail, negative case analyse and member check-
ing. Several of these techniques have been applied in the present study 
and have been addressed in this chapter. 
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Section 3.5 focusses on data collection and data analysis, and the quality 
of the data is discussed in terms of reliability, validity and generalizability. 
In line with social constructivist thinking, this study was conducted within 
the tradition of discourse analysis (Section 2.2). In a discourse analysis, 
patterns, ideas and concepts that are potentially key to sensemaking in a 
specific period are analysed (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1993; Hajer 
& Wagenaar, 2003) In this study, I sought to distinguish the dominant 
narratives on corporate governance that “circulated” in the period 
between March 2007 and August 2011. To structure the data analysis, 
Creswell's (2013) six steps for analysing and interpreting qualitative data 
were used: preparing and organizing the data, exploring and coding the 
data, describing the findings and establishing themes, representing and 
reporting the findings, interpreting the significance of the findings and 
validating the accuracy of the findings.  
 
In Section 3.6, the reflections on and limitations to the study are 
addressed. An important remark is that the case studies were not 
representative of the entire financial sector. Consequently, it is not 
possible on the basis of this study to make conclusions about the extent 
to which the tensions occur throughout the financial sector in the 
Netherlands.  
A crucial key to understanding data drawn from qualitative research is 
the context in which they were gathered. This is why the following 
section on the context of the financial sector has been included. After 
these brief “sketches” of context, the detailed descriptions of and 
findings from the case studies will be presented. 
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Sketches of the context of the financial sector: a 
brief overview  
This section sketches the context which dominates both case studies. 
Financial crisis, greed and bonusculture are key words of this context. By 
means of an introduction to the case studies (BPF and Florabank), the 
section below zooms in on the important terms in the context of 
financial sector at the time of the study. 
 
The financial crisis has been given several designations in recent years, 
such as the credit crunch and the banking crisis. The credit crunch is the 
designation for the crisis that originated in the financial markets in the 
summer of 2007 and peaked in the autumn of 2008. The first signs of the 
credit crunch became apparent at the beginning of 2007 in United States. 
A growing number of people had difficulty making their costly mortgage 
payments. They had borrowed too much money on mortgages with 
variable interest rates. The first mortgage banks starting having 
problems in early 2007, and the problems quickly become worse. The US 
mortgage crisis spread to Europe, resulting in falling stock prices and 
money markets drying up. The global financial system began to crumble. 
Banks everywhere reported losses in the billions. In the summer of 2008 
it all went wrong. Stock markets tumbled and the two largest US 
mortgage lenders, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, received billions in 
emergency aid from the US government. The biggest shock happened in 
mid-September: the US investment bank Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt and was not bailed out by the government. The resulting 
shockwave travelled through the financial sector. During the crisis many 
observers noted that surveillance of the banks had failed. However, the 
designation "credit crunch" does not cover all aspects of crisis. There was 
not only a credit crunch in terms of limited liquidity and a shortage of 
longer-term capital, but there was sometimes a crisis of trust in the 
financial sector. 
Closely linked to the credit crunch, in 2008 and 2009 there was also talk 
of a banking crisis. Due in part to bad loans, the solvency of banks was at 
risk. The banks held on to their money and no longer lent it to each other 
or to their clients, resulting is a shortage of credit. To defuse the banking 
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crisis, governments loaned billions to banks worldwide (Kickert, 2012). As 
a result of the banking crisis, a societal discussion started about the 
functioning of the banks. In the Netherlands there was also growing 
outrage over bankers, who were seen as the source of all financial woes. 
The public opinion was that “greed led to the crisis”. All incidents and 
events were widely covered in the media. The bankers should confess, 
apologise and preferably resign. In the United States and in Britain, the 
bankers had to answer to tribunals. In the Netherlands, members of 
parliament demanded that the top executives of nine Dutch banks come 
to The Hague for a roundtable discussion. The members of parliament 
were mainly angry and indignant, the bankers were distraught and tried 
to explain how complicated everything was. The call for action was 
growing and the conclusion was that firm management was necessary. 
The De Wit Commission (Section 1.5), which was commissioned by 
parliament to investigate the financial crisis, concluded that the state had 
made serious mistakes during the purchase of ABN AMRO and Fortis, and 
in providing aid to ING. Taxpayers had paid 4 to 5 billion euros too much 
for the Dutch component of Fortis. The excessive amount was a result of 
a lack of information at the Ministry of Finance, late intervention and 
poor preparation.  
The media paid much attention to the greed and bonus culture of 
financial managers. An important criticism was that the financial sector 
continued to pay large salaries and allowances to board members, even 
though the businesses were losing money and jobs were being lost. A 
much-discussed example was that of Rijkman Groenink, the former board 
chairman at ABN AMRO. His severance payment of 4.3 million euros and 
almost 26 million euros in options and shares, which had been agreed 
before the crisis, aroused great public indignation. The media played a 
major role in this situation. Executives were publicly confronted and 
criticized in the media for their greedy behaviour. In addition, social 
protests and demonstrations, such as the Occupy movement (Section 
1.1), began in Wall Street in New York and moved to other countries, 
including the Netherlands.  
 
The case studies presented in the following chapters took place against 
the background described above. 
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4  BPF 
This chapter gives background of the case study of the "Industry-wide 
Pension Fund" (hereinafter, the Dutch abbreviation BPF will be used), in 
preparation of chapter six which gives an analysis of BPF in light of 
theory. This chapter aims to answer to the second research question: 
“How do actors in and around the boards of governance of BPF and 
Florabank deal with tensions in corporate governance?”. The findings of 
this case study are presented in this chapter with the aid of three types 
of logic: the logic of the actor, of the institute and of the practice. The 
term logic is based on the core concept institutional logic. It focuses on 
how broader belief systems shape the cognition and behaviour of 
actors. Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) define institutional logics as: 
‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
providing meaning to their social reality’. The core assumption of the 
construct is that logics exists in a dynamic interplay between individual 
and macro-phenomenological levels of analysis. Logics are the products 
of shared beliefs and values in a community of individuals and they 
shape individual behaviour by defining what is considered the sensible 
thing to do.  
These three types of logic can be considered as three separate concepts 
that become concrete through the presentation of quotations from 
stories from the case study. These stories are drawn from interviews 
and document analysis and they are thus paraphrases of stories told by 
the actors themselves. In Section 4.1, the main actors take centre stage: 
What kind of people are these? What is their background and origin? 
What is important to them in their work? This is followed by the second 
topic: What is the dominant language of the key players and how is that 
language given shape in the daily practice of corporate governance? 
And finally the third topic is addressed: How do the actors in and around 
the executive board of BPF experience the present time and how do 
they deal with this? Section 4.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. 
Based on historical stories about external rules and internal processes, 
Chapter 4 
112 
 
procedures and stories about the interests and maintaining the balance 
between these interests, it becomes clear how corporate governance is 
given substance within BPF. Section 4.3 then presents the logic of 
practice, with stories about the tensions in practice: Which obstacles do 
actors encounter in practice, and how do they deal with these 
obstacles? Finally, Section 4.4 closes this chapter with a synthesis. 
4.1 Presentation of the actor logic 
The heading of this section refers to the presentation of the logic of 
actors in and around the executive board. By determining who the key 
players are, what is important to them, how they think and in which 
context they must operate, insight can be provided into the worldview of 
actors in and around the executive board. 
4.1.1 The key players 
To provide insight into the background and origin of the key players in 
and around the executive board of BPF, Appendix II includes a summary 
of the background and origin of the respondents of BPF. To clarify the 
relationship between players and respondents, Table 4.1 again shows the 
background and origin of the respondents.  
 
Table 4.1 Personal background of the respondents at BPF 
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1 Executive board 
BPF 
(employers 
organization) 
 
Chairman 
 
V   V  V V 
2 Executive board 
BPF 
(employee 
organization) 
 
Secretary 
of the 
Board 
   V V  V 
3 Executive board 
BPF 
(employers 
organization) 
 
Member    V V 
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4 Executive board 
BPF  
(employee 
organization) 
 
Member    V V  V 
5 Executive Office 
BPF 
 
Director     V 
 
 V  
6 Pension 
Administration 
(external bureau) 
 
Account 
Manager  
   V   V 
7 Portfolio 
Management 
(external bureau) 
 
Account 
Manager 
V   V V 
8 Investment 
Advisory 
Committee 
(external agency) 
 
Member V   V  V V 
9 Participants 
Council  
(employee 
organization) 
 
Chair     V V  V 
10 Supervisory Council  
(various other 
organizations)  
 
Chair V   V V V V 
 
Three important remarks can be made about the key players shown in 
this table. First of all, nearly everyone (with the exception of the Director 
of the Executive Office worked part-time at the pension fund. Besides 
their jobs at BPF, all respondents had another job in the industry, with a 
trade union or a commercial organization. The fact that nearly everyone 
had their primary job elsewhere meant that they did not have a fixed 
workplace at BPF, but had to make appointments to see each other. This 
resulted in a different dynamic than the actors in and around the execu-
tive board, who had a fixed workplace within the organization. The 
member of the executive board of the employer organization explained 
this as follows:  
 
The company is ultimately a social community in which people can 
work together to a greater or lesser extent. The more you work 
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together, the more you learn about each other. The executive 
board of the pension fund holds periodic meetings. As chairman, 
you have more contact, and sometimes you have more time to 
seek social cohesion, but this is not your primary safety net. I 
believe that chemistry in the executive board of a commercial 
organization is more important than in the board of a pension 
fund, because you are not bothered, you are going see each other 
every two months (Interview with member of executive board of 
employers organization). 
 
Another impact of working part time is that nearly everyone has their 
main job elsewhere. At BPF, they represent not only the interests of the 
pension fund, but also the interests of a particular group (such as 
employees, employers or pensioners) or another organization (such as a 
trade union, employer organization or a commercial agency).  
 
The respondents indicated that representing a constituency or an 
organization means that they also have to consider the perspective of 
this constituency or organization. The in-depth interviews indicated that 
it is difficult to stay informed about the wishes and needs of their consti-
tuency, not only for the members of the executive board, but also for the 
members of the participants council. The account manager Portfolio 
Management and account manager Pension Administration both stated 
that they always had to look at whether the wishes and needs of the 
customer are compatible with what their organization could provide. 
Consequently, when requested to do something, they regularly doubted 
whether they could make commitments.  
The second remark is that only two of the ten respondents were women, 
but in contrast to the executive boards of many other pension funds, 
during the interviews it turned out that half of the members of BPF 
executive board were women. When asked why there are generally so 
few women on the executive boards of pension funds, the respondents 
stated that it has to do with the effort that it takes to recruit women for 
such positions. Although the respondents were also aware that fewer 
women are generally available for these positions, they indicated that 
they were not always acquainted with the women who were available 
and therefore they had work harder to contact them. According to the 
respondents, because society is now places more emphasis on the 
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participation of women and minorities in management, there is more 
effort to ensure the participation of women in and around the executive 
board. Moreover, the respondents experienced the balance between 
women and men on the executive board of BPF as positive. They referred 
to a balance of personal characteristics: the social and emotional 
characteristics of women balance the hard and rational characteristics of 
men. Various respondents indicated that such a mix of characteristics is 
actually essential on the executive board, and they were therefore 
pleased with mix of women and men on the board at BPF. The third 
remark with respect to the background of the respondents is that the 
majority had been educated in economics or law. They emphasized that 
in the pension world a background in economics was a major advantage 
when interpreting financial models, which requires substantial expertise. 
At the same time, various respondents emphasized that this background 
explains the dominance of utility-oriented and rational thinking. After all, 
economists and lawyers are accustomed to acting rationally and in a 
utility-oriented fashion. 
 
When the individual respondents were asked what people in and around 
the executive board of BPF have in common, the majority of respondents 
stated that this question was difficult to answer, because this group is 
very diverse. The director of the Office of the Executive Board described 
this as follows:  
 
I find it very difficult to see similarities. The groups are so different. 
If I look at the Participants Council, then in a manner of speaking I 
see people who work with their hands, and if I compare that with 
the investment advisory committee, which includes the chairman 
of a large government institution [anonymized], then this is almost 
impossible to compare. I simply cannot put a label on this. 
However, I do have the idea that everyone is doing their very best 
for the pension fund. And I really mean everyone (Interview with 
director of the Executive Office). 
 
When the answers were subsequently probed and the respondents were 
compelled to make a statement, it emerged that the actors in the 
executive board of BPF are socially engaged and open. Moreover, the 
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respondents indicated various additional characterristics: mutual respect 
and trust between the actors, a willingness to enter into discussion 
without forcing their opinion –but with good arguments– the desire to 
be virtuous, an extroverted and critical personality, and that there is 
room to disagree with each other and to express feelings. Various 
respondents indicated that this has not always been the case. Several 
years before, there was a charismatic chairman who often dominated the 
meetings. According to the respondents, due to the composition of the 
executive board and the new Chairman and Secretary of the Board, the 
position of the members of the executive board has become more equal. 
The stories of the respondents clearly indicated that the composition of 
the executive board determines how it performs its duties. The member 
of the IAC described the executive board as follows:  
 
There are enjoyable discussions, everything is carefully considered, 
any lack of information is noted and whether we have to break a 
stalemate. That sticky inertia that we see in many pension funds is 
scarcely present at BPF. That has to do with 'puppets'. Purely the 
type of puppets involved. The membership of the executive board 
can change in many ways, a totally different board can be 
appointed, the atmosphere can also change (Interview with 
member of the Investment Advisory Committee).  
 
In summary, this section shows that the actors in and around the 
executive board of PPF are very diverse, but they have a very similar 
frame of reference. For example, there are individuals with a frame of 
reference that is oriented strongly towards their constituency or other 
organization, and who think in a utility-oriented and result-oriented 
fashion due to their education and background. The story in the 
following section shows that the actors see corporate governance as 
rules and regulations.  
4.1.2 Rules, rules and more rules 
The stories of corporate governance told by respondents are permeated 
with rules and regulations. This is not only due to the fact that many 
actors in and around the executive board have a background in law, but 
primarily because they see corporate governance as rules and regula-
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tions. When asked "What is corporate governance?", the majority of the 
respondents at BPF referred to rules and regulations. The Pensions Act 
and the Frijns and Goudswaard parliamentary commissions were men-
tioned in particular. Another important frame of reference concerns the 
internal procedures and processes, including charters and regulations. 
This attention for processes and procedures is reinforced because many 
former directors and controllers are represented on the Participants 
Council and the Accountability Body, and these former directors often 
have a great affinity with procedures and processes (Interview with 
chairman of the executive board). During the interviews it was striking 
that the respondents are not only aware of working in a process-based 
and procedural fashion, but that they also think in terms of processes 
and procedures. For example, when asked to make a drawing of the 
authority structure in the organization, the member of the board from 
the employer organization made a sketch of the decision-making 
process. In view of the fact that the Pensions Act, the Frijns and 
Goudswaard parliamentary commissions and the charter and internal 
regulations are so important within BPF, these aspects will be explained 
briefly below.  
 
Pensions Act 
The Pensions Act went into force on 1 January 2007, replacing the 
Pensions and Savings Act. The latter had become outdated. The new Act 
has the same objective as the previous one: safeguarding pension 
commitments. The difference is that there is more focus on 
transparency, certainty and transfer of knowledge about pensions 
(Zweers, 2006). The basic principle of the Pensions Act is that a pension is 
a condition of employment. The DNB and AFM monitor compliance with 
the provisions in the Pensions Act. The most important principles of the 
executive body of a pension fund are the following:  
- Half of the executive board must consist of representatives of 
employers organizations, the other half of representatives of 
employee organizations. The executive board must serve the 
interests of all stakeholders: the active participants, the employers 
the pensioners and the former participants.  
- An industry-wide pension fund has a Participants Council, in which 
the employees and retirees are represented proportionally. The 
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Participants Council advises the executive board about all important 
governance issues.  
- The executive board must establish an internal supervisory body 
that periodically evaluates the administrative processes and the 
governance of the fund. 
- The executive board must delegate accountability to an Accounta-
bility Body consisting of representatives of all stakeholders, 
employers, employees and pensioners (Pensions Act, 2007).  
 
In late 2005, the Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance (PFG principles) 
were established by the project PFG36. These principles are: good 
governance, internal supervision, accountability to stakeholders, exper-
tise of the executive board, management and those who are responsible 
for internal supervision; openness with regard to decision-making and 
communication to stakeholders and to society as a whole. Since 2007, 
these principles have been anchored in the Pensions Act. Each pension 
fund has a certain freedom to apply the PFG principles to its own 
situation and characteristics. BPF has chosen to focus on the following 
principles: accountability and supervision, expertise, openness and 
transparency and carefulness. BPF will be accountable in the annual 
report for the choice of the principles.  
 
Frijns and Goudswaard parliamentary commissions  
The reports of the Frijns37 and Goudswaard38 Parliamentary commissions 
were both published in January 2010. The Frijns Commission, also known 
as the Investment Policy and Risk Management Commission, investigated 
whether pension funds conducted a responsible investment policy in 
recent years and how they made a trade-off between risk and return. The 
 
36 It included representatives of the social partners and representatives of the VB, 
Association of Company Pension Funds (OPF) and Association of Insurers and the 
Coordinating Body Older People Organizations (CSO). 
37 The Frijns Commission was named after its chairman, Prof. dr. Frijns, professor of 
investments at VU University Amsterdam, former director of Portfolio Management and 
member of the Executive Council of the ABP Pension Fund. 
38 The Goudswaard Commission was named after Prof. dr. Goudswaard, professor of 
Applied Economics at the University of Leiden, professor by special appointment in Social 
Security at the University of Leiden and Commissioner at DNB.  
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Commission concluded there were no indications that pension funds had 
performed poorly in a structural fashion, despite the enormous losses in 
2008. However, little attention was paid to risk management policy and 
the implementation of investment policy. Furthermore, the Frijns 
Commission indicated that the increasing complexity of financial 
products requires more and more expertise from executives and that the 
quality of the administrative process requires special attention 
(Commissie Beleggingsbeleid en Risicobeleid, 2010). The Goudswaard 
Commission, also known as the Future-proof Supplementary Pension 
Schemes Commission, investigated the extent to which the pension 
system is future-proof with an eye on the aging population, or how it 
could become future-proof. The Goudswaard Commission concluded that 
the pension system in the Netherlands, with the existing ambitions and 
assumed certainty, is insufficiently future-proof due to the aging 
population, the increasing life expectancy and the increasing vulnerability 
for financial risks (Commissie Toekomstbestendigheid Aanvullende 
Pensioenregelingen, 2010). The conclusions and recommendations of 
both commissions and the evaluation of the Financial Assessment 
Framework (FTK)39 confirmed that a better system was needed to ensure 
structurally sustainable supplementary pensions, also for the younger 
generation. On 4 June 2010, agreement was reached between the "social 
partners" (management and labour). The most important elements from 
this pension agreement were raising the retirement age, increasing state 
pension benefits, providing more clarity about the risks of pensions, and 
stabilizing the costs of pensions and pension contributions.  
 
Charter and internal regulations 
Two essential topics concerning formal corporate governance at BPF are 
its charter (2010) and internal regulations (2010). In the charter, it is 
stated that the aim of BPF is to protect employees and former employ-
ees, as well as their surviving dependents, against the financial conse-
quences of old age and death and to protect employees against the 
financial consequences of long-term occupational disability. BPF endea-
 
39The Financial Assessment Framework (FTK) is a component of the Pensions Act, which 
specifies the statutory financial requirements for pension funds. The FTK is based on the 
principles of market valuation, risk-based financial requirements and transparency.  
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vours to achieve this aim by collecting premiums from employers, 
investing and managing the premiums, and using the proceeds of invest-
ments to allocate retirement benefits, death benefits and occupational 
disability benefits. The pension assets are entrusted to the pension fund 
by the stakeholders in the expectation that it will use the assets in 
accordance with the mandate. The charter briefly specifies the tasks, 
responsibilities and competencies of the executive board, the 
Participants Council, the Supervisory Council, the Accountability Body, 
the administrator, an advisory actuary, and a certifying actuary. The 
charter refers to separate internal regulations for the Participants 
Council, the Supervisory Council and the Accountability Body, specifying 
the membership, competencies and procedures of these bodies.  
In this section, the most important characteristics of the rules and 
regulations and internal processes are explained; the respondents base 
their thinking on these frames of reference. The following section 
focuses on current affairs because the stories about corporate govern-
ance have shown that this influences the thinking of the key players. 
4.1.3 The pressure of the crises 
From the interviews and the document analysis it emerged that a striking 
number of references were made to the financial crisis, the credit crisis, 
banking crisis and the crisis of trust and its impact on BPF. Various 
respondents stated that the negative results of the pension fund 
affected the image of the executive board of the pension fund. The 
member of the executive board from the employee organizations 
expressed this very clearly:  
 
When the share prices fell, it was no longer self-evident that the 
pensions were indexed, people suddenly began to use dramatic 
language: pension fund managers were equated with a gang of 
thieves (Interview with executive board member from employee 
organization).  
 
The executive board member from the employee organization explained 
that both politicians and the public criticized the pension fund managers 
severely, and the managers experienced this as very difficult. She 
explained that she was even held to account by a neighbour because she 
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was on the executive board of a pension fund. From the stories of the 
respondents, it emerged that they were frequently angry because they 
thought it was unfair that they were being held to account personally. 
For example, multiple respondents stated that people in their surround-
dings called them to account for the 'greed culture' of the executives. 
According to the respondents, this was unfair because the members of 
the board at BPF are scarcely paid40 for their executive activities and that 
board members from the employer organization in particular invested a 
great deal of their own time in managing the pension fund. One 
frequently heard remark from the respondents was that the executive 
board was portrayed negatively, even though the Supervisory Council 
and the DNB were also taken by surprise by the financial crisis or did not 
intervene.  
When subsequently asked about the consequences of the financial crisis 
for the daily practice of management, the executive board member from 
the employee organization replied as follows:  
 
The so-called certainty that previously existed had been 
transformed entirely into uncertainty, at least in the minds of many 
people (Interview with executive board member from employee 
organization).  
 
The account manager for Portfolio Management described the 
consequences of the crisis as follows:  
 
Of course, the pension funds experienced a crisis during the past 
two years. In general terms, before this time they all conducted an 
ALM41 study and were cheerful as a result… For example you have 
only a 1 percent chance that your coverage [the ratio between 
assets and liabilities of a pension fund] will be 100. Everyone always 
thought… Well, a 1 percent chance is negligible, but during the 
credit crisis, this 1 percent actually happened… And then everyone 
thought… So it can really happen. And how bad is that? Some 
 
40 The employer organization and trade unions pay their own representatives. For this 
purpose, the trade unions and the employers organizations receive €380,- per half-day. 
41 Asset-liability management. 
Chapter 4 
122 
 
funds didn't even manage 100, but only 90. You had only read 
about this, but never experienced it yourself. Several parties were 
required to submit a recovery plan. And they were even talking 
about "afstempelen"42. I had read about this only in books… 
Things must have gotten very bad. This happened. Luckily, we 
were able to recover somewhat. In the meantime, the regulating 
authority jumped into the fray. The commission reports were 
everywhere. The Frijns Commission, the Goudswaard Commission, 
parameters, you name it… And yes, you are on the board of such a 
pension fund (Interview with account manager Portfolio 
Management).  
 
The Secretary of the Board stated that the transactions between the 
actors in and around the executive board of the pension fund came 
under pressure. The public wanted to have more control over the 
pension funds and reached for professionalization. The Pension 
Administration put pressure on the organization by indicating that it 
could not deal with the crisis by itself. The DNB exerted pressure by 
implementing more, and stricter, rules and regulations. Moreover, 
stakeholders such as pensioners, employees and politicians exerted 
pressure on the organization to protect their interests (Interview with 
Secretary of the Board). For the employers it was important to have a 
better understanding of how their pension premiums were invested. The 
employers had a great need for information concerning their individual 
situation, since it became obvious that their pensions were performing 
badly. According to the respondents, this resulted in more attention from 
various parties for communication with the stakeholders of BPF. The 
AFM implemented many more rules and regulations about communi-
cation with employees and pensioners, but BPF itself also became much 
more involved in communication with its stakeholders. For example, with 
the aid of sounding board groups of employees, pensioners and 
employers, a new website was created with information about BPF.  
 
 
42 Afstempelen is pension jargon for reducing or cutting pension benefits and 
entitlements. Pension funds can take this step if their assets are no longer sufficient to 
cover all liabilities in the future.  
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In summary, this section illustrates the logic of the actors in and around 
the executive board. Although the group of actors in and around the 
executive board was very diverse, it is evident from the findings that 
there were similarities between these actors at BPF. The actors base their 
thinking on the perspective of their constituency or organization. And 
due to their education in economics or law and their background, they 
think in a utility-oriented and rational fashion. It is striking that all 
respondents saw corporate governance as rules and regulations. From 
the findings is also evident that the actors and around the executive 
board felt uncertain due to the financial crisis. According to the 
respondents, the financial crisis also led to pressure on the actors in and 
around the executive board.  
4.2 Presentation of the institutional logic  
The aim of this section is to provide insight into the logic of BPF as an 
organization. How were the respondents expected to act? What were 
the most important rules to survive at BPF? And which written and 
unwritten rules were followed by the actors in and around the executive 
board, and how was this shown? Below, the institutional logic is presen-
ted by means of four stories. At the end of this section, the four stories 
are summarized, and the institutional logic is explained.  
4.2.1 The historical values 
BPF was founded more than 60 years ago at the request of cao 
(collective labour agreement) signatories: the employer and employee 
organizations43 of a particular industry in the Netherlands. BPF focused 
on the second pillar44 of the pension system, which is the supplementary 
 
43 In the Netherlands, pensions are not obligatory. The employers and trade unions 
themselves can decide whether to offer a pension scheme. However, the government 
can make a pension scheme obligatory for an entire sector or a professional group if 
there is sufficient support for this measure. In these cases, employers cannot decide 
independently whether or not to offer a pension scheme. 
44 The Netherlands pension system consists of three pillars: the state pension scheme 
(AOW), the supplementary collective pensions and the individual pension insurance that 
people acquire for themselves. Together, these three pillars determine the amount of the 
pension that a pensioner receives. 
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collective pensions is funded45. BPF is a foundation. As an independent 
legal entity, it is not part of a company or industry. The specific industry 
cannot be reported in the present study because the organization wishes 
to remain anonymous. As indicated by its name, BPF is an industry-wide 
pension fund and not a company pension fund or occupational pension 
fund. An industry-wide pension fund belongs to the largest group of 
pension funds. Three-fourths of employees in the Netherlands belong to 
an industry-wide pension fund. Industry-wide pension funds are based on 
two important values: collectivism and solidarity. The title of this chapter 
refers to these values. By making pensions obligatory, you share the 
risks. The Secretary of the Board told the story of Dirk Witteveen:  
 
Dirk Witteveen, former director of the DNB, once gave a 
presentation using the example of dice. The chance that you will 
throw a particular number increases in proportion to the number 
of times you throw the dice. There is more solidarity because you 
the share risks and the revenues with each other. This solidarity is 
the strength of the Dutch system.  
 
The interviews revealed that the actors in and around the executive 
board believe in the collectivism and solidarity of pension funds. The 
underlying idea here is that the collectivism can reach more than one 
individual. Based on this value, a pension fund is able and willing to share 
the risks internally. In addition, the value of solidarity refers to the mutual 
solidarity between groups of pension payers. During the in-depth inter-
views, three of the ten respondents emphasized that the values of 
collectivism and solidarity not only played a major role during the 
establishment of the pension fund, but were also central to the current 
discussions. For example, the chair of the Participants Council stated that 
the discussion about the solidarity principle was cited in the public 
discussion about whether young people should pay the pensions of the 
elderly.  
 
45 In a funded pension scheme, pensions are financed by premiums that people have paid 
in the past, increased by the yield on the corresponding investment. 
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The above narration about BPF clearly shows that it was established at 
the request of the employer and employee organizations of the industry. 
BPF it is one of the wealthiest of the largest industry-wide pension funds. 
The stories revealed that the larger pension funds are at the forefront 
more often than the smaller pension funds. The large pension funds want 
to have more freedom and have more of an internal focus, while the 
smaller pension funds often prefer to keep to the rules and regulations, 
and have more of an external focus. The respondents linked the size of 
the pension fund to the attention for processes and procedures. At the 
larger pension funds, more specialized jobs and procedures are needed. 
The smaller funds work more pragmatically and focus much more on 
decisions than on procedures. At BPF, much more emphasis is placed on 
the procedure than on the decision (Interview with account manager 
Pension Administration). In addition to the size of the industry and the 
pension fund, the nature and history of the industry also partly deter-
mine the culture of BPF, according to the respondents. Traditionally, the 
industry is socially engaged and idealistic, and in the recent past has 
become much more commercial. This can also be seen in and around the 
culture of the pension fund. Due to the nature of the industry, most 
people who work at BPF have an affinity with finance. According to the 
respondents, this could be the reason that the members of the 
Participants Council spontaneously apply to become members, while 
pension funds in other industries have difficulty finding members.  
Respondents emphasized that BPF was originally based on the values 
collectivism and solidarity. The following section shows that these 
original values are still deeply rooted in the organization of the pension 
fund executive board.  
4.2.2 The organizational model  
This section concerns organized solidarity. The results revealed that 
people wanted to design the structure and organization of the pension 
fund in such a way that solidarity is reflected in the structure of the 
organization. For example, the executive board and other bodies within 
BPF consist of representatives of employer and employee organizations. 
The underlying idea is that by giving membership on the board to 
representatives to employer and employee organizations, the executive 
board will consider their interests in a balanced fashion. Figure 4.1 
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provides a summary of the actors in and around the executive board of 
BPF. This figure was created by combining information from the 
interviews, charter, internal regulations and annual reports. In the middle 
of Figure 4.1, the executive board and the corresponding Executive Office 
are shown in a dark frame, since the executive board determines the 
policy of the pension fund and is responsible for monitoring its 
implementation. According to the charter, the executive board of BPF 
has the mandate to collect premiums, invest them and ensure that the 
benefits are paid on time. The executive board of BPF consists of six 
board members, of which three are appointed by the employers 
organizations and three by the employee organizations or trade unions. 
The positions of chairman and board secretary are rotated between 
representatives of the employers and employee organizations. The 
Executive Office was established in September 2009 to support and 
advise the executive board in performing its duties. This Executive Office 
consists of one individual. An important task of this individual is to 
prepare the board meetings.  
 
Figure 4.1 Overview of actors in and around the boards of governance at BPF 
 
In Figure 4.1, the board and the Executive Office are surrounded by the 
external players who advise the board. The committees prepare the 
executive decisions in order to improve the efficiency of this process. BPF 
has the following standing committees: the Communications Committee, 
Regulations and Individual Affairs Committee, Arbitration Committee and 
Outsourcing Committee. A temporary executive committee, the Pension 
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Committee, has also been established46. Besides committee members 
from the employers and employee organizations and external experts, all 
executive committees include two executive board members of BPF. 
Another committee, which is not an executive committee, but does 
appear in Figure 4.1, is the IAC. This committee advises the executive 
board on portfolio management and focuses on strategic investment 
policy, comprehensive reporting, performance measurement and inte-
grated risk management. The pension administration and portfolio 
management are outsourced to external organizations. These organiza-
tions do not have their own policy in terms of pension regulation. This 
competency lies entirely with the executive board. Both organizations 
have account managers at BPF. In addition, there is another portfolio 
management advisor who provides independent advice in this area. To 
distinguish between the two external organizations in portfolio manage-
ment, the first organization is hereinafter called Portfolio Management 
and the other organization the Portfolio Management Advisor.  
In Figure 4.1, the circle on the left depicts the employer and employee 
organizations and the Participants Council. The circle can be seen as the 
constituency of the pension fund executive board. The employer and 
employee organizations elect representatives to the executive board of 
BPF. The Participants Council represents only the members of the 
employee organization. The task of the Participants Council is to provide 
the executive board, on request or on its own initiative, with advice on 
matters concerning the pension fund. In certain situations, the executive 
board is even obligated to obtain advice from the Participants Council, 
for example: ascertaining the financial status of the fund in the annual 
report, or if the financial situation prompts changes in the current 
pensions (Pensions Act, 2007). This Council consists of 12 members, and is 
formed by the members of three trade union organizations and the 
Pensioners Association of the industry. The executive board appoints a 
member to the Council for a term of six years. After this term elapses, 
there is a possibility for reappointment for one more term. The ratio 
 
46 This Pension Committee has the following tasks: preparing measures in case the fund 
is unable to repair the insufficient coverage or reserve shortage as part of the recovery 
plan; preparing for the consequences of the Pension Agreement for the fund; answering 
the questions from the cao signatories (Annual Report, 2010). 
Chapter 4 
128 
 
between the active participants and pensioners in the Participants 
Council reflects the total set of participants in the pension fund. The ratio 
at BPF is approximately 3 active participants to one pensioner (Annual 
Report BPF, 2010).  
The circle on the right of Figure 4.1 depicts the actors who are involved 
with monitoring the pension fund executive board. To make a distinction 
between the supporting actors and the supervising actors, a line has 
been drawn between the two groups. The supporting actors include the 
actuaries47, the compliance officer and the accountant. Within the group 
of supervising actors, a subsequent distinction can be made between 
internal and external supervision. The internal supervision of BPF is 
conducted by the Accountability Body and the Supervisory Council. The 
Accountability Body was established in 2008 and consists of six mem-
bers, of which two members are from the employee organization, two 
members from the pensioners and two members from the employer 
organizations48. The Accountability Body has the competency to make a 
general assessment of the activities of the executive board based on the 
annual report, the annual account and other information. Based on the 
provisions in the Pensions Act (2007), the Accountability Body also has 
the right of inquiry. This means that the Accountability Body can commis-
sion independent inquiries into the policy of the fund or the operation of 
the executive board. The other internal supervisory body, the Super-
visory Council, has the task of assessing policy and management proce-
dures, management processes, the checks and balances within the fund, 
how the fund is managed and how the board deals with long-term risks. 
The Supervisory Council is entitled to all information it requires to 
conduct its task efficiently, and is entitled to consult with the executive 
board about all executive tasks and consult with the accountant and 
actuary. The Supervisory Council is appointed by the executive board 
following a public selection procedure. The members comply with the 
 
47 Actuaries give insurance companies and pension funds a declaration of the adequacy 
of the provision and the financial position of the insurer or pension fund. Within the BPF 
there are two actuaries: an advisory actuary and a certifying actuary. The advisory actuary 
is the same person as the director of the Office of the Executive Board.  
48 The composition of the Accountability Body is specified in the Pensions Act and must 
consist of one-third participants, one-third employers and one-third pensioners. 
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standards of the DSB with respect to expertise and integrity. External 
supervision, as with the other case in this study, is provided by the DSB 
and the AFM. The DSB focuses primarily on the financing of the pension 
obligations and the content of the implementation agreement between 
the employer and the pension administrator, as well as the pension 
agreement that describes the relationship between the pension admini-
strator and the employee. The AFM focuses primarily on the communi-
cation by the pension administrator with employees who are making 
pension agreements or have made them in the past.  
In summary, this section shows that the original values of collectivism 
and solidarity are reflected in the governance model of BPF. The various 
interest groups are represented in nearly all bodies. The underlying idea 
of this organization model is that the employers and employees in the 
body must reach agreement about the implementation of the fund. The 
story also shows that the corresponding rules and regulations (Pensions 
Act) play an important role because they establish the basic principles of 
the administrative organization (Section 4.1.2).  
4.2.3 The authority of the executive board 
This story concerns the authority of the actors in and around the 
executive board of BPF, and can be told based on a matrix. The 
respondents were requested to fill in the matrix on which they ranked 
the authority of actors (with a score of one through twelve) in day-to-day 
administrative practice. The average authority ranking of actors is shown 
in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Average authority ranking of actors in and around the boards of 
governance of BPF 
No. Who has the final word?  
1 Executive board 
2 Executive Office 
3 Investment Advisory Committee  
4 Portfolio Management Advisor  
5 DNB  
6 Pension Administration 
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The respondents were allowed to add actors to the matrix if they chose. 
They added executives of the employee organization, members of the 
employee organization, actuaries (certifying and advisory), the 
accountant, the compliance officer, the employee organization and the 
employers organization. These were not included in  
the schematic, because only one or two respondents referred to these 
actors as someone with authority, and this would have resulted in an 
inaccurate average picture.  
 
All respondents, with the exception of the account manager of the 
Pension Administration, agreed that the executive board has the most 
authority. This account manager indicated that the employers and 
employee organizations actually shared first place, followed by the 
executive board. The reason for this was that the employers and 
employee organizations together determine the cao (collective labour 
agreement) and therefore determine the implementation framework for 
the pension fund. Other respondents also referred to the important 
influence of the cao negotiations between the employers and employee 
organizations. The respondents emphasized that there is a major 
difference between the way of working during the cao negotiations and 
the executive board of the pension fund. The atmosphere during the cao 
negotiations is more business-like and harder than the atmosphere in the 
executive board of the pension fund. In the executive board, there is a 
common interest and a common responsibility, while during cao 
negotiations you have the task of representing the interests of either 
employers or employees. The common interest of the executive board is 
arranged in the formulation of the collective task (Pensions Act Article 
102a). As a result, the executive board is required to accept a joint 
mandate from the employee and employer organizations. The mandate 
7 Participants Council 
8 Supervisory Council 
9 Accountability Body 
10 AFM 
11 The Dutch Association of Industry-wide Pension Funds 
12 Portfolio Management 
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for the executive board of BPF is to invest properly so that in the future 
there are enough assets to pay pensions or earn the desired yield. 
The respondents indicated that there is a hierarchy on the executive 
board between the chairman, the board secretary and the other board 
members. In this context, the board member from the employer 
organization stated the following:  
 
I experience the executive board as a whole, but if worst comes to 
worst, it is the chairman who can make a difference. Indeed, during 
negotiations I have sometimes had a discussion with someone 
from the Investment Advisory Committee. We didn't disagree 
about the final result, but about the method of negotiation. You 
and I will negotiate differently because we are different people. At 
that point I said, if we can't solve this ourselves, then we should go 
to the chairman and ask if he has any ideas. Such a chairman can 
also use his informal network to exert influence. This is why he 
chose the role of chairman. In addition, he chairs the board 
meetings. By leading the meetings in a certain way, he can direct 
and influence the outcome. But by and large, the board is a really a 
whole. The vote of the chairman does not count more than that of 
the other members. I would also say exactly the same if the 
chairman was from the employee organization (Interview with 
executive board member representing employer organizations).  
 
The other board members stated clearly that the entire board decides, 
but the chairman and board secretary have more influence than the 
other board members. Occasionally, at both BPF it was revealed that a 
role is played by the preference of actors in and around the boards of 
governance to continue with the duties in their portfolios or to place 
their own favourite projects on the agenda. All respondents, except for 
the account manager Portfolio Management, ranked the Director of the 
Executive Office second in terms of authority. The Director of the 
Executive Office supports and advises the executive board and makes 
preparations for the executive board meetings (Section 4.2.2). Before the 
above Director was appointed, the account manager for the Pension 
Administration was responsible for preparing the agenda for the board 
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meetings. As a result, the account manager of the Pension Administra-
tion noted that he had less autonomy:  
 
Until recently I was the one who could determine whether a topic 
was ready to be put on the board agenda. Sometimes I thought, I 
don't have this ready, so we will not discuss it just yet. I had much 
more autonomy to decide about the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Pension Administration, but now this aspect is taken much less 
into account. If there is something that I don't want to have on the 
agenda, then I must have very good reason…it is not ready, it is 
too soon or I see things that should be done otherwise. Previously, 
I could make such decisions by myself, but now I have to justify 
things much more often, and I am much more involved with 
coordination and consultation on these topics. This requires much 
more time (Interview account manager Portfolio Management).  
 
The Director of the Executive Office previously worked at the Pension 
Administration as supervisor of the current account manager of BPF. He 
had many years of experience in the world of pension funds, and for this 
reason was also approached by the executive board for his current 
position. According to the respondents he is ranked second in authority 
because he works full-time, is close to the executive board, has a great 
deal of knowledge and experience, and much of the communication to 
and from the board goes through him. The members of the executive 
board, as well as the chair of the Supervisory Council, were very pleased 
with the appointment of the Director of the Executive Office. Moreover, 
the chairman of the Supervisory Council noted that this appointment 
could also be dangerous: If something happens to him, we will have an 
enormous gap. I have warned about this previously: our strength can 
immediately become a weakness (Interview Chairman of the Supervisory 
Council). The Director of the Executive Office himself stated that he does 
not have much authority but that he does have a great deal of influence.  
The IAC and the Portfolio Management Advisor held the third and fourth 
places, respectively, in the ranking of actors with the most authority. This 
is due to their specialized knowledge and experience in investments and 
in the administrative organization. Respondents indicated that the 
knowledge of the executive board members regarding investments is 
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limited; this is why they engage external experts and why these experts 
have a great deal of influence on the board. 
The DNB was ranked as fifth in terms of authority. Notably, the opinions 
of the respondents were most divided about this particular actor. 
Roughly speaking, two groups can be distinguished. The first group views 
the DNB as a body that establishes the framework and controls the 
pension fund from the side-lines. The chairman of the Participants 
Council said the following about this:  
 
The influence of the DNB is strictly literal. When the DNB says that 
you must do something, we cannot refuse. When BPF keeps to the 
rules, then the DNB can't say anything, but if we break the rules, 
then they indeed have something to say. Does a police officer have 
power over me? No, but if I am in public and break the law, and 
then they do have power (Interview Chair of the Participants 
Council).  
 
The second group sees the DNB as a body that establishes the rules for 
the pension fund, and the pension fund then just follows the rules. The 
first group generally attributes less authority to the DNB than the second 
group.  
The Pension Administration is responsible for the implementation of the 
pension fund. The Pension Administration and Portfolio Management 
were seen by various board members as large, cumbersome organiza-
tions that handle large sums of money and in which BPF is only a minor 
player. The board members reported having the feeling that they have 
little influence with the Pension Administration and Portfolio Manage-
ment. There were both negative and positive about the Pension 
Administration and Portfolio Management. The chairman of the execu-
tive board characterized the relationship with the Pension Administration 
as a love-hate relationship:  
 
The Pension Administration submits its documents for the board 
meeting much too late; figures that arrive only three days before 
the meeting turn out to be wrong. That is so weak, it really 
shouldn't be tolerated. But some of the things they do are terrific. 
Then you're happy that you are working with the Pension 
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Administration, so for me it is a real love-hate relationship 
(Interview with chairman of the executive board).  
 
In Table 4.2, the Participants Council is ranked seventh in terms of 
authority. The respondents were unanimous about the ranking. The 
Supervisory Council, the Accountability Body and the AFM were ranked 
on average eighth, ninth and tenth, respectively. Notably, there was still 
a substantial difference in the averages. Although all three bodies have a 
supervisory role, it emerged that the Supervisory Council, according to 
the respondents, has more authority than the Accountability Body and 
the AFM. The respondents indicated that this also has to do with the 
status of the body and the individuals. According to the respondents of 
BPF the groups with the least authority are the VB49 and the Portfolio 
Management. Notably, the account manager of Portfolio Management 
has contact with many people, but according to the other respondents 
he is not seen as someone with much authority or influence. She also 
stated that her own influence is limited.  
 
I have influence in the way I explain things and the relationships I 
have developed, but I should not overestimate this influence 
(Interview account manager Portfolio Management). 
 
This story shows that the executive board is the body that makes the 
final decision and all respondents are aware of this fact. How the 
executive board does this emerges from the following story. This story 
primarily addresses the interaction patterns between actors in and 
around the executive board and focuses more closely on the methods of 
governance at BPF.  
4.2.4 The governance method 
This story concerns the interaction patterns of the actors in and around 
the executive board. To acquire insight into these patterns, the respon-
 
49 The VB protects the interests of 70 industry-wide pension funds. These pension funds 
consist of more than 5 million participants, more than 2 million pensioners and nearly 8 
million former participants (Annual Report the VB, 2009). 
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dents of BPF were asked about the amount of contact between the key 
players. These results are shown in Figure 4.2. This revealed a network 
consisting of the average number of contact hours between players in 
and around the executive board of BPF. Four comments can be made 
regarding Figure 4.2. First, the choice was made to quantify the contact 
times in terms of the average number of contact hours per month. This 
provides a good picture of the amount of time that they spend together, 
but does not indicate the frequency of contact. For example, Figure 4.2 
does not indicate that the Supervisory Council and Participants Council 
meet only once per month, and that outside these meetings these 
groups have almost no mutual contact. Moreover, the certifying actuary 
and the compliance officer have contact with the Supervisory Council 
and the Accountability Body only once per year. The second remark is 
that the accountant, compliance officer and the two actuaries are not 
included in Figure 4.2. This is because various respondents, including the 
members of the executive board and the chair of the Participants 
Council, did not consider these players to be actors in and around the 
executive board; instead they viewed them as functionaries who support 
the supervisory process. As a result, not all respondents described the 
contact hours per month of the four functionaries. The chairman of the 
Supervisory Council was the only respondent who indicated that he has 
contact with the four functionaries once per year50. One key player who 
was added by all respondents is the VB. Notably, the Pension Federation51 
was not named by the respondents as a key player in and around the 
executive board of the pension fund. The third remark is that various key 
players encountered each other at various locations and consequently 
had multiple interaction moments with each other. This is because the 
executive board and the Participants Council include members of the 
employers and employee organizations who not only encounter each 
other at BPF, but also as part of other activities of the aforementioned 
 
50 The advisory actuary was named more frequently, but in his function as Director of the 
Office of the Executive Board.  
51 The Pensions Federation consists of the VB, the OPF and the Union of Occupational 
Pension Funds (UvB). The mission of the Pensions Federation is to provide optimal 
protection of the interests of pension funds in the Netherlands and to promote the 
development of the pension system. 
Chapter 4 
136 
 
organizations. For example, the chairman of the Participants Council 
meets with the chief executive of his employee organization not only 
during the meetings of the executive board, but also during other 
activities of the employee organization such as the national evaluation 
day, during which members of executive boards, accountability bodies 
and participants councils of pension funds meet to evaluate and discuss 
the future of pension funds. On these occasions, they talk informally 
about BPF and inform each other about their current activities. These 
types of encounters were not included in Figure 4.2 because they are 
often informal or coincidental. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The number of contact hours per month in the corporate governance 
network of BPF 
 
The findings indicate that the executive board engages external experts 
as needed in particular situations or for specialized topics. During this 
process, the executive board makes use of the roles of the actors. For 
example, if the board requires advice about investments, then it engages 
the internal Investment Advisory Committee or the Portfolio 
Management Advisor. If it wants to know more about implementation, it 
engages the Portfolio Management organization. And sometimes a 
combination of all parties is possible. By means of examples, the 
respondents also showed that they are expected to play these roles. For 
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instance, high-quality performance is expected from the pension admini-
stration. If that doesn't happen, then the account manager is held 
accountable (Interview with account manager of the Pension 
Administration). Regarding this story, it should be noted that not only 
the external parties, but also the executive board itself, are required to 
play the role that is expected of them. For example, the executive board 
is expected to perceive and consider the interests of the various parties. 
It is expected to carefully weigh conflicting interests, such as those of 
employers, employees and pensioners, and make an appropriate 
decision.  
 
Figure 4.2 also shows that these three worlds of executive and advisory 
parties are separate from each other, with the exception of the Executive 
Office and the IAC, because they have a more central position due to 
their task and function. The BAC has this position because it provides 
internal advice to the executive board about investments and therefore 
has relatively more contact with the implementing organizations.  
 
The Executive Office, according to the respondents, is an important 
intermediary for the executive board. Nearly all information is communi-
cated via the Executive Office to the executive board and back again. 
This is also why the Executive Office has such a dominant position in 
Figure 4.2. The Portfolio Management account manager described this 
communication patterns as follows:  
 
Recently there was a question from the Supervisory Council. And 
then it goes to the executive board, and then to the office of the 
executive board, and then comes back to me. And I answer the 
question and then it goes via the Executive Office and through the 
executive board all the way back to the Supervisory Council 
(Interview with account manager Portfolio Management).  
 
According to the respondents, the position of the Executive Office was 
carefully considered. There was a suggestion from the DNB to establish 
this Executive Office because the pension administration had gained too 
much informal power.  
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In summary, the four stories above show that a number of aspects pre-
dominate: the historical values of collectivism and solidarity, compliance 
with these values and the organizational model of BPF, the authority of 
the executive board and the governance method. When the key aspects 
of these stories are combined, this can be transposed into rules that are 
maintained by the actors in and around the executive board. Based on 
the four stories, the following rules of thumb –which can be found in the 
stories– can be formulated: 1) You must be faithful to your constituency, 
2) the executive board makes the final decision, and 3) you must play the 
formal role that you are expected to play. These rules can also be 
described as the institutional logic. This institutional logic –or these 
rules– determine how the game is played. First, the rules affect the 
power of the various actors to influence the decision-making process. 
The employee organization and the employer organization (the 
constituency) can exercise power via the executive board, but the board 
makes the final decision. Second, the rules determine the nature and 
style of the decision-making process; at BPF, the executive board 
determines the nature and style of this process. Third, the rules 
determine the substantive preferences of actors. The executives of an 
employee organization always have a preference for employees, while 
executives of an employer organization have a preference for the 
employer.  
4.3 Presentation of the logic of practice 
The stories presented below concern the actions of the actors in and 
around the executive board of BPF, specifically how these actors cope 
with corporate governance. These stories have the following titles: dual 
roles, decorating the Christmas tree, the board meeting: a play, love-hate 
relationship with the DNB, corporate social responsibility or big profits?  
4.3.1 Dual roles  
An overarching theme that regularly returned in the interviews with the 
respondents at BPF is dealing with dual roles. Considering that repre-
sentatives on the executive board originate from employee and 
employer organizations, the actors in and around the executive board 
have dual roles and responsibilities. The members of the board want to 
be perceived as representing the interests of the participants and other 
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stakeholders of the pension fund in a balanced fashion. They not only 
bear the responsibility of their own constituency, but are also responsible 
for fulfilling the collective mandate. According to the respondents, the 
conflicting interests of players and employees are necessary to achieve a 
balance between the interests (Interview with chairman of Participants 
Council). To illustrate how the members of the board deal with these 
dual roles, the process of preparing the board meeting agenda is 
presented (Interview with board member from employers organization, 
interview with board member from employee organization, and inter-
view with chairman of BPF). The board member considers the agenda 
and documents for the meeting and forecasts what the constituency will 
think about this. In most cases, the board member can make an 
independent assessment of the position of the constituency. He is active 
in the field and therefore frequently hears opinions and ideas from 
constituency and often knows from experience what position the 
constituency will take on the matter. If he is in doubt about the position 
of the constituency, and the issue is sufficiently important, then he will 
seek counsel with the constituency or with the other executives of the 
employers organizations or employee organization. Depending on what 
the constituency wants and how hard it wants to play, the board 
member determines how firm he will make his demands during the 
meeting.  
In nearly all cases, the tensions are not severe and the board member 
and the constituency both understand that concessions will have to be 
made. However, if the interests are crucial, then it is theoretically 
possible that the board member would be dismissed as a representative 
or that the constituency of employees would go on strike. This has never 
happened in practice at BPF because the most important agreements 
have already been made during the cao negotiations, and the executive 
board of the pension only has to deal with the implementation of the 
pension fund agreement. But this has happened in the past during the 
cao negotiations. All other board members also indicated that they never 
had problems with the dual role. According to the respondents, this is 
because the executive board believes that the collective mandate is 
important. The Secretary of the Board explained this as follows:  
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For that matter, I do not see the executive board in parts, but as a 
whole. I am not someone from the employers organization, I am 
one of the board members. We all have a collective mandate 
(Interview with Secretary of the Board).  
 
The chairman of the executive board provided an example from practice 
which shows that the board members of BPF act on the basis of mutual 
interest. He explained that in 2008, the pensions had to be indexed 
according to policy52. The coverage ratio at that time was just over 100; 
during the December board meeting it was 100.6. The chairman reported 
how the discussion lasted only five minutes, and then a collective 
decision was made to not index the pensions. When asked how BPF 
could make this type of decision so quickly, the chairman said he thought 
it was because the board members are reasonably well acquainted with 
each other, have regular contact and consult before the meeting about 
the interests they should consider regarding the situation or problem. 
Consequently, explained the chairman, they base their reasoning on the 
organizational interests of the pension fund, and consider the other 
interests from this perspective.  
Besides the executive board members, other actors in and around the 
executive board also have to deal with dual roles. The account manager 
of the Pension Administration explained that the organization for which 
he works, i.e. the Pension Administration, bases its services on a 
customer satisfaction level of 7 or 7.5, but the director of the Executive 
Office requires 9 or 10. The account manager of the Pension Admini-
stration has to strike a balance between the demands of these two 
organizations. On the one hand, he wants to exert pressure on the 
Pension Administration so that customers are satisfied, but on the other 
hand he sometimes has to restrain customers because the constituency 
of the Pension Administration cannot provide the requested quality or 
quantity. The chairman of the Supervisory Council stated that the board 
 
52 Indexing means increasing the pension benefits in proportion to inflation or wage 
increases. Through indexing, purchasing power is maintained. A pension fund decides 
each year whether indexation is possible. The Pensions Act states that a pension fund in 
principle should always have a minimum coverage ratio of 105%. If the fund falls below 
this level, the law stipulates that it has three years to get back to 105%. 
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and Supervisory Council seek the best interpretation of the role of the 
Supervisory Council within BPF. On the one hand, the Supervisory Council 
must distance itself from the executive board in order to remain 
independent and objective, but on the other hand it must remain 
sufficiently informed and be able to intervene promptly if something 
goes wrong. This area of tension results in careful assessments and 
discussions within the Supervisory Council (Interview with chairman of 
the Supervisory Council).  
In this story it can be seen that the actors in and around the executive 
board struggle with their dual roles (i.e. their tasks and responsibilities). 
They not only have to be faithful to their constituency, but also to the 
collective mandate. The stories have shown that this usually goes well, 
but that this is also an area of tension in practice. Moreover, this tension 
does not occur frequently, but is expressed in certain situations in which 
important issues are at stake, such as the above-mentioned decision 
about indexation. A totally different theme is illustrated in the following 
narration. In this narration, the actors in and around the boards of 
governance asked the question of whether it is indeed necessary to build 
a management model with all kinds of representatives.  
4.3.2 Resistance against the organizational model 
It is notable that many respondents from the industry-wide pension fund 
refer to “decorating a Christmas tree” when they speak about corporate 
governance. This metaphor is used to indicate that they doubt the effi-
ciency and utility of establishing various bodies surrounding the 
executive board. Several examples from practice are given by various 
respondents below. Although the following respondent was not 
employed at BPF, but at a different pension fund, this quotation does 
show how the story of decorating the Christmas tree makes sense in 
practice.  
 
If something in the charter must be amended, then I consult with 
the legal expert, who implements the change and amends the 
charter. The following day it goes to a member of the executive 
board, who approves it, and then it takes six months before 
everyone has seen it and commented on it. After all this time and 
effort, not a single letter of the proposed amendment has been 
Chapter 4 
142 
 
altered. I wonder whether the result would have been the same 
without all these groups? This process is rather cumbersome. 
Without decorating the whole Christmas tree with 72 people, who 
are all involved with employers councils and governance, I think it 
could have been done much more efficiently with the same result. 
Moreover, all these groups do not lead to a more transparent 
decision-making process (context interview with the head of 
executive affairs of a pension fund).  
 
Other respondents stated that although they are proud of the balanced 
representation of the interests of employers and employees on the 
executive board, there is also an ongoing discussion about the decision-
making process. This discussion concerns a professional executive board. 
This means that the executive board would no longer be nominated from 
the constituency, but that people with executive experience and 
expertise could apply for a position on the board. The chairman of the 
executive board sketched an ideal picture of a professional executive 
board with employee and employer organizations acting as a type of 
supervisory council with right of approval for strategically important 
matters. He indicated that there is still a lot of reluctance to discuss a 
professional executive board, but he expects that the discussion will 
ultimately move in this direction because the board members need to 
have more and more expertise about financial models and mathematics. 
This professional model could potentially be much more efficient. The 
opponents to professionalizing the executive board are primarily on the 
side of the trade unions. According to the board members from the 
employers organizations, this is logical because the opponents include 
union executives for whom the executive board comprises their daily 
work. According to various respondents, the policy of the employee 
organization does not include professionalization, but will probably move 
in that direction in the future.  
Another discussion that emerged from the interviews concerns whether 
or not to merge the Participants Council and the Accountability Body; 
several actors in and around the executive board believe this would be 
much more efficient. The chairman of the executive board said the 
following about this topic:  
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Some time ago, there was a discussion about such a merger 
(referring to the merger between the Participants Council and the 
Accountability Body). But at that time it was said that we should 
say something to the Participants Counsel beforehand and to the 
Accountability Body afterwards; hence the participants have to 
review themselves during the merger. But you are actually rigging 
a circus. I believe that all the participants should be accountable. I 
would like to use the Accountability Body much more as a type of 
panel, more as a customer panel both beforehand and afterwards 
What you now see is that an Accountability Body tends to review 
the policy… but we have a Supervisory Council for that (Interview 
with chairman of the executive board). 
 
The chairman of the Participants Council said that he experiences this 
discussion as difficult because he not only understands that there are 
many similarities between both bodies, but also that they have a 
different function (Interview with Chairman of Participants Council). This 
example shows very clearly that the actors in and around the executive 
board are struggling with efficiency and utility-oriented thinking in terms 
of the roles and expectations of actors.  
Another example of ‘rigging a circus’ was given by the account manager 
Pension Administration and several executive board members from 
employee organizations. Not long ago, a new body was established at 
BPF: the Supervisory Council. Before the Supervisory Counsel was 
appointed, a discussion took place about implementing the internal 
supervision of BPF. This discussion focused on the question of whether 
the internal supervision would consist of a Supervisory Council or an 
external review committee. A Supervisor Council was chosen, because 
such a body is generally perceived as providing stricter supervision than 
an external review committee (Interview with account manager Pension 
Administration and interview with the chairman of the executive board). 
According to the respondents, BPF wants to have the strictest form of 
supervision because it is an ambitious organization. Another reason for 
choosing the Supervisory Council is that this body would be internal, 
while a review committee is external. Members of the executive board 
from the employer organization stated that they see this as an advantage 
because then they can build for the longer term. The respondents were 
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also critical about the chosen form. Especially the members of the 
executive board from the employee organization stated that they often 
have better experiences with an external review committee because it is 
more reflective. The account manager for Pension Administration 
wondered whether the Supervisory Council was indeed a good model for 
a foundation. According to this respondent, the chosen model is not 
compatible because the pension fund executive board is only involved 
with the pension fund for one half-day per week, and this model is not 
compatible with such a relatively small pension fund. Later in his 
narration, he stated that he actually believes that there should not be any 
formal supervision at all for the pension fund executive board; the 
supervision should focus on the pension administration itself. He 
explained that a pension fund was traditionally only a pension 
administration with the aim of collecting premiums, investing money and 
ensuring that the benefits were paid on time. He believes that the 
supervision has now gotten completely out of hand, and that an 
additional layer of governance and stakeholders has been added which is 
totally unnecessary. But at the same time, he indicated that it is difficult 
to change this situation, because this would be totally out of step with 
the current rules and regulations.  
The above examples show that in the interviews the respondents refer to 
the tension between utility and efficiency on one side and institutional 
thinking on the other. In the stories, a discrepancy becomes apparent 
between how actors in and around the executive board think and how 
their ideas are implemented by the organization.  
The next subsection is about a different discrepancy: the discrepancy 
between the formal and informal worlds. This is done by presenting a 
story about the executive board meeting.  
4.3.3 Dealing with the formal organization 
To provide insight into the executive board meeting, the process of orga-
nizing the meeting is described below. In preparation for the executive 
board meeting, a consultation takes place between the chairman, the 
board secretary and the director of the Executive Office. During this 
informal consultation, the topics for the agenda of the board meeting are 
identified and given a prior review. The initiative for collecting the points 
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on the agenda is taken largely by the director of the Executive Office. He 
explained this as follows:  
 
Last year we made a proposal for FIRM, the risk policy. However, I 
believe the risk policy should be put on the agenda as such….that 
we should do something about this, then I will give it a prior review 
…do you think it is a good time to discuss this during the executive 
board meeting? (Interview with director of the Executive Office).  
 
The chairman of the executive board described the relationship between 
himself, the Secretary of the Board and the director of the Executive 
Office as collegial, professional, open and direct, where professional 
means that not too much emotion is involved. They look at which rules 
must be followed and whether certain decisions entail risks. The three 
men consult together about which points on the agenda would be 
discussed at the next executive board meeting. After this, the prepara-
tion of the documents for the meeting begins. Some information and 
recommendations must be obtained, for which the director contacts 
other parties, such as the account managers for Pension Administration 
and Portfolio Management. Once all documents have been collected, 
they are distributed to the invitees for the board meeting. According to 
the respondents, these documents often consist of enormous bundles of 
paper and may require several days to read. When topics that require 
coordination with the constituency are involved, they contact their 
constituency for advice; occasionally they also contact a colleague at the 
employee organization as well. However, this does not happen frequent-
ly (Section 4.3.1).  
The executive board meetings are held five or six times per year, and last 
an entire day. First there is pre-consultation with the executive board, 
the director of the Executive Office, the chairman of the IAC and the 
Portfolio Management advisor. This is followed by the executive board 
meeting itself and then a brief discussion about the early retirement 
(VUT) fund. During the pre-consultation they discuss the financial 
summaries and which items they want to discuss in greater depth with 
the Pension Administration and Portfolio Management. After this, the 
account manager for Pension Administration and account manager for 
Portfolio Management join the group and the official board meeting 
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begins. Depending on the topic, experts attend the meeting on request. 
The executive board meetings are often very lengthy, according to the 
respondents. This is because they spend a relatively large amount of time 
on individual cases, and because of the complex nature of topics such as 
investments and reporting. The account manager Portfolio Management 
described the executive board meeting as follows:  
 
I remember the first few times I attended a meeting and thought: 
What a circus... I was unfamiliar with this type of meeting… The 
executive board meeting is almost a formal event. It sounds 
somewhat disrespectful, but it also involves a bit of acting about 
how we going to perform the executive board meeting. It has 
characteristics of a ritual (Interview with account manager for 
Portfolio Management).  
  
In this quotation, the respondent outlines the course of affairs during a 
formal executive board meeting. Later in the interview, the account 
manager for Portfolio Management explains that she gradually learned 
that there is a pre-consultation.  
From the other in-depth interviews, it indeed emerged that during the 
pre-consultation agreements are made about which topics will be 
addressed and who is going to ask questions to both account managers. 
A similar picture was presented by other respondents and in the 
exploratory interviews with experiential experts from other pension 
funds. Before the meeting begins, it is often clear what the decisions are 
going to be. According to the respondents, there is a lot of room before 
the formal meeting in which people can discuss and coordinate various 
matters. In this context, a number of respondents referred to a game in 
which there was room to manoeuvre. This room is used primarily to 
reach agreement and to influence each other. The employees and 
employers representatives often consult with each other during informal 
meetings that precede the board meeting, and they phone each other. 
Besides executive board members, other interest groups also know 
about this informal world and try to exert their influence here as well. For 
example, the chairman of the Participants Council said the following:  
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An association of retirees has been established, with many 
directors from the pension world. Yes, these are bureaucrats, they 
understand the rules of the game and they know how the game is 
played. They are also tactically smart and have expertise. And they 
know how to get inside…in all possible ways…via the 
constituency, via mailings, in all possible ways. 
 
The above narration shows that there is extensive room behind the 
formal world which is used by actors in and around the executive board 
of BPF to coordinate matters and to influence each other. In the subse-
quent story, it becomes apparent that there is also room of a totally 
different type: dealing with rules and regulations.  
4.3.4 The relationship with the DNB  
Eight of the ten respondents indicated that the rules and regulations 
have increased substantially, not only at the DNB but also at the AFM. 
The executive board of BPF is fully engaged in complying with the 
frameworks prescribed by the DNB and AFM. For example, BPF has 
chosen to focus on the following PFG principles: accountability and 
supervision, expertise, openness and transparency, and due diligence. In 
the annual report, they linked each of these key points to their pension 
fund. The following extract from the annual report shows how the 
general term 'expertise' is linked to their own organization.  
 
To oversee the entirety of risks and deal professionally with them, 
the expertise of the executive board of the pension fund is crucial. 
Moreover, recent developments have resulted in a demand for 
even more expertise on the part of pension funds. We therefore 
believe it is exceedingly important that the expertise of all board 
members is continuously maintained and improved. To achieve 
this, we have adopted an expertise plan, among other measures. 
The expertise plan describes the requirements that every member 
of the executive board will have to meet within one year after his 
or her appointment, and the joint expertise that will be required of 
the Executive board as a whole.  
 
Chapter 4 
148 
 
The annual report also paid attention to the expertise of the Participants 
Council and the Accountability Body. Although the Pensions Act does not 
specify requirements for the expertise level of the members of these 
bodies, the annual report stated that the members believe this is 
important. This is because they are fully fledged counterparts of the 
executive board and must therefore comply with comparable expertise 
requirements. To this end, they took part in a course (Annual Report BPF, 
2010). The annual report also linked the other relevant themes of Pension 
Fund Governance to BPF.  
Nearly all respondents stated that they understand that rules and 
regulations are important, certainly in view of the events in the recent 
past, but at the same time there are conflicts in the implementation of 
rules and regulations. The chairman of the executive board explained this 
as follows:  
 
And I understand DNB's position very well. A great deal has 
happened. Before you know it, the accusations will be flying back 
and forth, certainly if you look at Scheringa53 and so forth. But if 
you look at what is different, then you still need that room because 
we have more to explain to our participants than to the DNB 
(Interview Chairman BPF).  
 
Rules and regulations are important, but the responsibility with respect 
to the participants has a higher priority. According to the respondents at 
BPF, this also has to do with the continuous pressure on the pension fund 
board. According to the members of the board, they now spend much 
more time on the executive management of the pension fund than was 
assumed beforehand, and much of this on their own time. Furthermore, 
the reporting that is required by the current rules and regulations is very 
time-consuming. The latter is also difficult because the value of the 
reporting is not always appreciated. The process of preparing for the 
 
53 Scheringa was the owner of DSB Bank, which went bankruption in the early years of 
the crisis. Scheringa accused and four executive members of violating the code of 
secrecy. Scheringa alleged that the so-called second bankrun at DSB Bank was caused by 
the DNB who “intentionally and actively” informed third parties about emergency funds 
that DSB Bank had asked for.  
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reporting is also seen as something important, but the reporting itself is 
not; the respondents stated that this requires additional time, but this 
time is not productive.  
 
Notably, nearly all respondents were both positive and negative about 
the method of supervision of the DNB and AFM. The positive story is that 
productive discussions are often held with the DNB. One example is the 
discussion about the professional governance model, which was 
thoroughly discussed over several years with the DNB. The negative 
stories range from criticism of the officers at the DNB, to the role and 
methods of the DNB. Various respondents wondered why the president 
of the DNB still holds his position, even though it was clear that he and 
Minister Bos (former minister of finance) should have intervened to 
prevent the crisis.  
 
In fact, the entire society believes that Wellink [the president of 
the DNB] should be dismissed, but he still holds this position and is 
imposing rules on executive boards. How is this possible? I think it 
is because the Dutch business culture does not recognize that a 
supervisory authority can fail and that we do not have a 
mechanism in place, certainly from the constituency on the left, 
which calls for more regulation, and more centralization, but I 
don't think this is going to work (Interview with executive board 
member representing employers organizations). 
 
The criticism of the respondents regarding the role and methods of the 
DNB has a common denominator: The DNB has little regard for deviation 
from the frameworks. According to the respondents, everything must fit 
into boxes and frameworks, and it is difficult to discuss this. The 
chairman of the executive board used the following example to illustrate 
how this works in practice. The executive board of BPF was required by 
the DNB to write a recovery plan. A contingency plan was also requested 
in case the recovery did not proceed as expected. The executive board 
did not provide a contingency plan, and then the DNB accused them of 
being afraid to communicate about reducing pension benefits. The 
chairman explained that this accusation was not valid because the 
website does communicate about this possibility. He indicated that the 
executive board did not want to provide a contingency plan out of 
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principle because they were confident that the recovery plan would 
work. However, the DNB did not want to approve the recovery plan 
without a contingency plan because other funds could potentially 
assume that they were allowed to deviate from the frameworks. The 
respondents emphasized that it is important for the DNB to keep to the 
frameworks because this is how the state bank covers itself. As the 
account manager for Pension Administration explained:  
 
If there is a parliamentary inquiry, then the DNB cannot be accused 
of anything, because it has done everything perfectly. This is 
useless for a pension fund, but okay, the DNB has done everything 
correctly (Interview with account manager for Pension 
Administration).  
 
In summary, this story reveals tensions not only with respect to the rules 
and regulations, but also with respect to the bodies that monitor their 
implementation, especially the DNB. The tensions are primarily found in 
the grey areas of rules and regulations. Which decisions does the 
executive board make, and can they justify these decisions to their 
constituency? With respect to the methods of the DNB, it is clear that 
actors in and around the executive board experience the interaction both 
positively and negatively. The negativity primarily concerns the compart-
mentalized thinking of the DNB. In the following story, another area of 
tension emerges: that between social responsibility and profit.  
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4.3.5 Dealing with social issues  
 
In the Netherlands, pension funds invest in all kinds of businesses, including arms 
manufacturers that produce cluster bombs and landmines. They also invest in 
companies that cause serious environmental harm and in products that are made 
with child labour. This was shown in an investigation conducted by the television 
programme ZEMBLA, in the episode titled ‘The cluster bomb feeling’. ZEMBLA 
investigated aspects such as the financial flows of the pension funds ABP, PGGM 
and the Spoorwegpensioenfonds (Pensionfund for railway workers) who make 
these controversial investments. 
 
 “Cluster munitions are reprehensible weaponry but we have no guidelines for 
ourselves that forbid us to invest in them,” explained Director R. Munsters of the 
ABP. Despite the international landmine treaty, the ABP also invests in landmine 
manufacturers. But that is not an impediment, according to Munsters: “Our 
strategy is to earn a good yield, and the businesses that operate in the weapon 
industry sometimes offer an attractive return.” 
 
The PGGM also confirmed that they invest in manufacturers of cluster bombs as 
well as landmines, despite an appeal from the European Parliament to no longer 
make such investments. “We are now discussing this and I think it is quite possible 
that we will come to the conclusion that we should not do it,” explained H. Alders, 
chairman of the executive board of PGGM.  
 
The pension funds also invest in companies that cause severe environmental harm, 
such as Freeport McMoran, one of the largest copper mines in the world. 
Investments in this company were previously the subject of debate. In response to 
criticism, in 1999 ABN/AMRO withdrew its holdings in Freeport McMoran. However, 
the ZEMBLA investigation showed that ABP, PGGM and the pension funds of the 
railways, public transport, Shell and DSM are still investing in this company. 
Confronted with the facts, Munsters of the ABP did not exclude the possibility of 
the fund withdrawing its holdings in companies such as Freeport “if businesses 
blatantly violate a number of conventions”. 
 
Finally, ZEMBLA reported investments in companies that exploit child labour, such 
as the American company Walmart. ABP stated that child labour is reprehensible, 
but it admitted holding shares in Walmart (like the pension funds for the railway, 
public transport, Shell and DSM). The pension fund for the healthcare industry, 
PGGM, also invested in the English supermarket chain Tesco, which purchases 
clothing from a factory that uses child labour. 
 
The pension funds in the Netherlands manage assets totalling €671 billion. ZEMBLA 
conducted research into seven large pension funds, selected from the more than 
600 pension funds operating in the Netherlands. Approximately 90% of employees 
in the Netherlands are mandatory participants in a pension fund. Every month, 
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they pay hundreds of euros without having any insight into how the pension funds 
invest this money (Television programme Zembla, 17 March 2007) 
http://zembla.vara.nl/seizoenen/2007/afleveringen/18-03-2007). 
 
Pension funds are getting ample attention in the media. The media 
coverage mentioned above took place during the period in which this 
study was conducted. Not only broadcasts such as Zembla, but also other 
television programmes (Pauw & Witteman, 19 March 2007, Buitenhof 13 
May 2007) and newspaper articles (De Volkskrant, 19 March 2007; NRC, 
19 March 2007; Het Financieele Dagblad, 20 March 2007) focused on the 
topic of unethical investments, but there was also intense interest in 
other topics such as bonuses and salaries of top managers. Remarkably, 
during the Zembla broadcasts and afterwards, the attention was focused 
primarily on profits from pension funds, but the awareness of the 
impropriety of investing in cluster bombs was hardly reflected in the 
response of the pension funds. Within the pension fund industry, 
attention was also paid to this topic. A seminar on “Investing in society” 
was held on 21 June 2007. Organized by ABP, pension funds and other 
stakeholders and interested parties were invited to discuss this issue. 
Both during the seminar and afterwards, the statements of Munsters 
(Director the ABP) resulted in much internal and external criticism. The 
opinion of society at large became clear. People no longer found it 
acceptable to invest in cluster bombs, but at the same time they also did 
not want to reduce pension benefits as a result of losing the enormous 
profits. In other words, there was tension between corporate social 
responsibility and higher pension benefits. Did the participants want to 
sacrifice benefits in return for ethical investments, and if so, how much?  
 
This discussion about investing in cluster bombs also took place at BPF 
(and Florabank as well). The members of the executive board were 
questioned about this by the internal supervision bodies, the external 
supervising authorities, shareholders (Florabank), the Participants 
Council (BPF) and customers. The investment policies of BPF and 
Florabank were once again scrutinized to determine whether specific 
aspects should be changed. It should be noted that various respondents 
understood that the smaller banks and pension funds look at the actions 
taken by larger banks and pension funds. The interview shows that these 
smaller funds imitate the larger ones. In March 2007, following the 
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Zembla broadcast, the largest pension funds in the Netherlands, ABP54 
and PGGM55, decided to stop investing in cluster bombs (NRC, 12 April 
2007). It should be noted that on 1 January 2013 a law went into force56 
prohibiting investments in companies that are involved in the production 
of cluster munitions. This law prohibited direct investments in companies 
involved in the production of cluster munitions, as well as in indexes with 
more than 5% of such businesses. 
 
The above narration shows that the media played a major role in the 
societal debate on unethical investments. The Zembla broadcast resulted 
in a societal debate on cluster bombs; as a result the tension between 
corporate social responsibility and profits was clarified. Moreover, this 
story shows that the dominant social beliefs and actions of the larger 
pension funds influence the actions of the actors in and around the 
executive board of BPF. In the section below, the other tensions of the 
logic of practice are summarized.  
4.4  Synthesis  
This chapter presents the findings on BPF case study. The findings are 
presented on the basis of three types of logic: the logic of the actor, of 
the institute and of the practice.  
In Section 4.1 the logic of the key players or the actors is addressed. 
Although the actors in and around the executive board of BPF are very 
diverse, it is evident from the findings that there are also similarities 
 
54 ABP stands for Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds. It is the largest pension fund in the 
Netherlands. All civil servants –and the pensioners– are members of this fund.  
55 PGGM is a Dutch pension administration organization. On 1 January 2008, PGGM 
became an independent administration organization separate from the Pensioenfonds 
Zorg en Welzijn (PFZW), to which it previously belonged (and until that time also bore the 
name PGGM). PGGM is still the pension administrator for PFZW. The decision to separate 
the pension fund and the pension administrator resulted from a change in the law that 
prohibited a pension fund from selling individual insurance products to its members. 
Furthermore, it is now possible for PGGM to administer pensions for other funds. PGGM is 
a cooperative that employers and employees in the healthcare and welfare sector can 
join. The abbreviation PGGM no longer has a specific meaning. Before the separation, this 
abbreviation stood for Pensioenfonds voor Gezondheidszorg, Geestelijke en Maatschap-
pelijke belangen. 
56 The new regulations are contained in the Amending Act Financial Markets 2013 (see 
besluit, artikel III). 
Chapter 4 
154 
 
between these actors. The actors are representatives of their constitu-
ency organization, and therefore base their thinking on this perspective. 
And due to their education in economics or law and their background, 
they think in a utility-oriented and rational fashion. It is striking that all 
respondents see corporate governance as rules and regulations. The 
legal frameworks are therefore important for the actors. From the 
findings it is also evident that the actors and around the executive board 
felt uncertain due to the financial crisis. According to the respondents, 
the financial crisis also led to pressure on the actors in and around the 
executive board.  
Section 4.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. Based on the stories 
about the initial values, the organizational model, the authority and the 
management methods, it is clear which written and unwritten rules are 
important in the organization. Based on the three stories, the following 
rules of thumb –which can be found in the stories– can be formulated: 
You must be faithful to your constituency, the executive board makes 
the final decision, and you must play the formal role that you are 
expected to play. These rules can also be described as the institutional 
logic.  
Section 4.3 shows that stories about practice can be used to understand 
that people in practice are faced with various types of logic that are in 
conflict with each other. The story about the dual roles shows that you 
not only must be faithful to your constituency, but that you must also 
fulfil the collective mandate (the formal role). The story about decorating 
the Christmas tree refers to the tension between the utility-oriented logic 
of the actor and the institutional logic of the governance model. The 
story about the executive board meeting shows that there is a discre-
pancy between the formal and informal worlds. And the tension in the 
grey area of rules and regulations and in the interaction with the DNB 
shows that there is room for action within the areas of tension. Finally, 
the story about social issues shows that the media influence the actions 
of actors in and around the pension fund.  
 
Now that the findings of BPF case study have been presented in this 
chapter, the subsequent chapter addresses the findings of Florabank 
case study.  
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5  Florabank 
This chapter gives background of the case study of the case study of 
Florabank, in preparation of chapter six which gives an analysis of BPF 
in light of theory. This chapter aims to answer the second research 
question: “How do actors in and around the boards of governance of 
BPF and Florabank deal with tensions in corporate governance?”. As in 
the previous chapter, these findings are presented with the aid of 
various types of logic. The aim is not to compare the case studies, but to 
gain insight into the sensemaking about corporate governance. The 
topics in the various sections are therefore not identical to the topics in 
the previous chapter. However, like the previous chapter, the three 
types of logic –actor logic, institutional logic and logic of practice– are 
used to explain the stories from the case studies. These stories are 
drawn from interviews and document analysis and they are thus 
paraphrases of stories told by the actors of Florabank themselves. In 
Section 5.1, the main actors take centre stage, and the backgrounds of 
the key players are described. The pursuit of ideals of actors in and 
around the boards of governance is also an important theme in this 
section. This section closes with a story about the CEO, which clarifies 
the characteristics of this individual and the characteristics of his frame 
of mind. Section 5.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. Based on 
stories about rules and regulations, culture, bylaws, authority and the 
informal consultation structures, the written and unwritten rules within 
Florabank that give meaning to corporate governance are clarified. The 
logic of practice is presented in Section 5.3 with stories about the 
tensions in practice: Which obstacles do actors encounter in practice, 
and how do they deal with these obstacles? This section focuses on 
these areas of tension. The following themes are addressed: The imple-
mentation of rules and regulations, the discussions about ideals, 
balancing between formality and informality and the completeness and 
timeliness of information. Finally, Section 5.4 closes this chapter with a 
synthesis.  
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5.1 Presentation of the actor logic  
This section focuses on the logic of the actors in and around the boards 
of governance. The first subsection answers the following question: who 
are the actors in and around the boards of governance? In the second 
subsection, it becomes apparent that the greatest similarity between all 
actors in and around the boards of governance is that they pursue ideals. 
The third and final subsection focuses on the personal characteristics and 
thinking of the CEO. At the end of each subsection, the type of actor 
logic that comes forward in the stories is identified.  
5.1.1 Old key players and new entrants 
To provide insight into the background and origin of the key players in 
and around the boards of governance of Florabank, Appendix II includes 
a summary of the background and origin of the respondents of BPF. To 
clarify the relationship between key players and respondents, Table 5.1 
again shows the background and origin of the respondents.  
 
Table 5.1 Personal characteristics of respondents at Florabank 
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1 Executive 
board 
CEO V V V V  
2 Executive 
board 
CFO V V V V  
3 Executive 
board 
COO V V    
4 Daily 
management 
of 
Netherlands 
branch 
Managing 
Director 
V V V V  
5 Depository 
Receipt 
Holders 
Chair of 
Association 
Administration 
Office (AAO) 
V V V V V 
 
 
6 Supervisory 
Board 
Chair of 
Supervisory 
Board 
V V V V V 
7 Works Council Chair of Works 
Council 
 V  V V 
Florabank 
 
159 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the group of actors in and around the boards of 
governance is very homogeneous. Most of the actors are males older 
than 50 with a university education in economics or law. This male-
dominated picture closely resembles the image of the entire financial 
sector. On 30 June 2008, not a single female executive board member 
had been appointed in the entire Dutch financial sector, and there were 
only nine female members of supervisory boards, relative to a total of 126 
members of executive and supervisory boards (Female Board Index, 
2008). The banks made an agreement with the Social and Economic 
Council of the Netherlands (SER) that 30% of top positions must be held 
by women. In October 2014, only a single woman held such a position at 
the four largest banks in the Netherlands (ING, ANB Amro, Rabobank and 
SNS). This is equivalent to 5 percent of the top positions at those four 
banks. The dominant group of men represents rational thinking and 
professionalism relative to the emotional and social side. As a reason for 
the large number of males in top executive positions, the respondents 
also indicated that fewer women than men are available for such 
positions. Furthermore, the CEO indicated that Florabank was indeed 
looking for women to fill certain executive positions. He was therefore 
very pleased that a female member of the supervisory board was 
recently recruited.  
The dominance of university backgrounds in economics and law also 
results in a specific frame of mind, which is dominated by rational and 
utility-oriented thinking. Elements such as profits, balance sheets, 
controlling and sharing risks, achieving advantages of scale and 
minimizing costs, as well as solution-oriented thinking, are learned in 
these studies. The stories of the respondents show that in recent years, 
due to the enormous increase in rules and regulations, there also been an 
increase in the number of executives with training in law. Notably, the 
CFO of Florabank has a university degree in law and then worked in a 
variety of economics departments at international banks; this is partly 
why he was chosen for this position.  
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This observation leads directly to the topic of the old boys’ network57. In 
the interviews, the respondents indicated that the phenomenon of the 
old boys’ network indeed exists. Various respondents described this as a 
network that became established because many people became 
acquainted with each other in the banking world. They encounter each 
other during meetings of umbrella organizations and at seminars and 
conferences. According to the respondents, it is often a practical solution 
to recruit amongst one's acquaintances; the recruitment is often much 
faster. Some respondents described recruitment via this network as com-
placency. At Florabank the respondents often know how their colleagues 
were hired. For example, the COO (35) knew that he was the only one of 
all the actors in and around the boards of governance at Florabank who 
was not recruited through the network of the CEO. Besides the existence 
of an old boys' network, the respondents also referred to the growing 
trend of "new entrants". A number of respondents also described them-
selves as new entrants. The CFO, who is of foreign origin, explained that 
he running up against the "ceiling" because people who grew up in the 
Netherlands already have a network and he does not. As a result, he 
considers his foreign origin as a deficiency and he must make a special 
effort to be admitted to the network. The COO, who is the only 
respondent who was not recruited to his current position through the 
network of Florabank, explained this as follows: “I am certain that there 
is an old boys’ network, but I also know that you can break through the 
‘glass ceiling58” (Interview COO). Furthermore it is striking that all the 
new entrants claimed that it is indeed possible to be admitted to the old 
boys’ network. To "break through the glass ceiling", the respondents had 
 
57 The old boys network refers to the phenomenon in which the top executives in the 
business community belong to a closely knit group. The members of the old boys 
network come into contact with each other not only on the executive boards and 
supervisory councils, but they also have mutual links of friendship and family. They know 
each other from the better families and have often known each other since their college 
days, during which they often acquired their initial experience in governance on the 
boards and committees of fraternities (Fennema & Heemskerk, 2008).  
58 The glass ceiling is a metaphor that refers to the invisible barriers (ceilings) that 
prevent women from attaining top-level positions in business and government. It 
distinguish itself from more visible barriers such as requirements for experience and 
education.  
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to be more flexible, motivated and passionate. In addition, the CEO 
indicated that it is not desirable to exhibit insolent and arrogant 
behaviour.  
 
The story sketched above shows that this group of actors in and around 
the boards of governance shares references to similar concepts: “old 
boys networks” and “the glass ceiling”. Similarly to BPF, many shared 
ideas on the organization’s context prevail. The story above also shows 
that the dominant group of actors in and around the boards of 
governance consists of men. This results in a strongly developed rational 
side and a professional approach to governance. The dominance of 
training in economics and law of the actors in and around the boards of 
governance often results in rational and utility-oriented thinking. At the 
same time, this section shows that efforts are being made to attract 
other actors in and around the boards of governance.  
5.1.2 People with ideals 
Nearly all respondents emphasized that in recent years a great deal has 
changed in the financial sector. For example, the director of Florabank 
cited the example of a discussion was held a number of years ago about 
not to use certified shares, which give shareholders more control in the 
shareholder meetings. Although the Tabaksblat Parliamentary Commis-
sion at that time gave a great deal of attention to shareholder control, 
the discussion at the time was about whether the shareholders had 
enough power. At that time, the certification of shares became a dirty 
word. At Florabank, a discussion was held about what it would mean if 
certified shareholders would no longer be admitted by law. According to 
the respondents, change has accelerated in recent years and in public 
discourse the financial sector and the boards have acquired a bad repu-
tation. This is because executives have received gigantic salaries and 
bonuses while regular employees were fired. Current society appears to 
have an enhanced sense of justice. Executives are publicly confronted 
and criticized for their greedy behaviour. The interviews show that this 
resulted in actors in and around the boards of governance in the financial 
sector becoming more cautious; they don't want to have negative 
publicity. Society has lost its faith in the boards of governance of the 
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financial organizations. According to the respondents, this undesirable 
behaviour led to a new development. The COO explained this as follows:  
 
Eagerness and drive to perform are increasingly important, there is 
a need to achieve, not only in financial terms, but people also want 
to be more balanced and mean something for society. In fact, one 
is increasingly balancing the need to achieve (Interview COO).  
 
According to the respondents, this story is a logical extension to the 
historical story of Florabank, which began in the 1960s. A study group, 
consisting of an economist, a professor of financial law, a management 
advisor and a banker, began to study how money could be managed in a 
sustainable fashion. They had clear ideas about the role of money in 
society and believed that money is the engine of social change. Based on 
these initial ideas, the study group jointly established a foundation to 
support innovative projects aiming for positive societal, ecological and 
cultural change with grants and loans. Florabank became possible by a 
small group of individuals who provided financing based on idealistic 
considerations. These shareholders believed it was important to invest 
more in projects with ecological, cultural or social aims, and not only 
financial motives. To give this mission an optimal chance to succeed, the 
shareholders initially accepted lower yields on their investments. In a 
short period, all kinds of projects were funded, such as green projects 
and micro-finance institutions in developing countries. The parties 
interested in companies with social, cultural and ecological added value 
then expanded to include wealthy individuals and institutional investors.  
The idealistic values in this history can still be found in the actors in and 
around the boards of governance. An overarching similarity between the 
people who work at Florabank is that they believe the bank can help 
change society. For example, the chairman of the supervisory board 
stated that the way in which people want to do their banking is an 
improvement for the entire world:  
 
Usually when you look at a bank, then you have a bank with a 
mission. However, I see Florabank as a mission with a bank. We 
want to improve the world, what is the best way to do this? By 
becoming involved in the financial world. Our mission will be 
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achieved only when the entire financial world operates like 
Florabank (Interview with chairman of supervisory board).  
 
Or, as explained by the CFO: “We have a higher ideal, and that is actually 
society at large. We strive for a better society. For me, that is the most 
important” (Interview with CFO). According to the respondents, the 
function of money in society can be an important impetus for change. 
The second interpretation of ideals is much more fundamental. In this 
respect, the original ideas of the founders are usually cited. The 
interviews revealed that the respondents thought it was important to 
preserve the original ideas. For example, when preparing a vacancy 
announcement for a new member of the supervisory board, there was 
rapid agreement that the new member had to adhere to the original 
ideas. At that time, the supervisory council had only a single member 
who represented the original ideas, and the members of the council 
thought this was insufficient (Interview with chairman of the supervisory 
council).  
 
The above story shows that a societal development is underway in which 
social values are becoming more important. This social perspective links 
up with the perspective of the actors in and around the boards of 
governance of Florabank. The most dominant similarity is that all actors 
are confident that their method of sustainable banking can result in a 
better society. The following story shows that the CEO also has this 
ambition, but has other characteristics as well that determine the line of 
thought of the actor.  
5.1.3 The CEO: always in control 
In general, the respondents were very positive about the CEO; nearly all 
of them described him as an idealist, but also as a visionary, entrepreneur 
and pioneer. Nearly all respondents expressed their appreciation and 
admiration for these characteristics of the CEO. During the interviews, 
they spoke with great respect about the CEO. For example, in an inter-
view, the chairman of the works council stated that without the CEO, 
Florabank would not have come nearly as far. According to the respon-
dents, he does much more than a regular CEO. He is involved much more 
with banking matters than other CEOs and is more involved with the 
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work of other people at the bank. When asked what improvements they 
would like to see in their interaction with the CEO, more than half of the 
respondents indicated that they believe the CEO should listen better to 
his players. The chairman of the supervisory board commented as 
follows:  
 
The CEO stands head and shoulders above the rest, and that is 
dangerous in a certain sense. He is the standard bearer of the 
organization, but at quite a distance from others. The danger of 
what's inside him... and I talk to him quite openly about this... is 
that he exhibits Van Der Hoeven behaviour, who also had no 
reply.59 We are very mindful of this (Interview with chairman of the 
supervisory board).  
 
The majority of respondents indicated that not listening is closely related 
to the fact that he is a true entrepreneur. He is not quick to give up on his 
ideas and he certainly doesn't want to incur any delays. For him, getting 
people involved and creating support is seen as an obstacle or something 
that is annoying. Various respondents also thought that this is why he 
“forgets” to involve other players in the process. This is not because he is 
hiding anything. Quite the contrary, all respondents stated that he is very 
trustworthy. Half of the respondents indicated that they would some-
times greatly appreciate being informed about certain developments in a 
more timely fashion. But it was also clear for some respondents that this 
is not always possible. Another group of participants indicated that the 
CEO has difficulty letting go and viewing things from a distance. 
 
59 Cornelis Harry (Cees) van der Hoeven (Den Haag, 9 September 1947) was appointed 
chairman of the executive board of Ahold in 1993. Initially he was very successful. For 
example, he was voted top executive of the year for five years in a row. Under his 
leadership, Ahold completed more than 50 takeovers, and the share price for Ahold rose 
steadily. In 2002 an unexpected turnaround occurred: Ahold had to issue three profit 
warnings. In February 2003 a bookkeeping scandal came to light at the Ahold subsidiary 
US Foodservice. Ahold had overestimated the operating income of U.S. Foodservice in 
2001 and 2002 on paper by more than $500 million. "Van der Hoeven behaviour" refers to 
the Louis XIV-type behaviour of Van der Hoeven. The book by Cools (2005) described how 
this arrogant behaviour led to a culture that tolerated little opposition, so that errors and 
fraud occurred more often.  
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According to various respondents, however, the CEO has improved 
steadily in this respect.  
An important question to determine the identity of the board members is 
the following: how were they appointed to their current positions? When 
you ask this question to executives and experts in the financial world, 
you hear very personal stories, but there are also similarities. An 
important similarity is the need for control. Most of the executives 
achieved their current position because they developed a great sense of 
control during their career. Of course, control is praiseworthy in the 
financial sector. As the chairman of the works council explained this 
during an interview: “The members of the board are the directors of their 
own careers”. They have a goal and they aim directly for that goal. This 
thinking in terms of directing also emerged from two stories of the CEO 
on day-to-day management. The first story is about finding a balance 
between certainty and risk. He indicated that he is very deliberate about 
calculating risk. What happens if we lose the money? Or what can I fall 
back on if something goes wrong? These are questions which regularly 
appear in the mind of the CEO of Florabank. Terms such as balance 
management, mathematical, rationality and risk management regularly 
appear in this story. The CEO explained his story by indicating that you 
can't attract savings if you don't know what you're going to do with that 
money. It seems that this is a very static consideration, but the CEO 
emphasized that this is very dynamic and that it is difficult to move 
between the stringent frameworks of certainty and risk management 
(Interview with CEO). The stories of the members of the board and key 
players in the financial world therefore show that people are increasingly 
subject to doubt about the use and tenability of these models. The 
chairman of the supervisory board of Florabank explained this as follows:  
 
These products have become so complicated and are removed so 
far from reality –which was one cause of the financial crisis– that 
we have lost contact with the real economy. Very simple, two 
words….Previously there was a supply chain in the world, and 
there was a corresponding flow of money, but now money has 
become a product itself and has increasingly become only a 
derivative…. Previously, the bank incurred the risk of financing a 
certain business, and was familiar with that business, but now the 
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bank buys and sells, and buys and sells again, and ultimately the 
risk is incurred with the financial institute. There are banks which 
do not even understand the risks they have incurred, they are no 
longer on solid ground (chairman of the supervisory board).  
 
The second story in which "directing" appears concerns the social 
relationships. These stories involve terms such as feelings, relationships, 
power and the management of balance. The CEO stated that he manages 
actors in daily practice very deliberately. He described this as follows: “I 
have to maintain balance; when I promise something to one stakeholder, 
this has consequences for the other stakeholder. I do this very 
deliberately” (Interview with CEO). He indicated that he is continuously 
managing constellations and seeing whether all actors are involved. In 
this story, the CEO makes it clear that it is sometimes difficult to see who 
the right stakeholders are. For example, the CEO distinguishes three 
groups: the economic stakeholders (such as customers, employees and 
shareholders), the NGOs (such as sustainability associations), and the 
freethinkers, who are important for the societal debate (such as 
journalists and professors). He explained that he has problems with the 
latter groups. With the NGOs, the problem is that he often does not 
know with whom he must negotiate, who has authority within the NGO, 
and who is therefore the best person for him to contact. And with 
individuals and freethinkers, the problem is that they are difficult to 
organize. According to the CEO, it is not always possible to have control 
over managing the stakeholders. Although he indicated that he under-
stands that he can't control everything, the CEO stated that he has 
developed methods to stay in control, such as “leapfrogging”. Leapfrog-
ging, as the name indicates, means that he doesn't always go to the 
people who are directly under him, but skips one level in order to hear 
what is actually going on. He believes this is a good strategy and 
recommends this to the people he manages; he concludes that this 
results in a “fabric” of control.  
The above story clearly shows that thinking in terms of control is 
inherent to the CEO. This results in a specific frame of mind for the actor. 
For example, how the CEO views stakeholders can be formulated as 
thinking in terms of keeping control. In the following section, 
institutional logic is addressed.  
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5.2 Presentation of the institutional logic  
The aim of this section is to provide insight into the logic of Florabank as 
an organization. The stories below address the important written and un-
written rules of actors in and around the boards of governance at Flora-
bank. At the end of each subsection, it is indicated which institutional 
logic underlies the stories. These four stories have the following titles: 
the fundamental reasons for rules and regulations, the small sustainable 
bank, the organizational model, the authority of the CEO and the 
governance method.  
5.2.1 The fundamental reasons for rules and regulations 
During the interviews, when the respondents were asked what corporate 
governance refers to, all of them initially cited the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code and the Banking Code. The corporate principles of 
Florabank were also cited.  
 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code was established at the invitation 
of the Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs and at the request of 
Euronext Amsterdam, the Netherlands Centre of Executive and Super-
visory Board Members, the Foundation for Corporate Governance 
Research for Pension Funds, the Association of Stockholders, the 
Association of Securities-Issuing Companies and the business organiza-
tion VNO-NCW. Section 1.2 indicates that the Dutch Corporate Govern-
ance Code was adopted in 2003 by the Tabaksblat commission and was 
updated in 200860 by the Frijns commission. The Code contains principles 
and best practices that regulate the relationships between the executive 
board, the supervisory board and the stockholders (or the general 
meeting of stockholders). The relationship between the corporation and 
its employees (representatives) is addressed elsewhere, i.e. in the Works 
Councils Act (WOR). However, according to the preamble of the Code, 
the interests of the employee must be taken into account in the context 
of integral consideration of all stakeholders. The Dutch Corporate 
 
60 The update of the Frijns commission went into effect on 1 January 2009.  
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Governance Code applies to all corporations with their head office in the 
Netherlands or to listed companies61.  
 
In strictly legal terms, Florabank does not have to comply with the 
provisions in the Code, since the share certificates are not listed on a 
regulated stock exchange. Nevertheless, in its annual reports Florabank 
has indicated that it stands behind the principles of this Code and is also 
committed to them. The respondents indicated that they want to comply 
with these provisions because the Code supports the Triple P values and 
the standards of Florabank. However, following due consideration, the 
bank decided to deviate from the Code on five specific points. The first 
deviation concerns the voting rights on shares. The certificate holders do 
not have voting rights on the underlying shares. Instead, the voting right 
is exercised by the AAO. The second deviation is that the term of office of 
the statutory directors is not limited to a period of four years, since 
according to the organization this would not benefit the long-term deve-
lopment of the company. The third difference is that the supervisory 
board of Florabank has a single, integrated appointment-and-remune-
ration committee for the executive board and therefore does not have 
separate appointment and remuneration committees as prescribed by 
the Code. The fourth difference is that the bank does not present 
proposals for substantial changes in the bylaws as separate agenda 
points to the General Meeting of stockholders. The reason for this is that 
they want to reserve the possibility for presenting multiple changes as a 
single point on the agenda. According to the bank this is desirable if 
there is a strong mutual correlation between the proposed changes. The 
latter difference concerns the remuneration for the managing directors. 
This is because Florabank does not have any share or option schemes, as 
described in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.  
 
Banking Code 
Besides the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the Banking Code is also 
relevant for the corporate governance of Florabank. The Banking Code 
was a response to the publication of the report Naar Herstel van 
 
61 The Code does not apply to investment institutions that can be classified as financial 
products. 
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Vertrouwen of the advisory committee on the Future of Banking (Maas 
Commission, 2009). The Dutch Banking Association (NVB) adopted the 
Banking Code on 9 September 2009. The Banking Code concerns 
principles relating to the supervisory board, the executive board, risk 
management, auditing and remuneration policy. The Banking Code 
applies to all banks holding a banking permit granted according to the 
provisions in the Act on Financial Supervision62. Florabank complies with 
the principles of the Banking Code. However, there is one exception: 
Florabank does not pay variable remuneration based on predetermined 
financial objectives or performance. This is to avoid a risk-taking culture 
from taking hold in the organization. 
 
Corporate principles 
The corporate principles of Florabank were formulated by the bank itself 
on the basis of consultation between the board of the Association 
Administration Office (AAO) and the supervisory board. The corporate 
principles of Florabank are the following: respecting the law in every 
country where the bank does business, respecting human rights in 
various cultures and societies and respecting the environment, promo-
ting sustainable development and taking responsibility for all those 
involved and their actions, and continually looking for ways to improve 
(Annual Report Florabank, 2009). The corporate principles apply to all 
employees of Florabank regardless of their job title.  
 
The above explanation shows that Florabank is not obligated to comply 
with the rules and regulations, but has decided to do so out of principle. 
The bank does not have share or option schemes based on the principle 
that this could lead to a risk-taking culture. The fact that the term of 
office the statutory director is longer than four years has to do with the 
long-term thinking of the bank. According to the respondents, short-term 
thinking is an important contributor to the risk-taking culture of today. A 
short term of office can exacerbate this culture because the performance 
of the director is assessed only over the short term. This principle-based 
reasoning is strongly anchored in the culture of the organization. The 
 
62 For some foreign banks, the provisions in the Banking Code are only recommend-
dations. 
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document analysis and interviews revealed repeatedly that the 
organization deviates from the rules and regulations in a positive sense. 
Various respondents indicated that this also has to do with Florabank 
culture. In the following subsection, this culture is addressed explicitly.  
5.2.2 The small sustainable bank 
The respondents described the interactions between the actors in and 
around the boards of governance of Florabank as informal and friendly, 
with a mentality based on serious and hard work. Two respondents 
indicated that the organization is not open. Arrogance, lack of expertise 
and unprofessional behaviour are incompatible with the culture of the 
bank. The interviews show that ideals are very important at Florabank. 
For example, the CFO responded as follows when asked what he 
wouldn't do at Florabank:  
 
Arrive here in a beautiful automobile. If you don't have feeling for 
the mission, then you will be uncomfortable here. People here 
think this is really important. You must adapt yourself to this 
atmosphere. You must be able to connect with these aspects 
(Interview with CFO).  
 
The chairman of the supervisory board said the following about the 
ideological character of the bank: 
 
There are still small elements of …customers… They should be 
happy if they're allowed to bank here. This thinking is somewhat 
elitist. We are one stroke better (Interview with chairman of the 
supervisory board).  
 
In this context, the CFO stated: 
 
It is not easy to work with people who have high ideals. This is 
often more difficult than the social context. I do not know if you've 
noticed this. They stand for their ideals, and everything else has to 
wait. (Interview with CFO).  
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Various respondents indicated that the danger is that people will think 
that only the ideals are important at Florabank and that profits and 
expertise on the job have a low priority. However, nearly all respondents 
emphasized that Florabank gives a high priority to good job performance 
and profits.  
Notably, all respondents emphasized the informal character of the bank 
culture. They attributed the informal character to the small scale of 
Florabank. According to the respondents, the informal character is also 
related to the pioneer phase with which Florabank is struggling. Due to 
its rapid growth, Florabank has moved to a different phase from the 
pioneer phase, they explained. There is more professionalization and 
greater formality. On this topic, the chairman of the works council stated 
that he notices the difference with large banks. These differences 
become particularly visible during the inter-bank consultation in which 
the works councils of various banks meet with each other. At large 
banks, problems are solved in a formal procedure. Because problems are 
still solved informally, Florabank is therefore truly an exception, because 
it is still a small bank. The chairman of the works council explained this 
with an example:  
 
We had a reorganization at one department, during which four 
people could lose their jobs. The works council was informed about 
this situation much later. How did this happen? Good alternatives 
were arranged for all four people. For ”Klaasje” another job was 
arranged. “Pietje” decided to leave anyway, etc. This was already 
solved an individual fashion before it got to the works council 
(Interview with chairman of the works council). 
 
The chairman of the works council indicated that the reorganization was 
successful. The CEO also wants to arrange everything himself. This 
paternalistic attitude of the CEO was also mentioned in other interviews 
(Interview with CFO and interview with chairman of AAO). The chairman 
of the works council stated that he has the best intentions to find 
another position for the people, but that he is faced with a dilemma. This 
dilemma is also addressed in Section 5.3.2.  
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This story shows clearly that the informal character determines the 
interaction between actors in and around the boards of governance. 
However, the following story shows that formality also has a dominant 
role within Florabank.  
5.2.3 The organizational model  
During the interviews, the respondents regularly referred to the roles, 
tasks and functions that are described in the bylaws. The bylaws are 
legally certified by a public law notary during the formation of a limited 
liability company. The General Meeting of Shareholders may decide to 
amend the bylaws of Florabank. This decision is made annually. The 
bylaws of Florabank specify aspects such as the number of shares that 
can be issued, the method of appointment and discharge of board 
members, the competencies of the various bodies and the frequency and 
manner of their meetings, and the conveyance of shares. Because these 
competencies are described in the bylaws, it is logical that the respon-
dents referred to them during the in-depth interviews. However, it is 
notable that the preamble to the bylaws includes the original philosophy 
of Florabank63. The first article of the bylaws states that Florabank is a 
limited liability company. The choice for this legal form has a number of 
consequences for Florabank. First, when a limited liability company is 
established, the bylaws must be certified by a public law notary. Second, 
a limited liability company has a number of bodies: an executive board or 
board of directors, a supervisory board that monitors and advises the 
executive Board or Board of Directors, and a General Meeting of 
Shareholders that is authorized to appoint and discharge members of the 
board, amend bylaws, issue new shares and can decide to dissolve the 
limited liability company. Third, the members of the board of directors, 
executive board and supervisory board are in principle not liable for 
debts incurred by the limited liability company64. However, in case of 
mismanagement with resulting damage to the company, the members of 
the executive and supervisory boards can be held responsible. 
 
63 The preamble is not legally binding. 
64 To avoid personal liability of the members of the executive board and supervisory 
board, the limited liability company must be registered in the trade registry. This 
registration is usually supervised by the public law notary.  
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To acquire insight into various roles, tasks and competencies of the 
actors, Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the actors in and around the 
boards of governance at Florabank. This figure was created by combining 
information from the interviews, the annual reports 2009 and 2010 and 
the bylaws of Florabank. 
 
The organization revolves around the members of the boards of 
governance of the international head office consisting of three board 
members: the chairperson (Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) for financial matters and the Chief Operations 
Officer (COO) for day-to-day internal management and operational 
management.  
The CEO and CFO are the statutory directors65. These statutory directors 
are formally responsible for the leadership of Florabank in general, and 
are appointed by the supervisory board. The operational management of 
all the separate branches, i.e. the branches in the Netherlands and 
abroad consisting of a director and one or more managers, is 
accountable to these statutory directors. For example, the Dutch branch 
has a management consisting of one director and four managers, who 
manage the other employees at Florabank. A works council (OR) has 
been appointed at the branches in the Netherlands and in Spain.  
Figure 5.1 illustrates the overarching role of the shareholders and 
certificate holders. At the General Meeting of Shareholders, the share-
holders approve the annual accounts and the allocation of profits, grant 
discharge66 to the directors and members of the supervisory board, 
approve proposals to amend articles from the bylaws, discuss reappoint-
 
65 According to law, a statutory director is responsible for directing a limited liability 
company. A director is a member of the executive board only if he is appointed as such by 
the body that is authorized to make such appointments. This is frequently the General 
Meeting of Stockholders or the Supervisory Board. Appointment takes place by a legal 
appointment decision. An important provision is that a statutory director is liable, while 
other non-statutory directors are not jointly and severally liable. In the remainder of this 
thesis, I will refer to the CEO, CFO and COO jointly as the executive board and when I 
refer to the statutory directors I will state this explicitly.  
66 Granting discharge means relieving an individual of a specific responsibility, i.e. a set of 
tasks, a function, position or obligations in general. During a General Meeting of 
Shareholders, members of the executive board and the supervisory board can be granted 
discharge. 
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ment and remuneration of the supervisory board, authorize directors to 
acquire their own certificates, assess the performance of the external 
auditors, and decide on the issuance of new shares. The General Meeting 
of Shareholders has only a single shareholder –the Association Admini-
stration Office (AAO)– which has voting rights at the General Meeting. 
The AAO is a foundation that represents the certificate holders. It issues 
certificates to private parties and institutions. The certificate holders 
have voting rights at the Meeting of Certificate Holders. The Meeting of 
Certificate Holders appoints the board members of the AAO based on 
these recommendations and approves or does not approve the  
remuneration for the members of the AAO.  
Figure 5.1 Overview of actors in and around the boards of governance at 
Florabank 
 
The left side of Figure 5.1 shows the internal supervision of the bank, 
consisting of the accountant, compliance officer67 and the supervisory 
board. The latter internal supervising authority has the task of super-
vising the policy of the executive board and the general course of affairs 
in the limited liability company and its associated companies. It provides 
the executive board with advice. When fulfilling its task, the supervisory 
 
67 A compliance officer is a functionary who is appointed at a financial institution to 
monitor compliance with rules and regulations within the organization. He can act as an 
advisor to the institution under his supervision, but he can also have a more controlling 
role and act as a type of internal accountant. For banks, insurers and pension funds, the 
appointment of a compliance officer is mandatory.  
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board focuses on the interests of the limited liability company and its 
associated companies.  
On the right side of Figure 5.1, the external supervision is shown that is 
organized by the Dutch government, consisting of the DNB and AFM. 
Both external supervising authorities have different tasks. The DNB 
monitors whether financial institutions are healthy and can meet their 
financial obligations, while the AFM focuses more on the behaviour of 
the financial markets or whether the institutions properly inform their 
customers about financial products. The AFM also monitors whether 
companies keep to the agreements they have made with their 
customers. The foreign branches of Florabank are supervised by the 
corresponding national regulatory authorities. However, since the 
foreign branches to not fall within the scope of this study, they will not 
be included.  
 
This story outlines the tasks, roles and competencies that the respon-
dents expect from their formal role. The interviews show that these tasks 
and roles are very important. The respondents referred very frequently 
to the bylaws and often to the exact role of the actors in around the 
boards of governance. The subsequent story shows that not only the 
formal role determines the institutional logic, but also that the informal 
authority plays a major role in the institutional logic of Florabank.  
5.2.4 The authority of the CEO 
All respondents were asked to fill in a matrix showing who has the most 
authority in daily management. They were asked to do this by assigning a 
rank of one through eleven, where 1 has the most authority and 11 the 
least. Table 5.2 shows the results of this ranking. The respondents were 
free to add actors to the matrix. The respondents added employees, 
suppliers and the accountant. They indicated that it was difficult to fill in 
this matrix, since there are various levels of authority. Various 
respondents stated that at the management level, the CEO has the most 
authority, but that each actor has the most control within his or her own 
practice. For example, on the work floor itself the managing director, a 
manager or an employee has much more authority than even the CEO. 
Notably, the chairman of the AAO indicated that this organization should 
formally be ranked number one, because the bank is owned by the 
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shareholders. A number of respondents also indicated that society 
should be ranked number one, but in day-to-day practice this works out 
differently. The opinions of the respondents about the ranking were very 
similar, and the justification for the ranking was virtually the same.  
 
Table 5.2 Average authority ranking of actors in and around the boards of 
governance of Florabank 
No. Who has the final word 
1 CEO 
2 CFO/COO 
3 Managing Director 
4 Supervisory Board 
5 Association Administration Office (AAO) 
6 DNB 
7 AFM 
8 Government 
9 The Works Council 
10 Consumers/customers 
11 Interest groups 
 
According to the respondents, the CFO, COO and the Managing Director 
are at the top of the ranking. Notably, this group, supplemented with the 
supervisory board and the AAO, also has the most interaction with the 
CEO. The groups that have the least interaction with the CEO also have 
the least authority. Four of the seven respondents indicated that the CEO 
has the most authority in day-to-day management. After the CEO, the 
respondents ranked the CFO and COO as having the most authority. 
However, the respondents also indicated that the amount of authority 
often depends on the allocation of dossiers to the members of the 
executive board. For example, in daily practice, the COO often has more 
to say about automation than the CEO. According to the majority of 
respondents, the CEO receives the most backtalk from the CFO, the 
supervisory board, the managing director and the external accountant. 
The CFO described how he approaches confrontations with the CEO very 
deliberately and how he determines whether he should initiate a con-
frontation or wait for the right moment. The chairman of the supervisory 
council indicated that the personal characteristics of the CEO and CFO 
are complementary, and that the CEO is the entrepreneurial type, the 
CFO is the risk-avoiding type, and that the CEO is primarily responsive 
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while the CFO secondarily responsive. The chairman of the supervisory 
board commented as follows:  
 
The next day (first name of CFO) comes back and says: “I've 
thought about this,” and then the CEO says: “we discussed this 
yesterday” and the CFO responds: “yes, but after sleeping on it...” 
and this game continues and (first name of CEO) listens. (the 
respondent laughs). Well, he tries to listen” (Interview with 
chairman of the supervisory board).  
 
The CFO stated that the roles have grown in this way. He believes that 
they look at the competencies and capacities of the people in question. 
Although the chairman of the supervisory board, the chairman of the 
AAO and the managing director also typified the relationship with the 
CEO as cooperation, the CFO said that they do not cooperate, but coor-
dinate, so their activities do not overlap too much. The CEO has the 
mandate to look at strategy and development, while the CFO looks more 
at striking a balance between risk and benefit. However, the CFO 
emphasized that they feel jointly responsible for the mission of the bank. 
After the CEO, CFO, COO and managing director, the supervisory board, 
the AAO, the DNB and AFM have the most authority. Various 
respondents indicated that the supervisory board and the AAO hold 
separate positions; if the organization performs well and there is no 
threat of takeover, formally they do not have much authority, but if there 
are problems in these areas, then they do have the formal authority to 
intervene. The chairman of the supervisory board himself indicated that 
when the executive board and the managing director do their work 
properly, the influence and authority of the supervisory board is negligi-
ble (Interview with chairman of the supervisory board). The chairman of 
supervisory board stated that at the beginning of his career at Florabank, 
he felt like he was not always needed. He said that a prominent politician, 
who had also spent some time on the supervisory board, made the 
following statement: Are we actually needed in our role on the supervisory 
board, or is this only a legal obligation? (Interview with chairman of the 
supervisory board). The above chairman stated that he agreed with this 
politician and that he indeed felt this way at the beginning of his career. 
However, due to the composition of the supervisory board, it now offers 
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a much stronger counterweight. According to the chairman, it helps that 
the supervisory board now begins every meeting with a presentation 
from a department head during which members of the board can ask 
questions. In addition, the supervisory board has come to know much 
more about the organization and has much more understanding of the 
risks and worries in the organization. 
Although the supervisory board and the AAO both have supervisory 
tasks, they also have differing interests. The AAO focuses on the interests 
of the certificate holders, while the supervisory board keeps an eye on 
the interests of the bank as a whole. Although their interests differ, the 
executive board, the supervisory board, the AAO and the supervisory 
board were reported by various respondents as being friendly with each 
other. For example, the chairman of the works council stated that the 
supervisory board does not contradict the CEO. He added that the 
chairman of the supervisory board and the CEO often think the same way 
about many matters. The members of these bodies do everything they 
can to present a united front to the outside world. The chairman of the 
supervisory board commented as follows:  
 
For people in the organization, the AAO and the supervisory board 
are one and the same. They have may disagree with each other, 
but they present a single face to the outside world. They also 
cannot show that they differ in insight (Interview with chairman of 
the supervisory board).  
 
According to the respondents, the DNB and AFM establish the conditions 
and the rules and regulations which Florabank and its executive board 
must comply with, and they have authority only in this respect. According 
to Florabank respondents, the parties with the least authority are the 
government, the works council, consumers (customers) and interest 
groups. Notably, the works council is given the ninth place. Various 
respondents indicated that the works council has little or nothing to say 
within the organization. 
According to the respondents, the customers and the interest groups 
have the least to say in day-to-day operations. Some respondents indi-
cated that there is actually too little contact with customers from the 
management level, and that too few structural contact moments have 
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been arranged. Although customer days are organized during which 
actors in and around the boards of governance can talk with customers 
about topics such as sustainability, customer panels are not deployed. 
Notably, the respondents did realize that this group determines the 
legitimacy of the organization. Various respondents indicated that the 
clients themselves show their authority by “voting with their feet”. The 
CEOs cited an example from practice which showed that this actually 
occurs. When the television programme Zembla made it known that 
several other banks and pension funds were investing in cluster bombs, 
the number of clients opening an account at Florabank increased sharply 
(Interview with CEO).  
This section shows that people have difficulty in answering the question 
of who has the most authority within the organization An important 
reason for this difficulty is that everyone has authority in their own area, 
and that the executive board makes no decisions in certain areas. 
However, when looking only at management decisions, it emerged that 
there is a difference between formal and informal authority. According to 
the bylaws, the CFO and CEO are responsible for decision-making at the 
executive level, but the interviews show that the CEO still has the most 
informal authority. The following story is about the patterns of inter-
action and the corresponding role of the CEO.  
5.2.5 The governance method 
During the in-depth interviews with respondents at Florabank, enquiries 
were made about the amount of interaction between actors in and 
around the boards of governance. Figure 5.2 shows a network of contact 
moments between the various players. Three remarks can be made 
about this network. First, various respondents indicated that the 
accountant and compliance officer were actually not very important, 
since they are seen as acting under the auspices of the DNB and AFM. 
However, other respondents did acknowledge that the accountant has 
an important role (Interview with CFO). Second, the respondents added 
the following actors to the list that was presented to them in a matrix 
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(Appendix III): consumers, interest groups68 and the government69. The 
third remark is that when no line is drawn between various players in 
Figure 5.2, this means that little or no formal contact is present. 
However, coincidental contact between these players is still possible, for 
example during seminars, customer days or other events. These contacts 
have not been included in Figure 5.2. 
  
 
68 The interest groups are the associations in the area of sustainability or the Association 
of Banks.  
69 The government includes ministers, state secretaries, parliament and civil servants. 
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Regarding the interaction between the players in and around the boards 
of governance of Florabank, three remarks can be made. First, the CEO is 
drawn as a sort of spider at the centre of the web; this was done for a 
reason. The respondents surrounding the CEO indicated that he likes to 
take control, and actually has control at the managerial level. For 
example, the chairman of the AAO indicated that the CEO does not want 
him to hold discussions with the financial officer of a foreign branch 
(without permission). He said that he understands this and complies; he 
continued as follows:  
 
Like the proverbial spider in the web, he wants to see all the lines 
of communication. Not that he wants to hold anything back, I don't 
believe that, but he does want to be in control, and I note that he is 
very cautious about uncontrolled growth in internal communi-
cation (Interview with chairman of AAO).  
 
However, the other respondents see that the CEO has developed in this 
respect. He has distanced himself somewhat more from the bank and he 
tries to let go of some aspects, according to the respondents (Interview 
with the chairman of AAO and interview with chairman of supervisory 
board). According to nearly all respondents, it is primarily the CEO who 
takes the initiative on specific points during meetings or puts topics on 
the agenda. When the chairman of the supervisory board was asked to 
draw the network, he drew a flower, and indicated that the roots 
symbolize the CEO. All lines to the other players go through the CEO. He 
then explained that this is also something he is concerned about: the CEO 
has to hold on to all these lines, because if the roots are gone then the 
tree will fall (Interview with chairman of the supervisory board). Both the 
chairman of the supervisory board and the chairman of the AAO voiced 
the concern that this aspect is difficult because the organization is so 
highly concentrated around the person of the current CEO. Both 
chairmen also discuss this theme extensively during the meetings with 
their own groups. It is striking that these groups, in view of the 
similarities, have not yet exchanged thoughts on this topic with each 
other; it is even more striking that they have never had bilateral contact 
with each other.  
 
Florabank 
 
183 
 
The second remark concerning the interaction between the players in 
and around the boards of governance is that the numbers of contact 
moments differ greatly. The CEO has the largest number of contact 
moments. The CEO and CFO have much contact with each other. The CFO 
stated that their interactions consist primarily of making agreements 
about dividing tasks so there is less overlap. The meetings with the CEO 
show a fixed pattern that is planned well in advance. In the interactions 
with the CEO, it is notable that nearly everyone, besides having contact 
at the formal meetings, also has informal contact with the CEO. The 
works council is an exception. The informal meetings with the CEO 
primarily have an exploratory, coaching and sometimes an evaluative 
character. The agendas for the formal meetings are discussed in advance. 
Is a specific topic ready for the agenda, or is it too soon? Information is 
also exchanged on many topics. As an example, the chairman of the AAO 
said that during the informal conversations with the CEO, topics such as 
the credit crisis were discussed. The following issues were raised: Does 
the credit crisis have consequences for the bank? If so, which conse-
quences? And if a certificate holder asks why Florabank is not troubled by 
the credit crisis, what can we answer? (Interview with chairman of the 
AAO). An important function of informal consultation is that the dilem-
mas can be discussed from both sides and reviewed by the other party. 
During the informal meetings, confrontations sometimes take place that 
outsiders should not hear. For example, the CFO indicated that when he 
confronts the CEO, he does that primarily in an informal setting.  
The third remark concerns two developments that are currently taking 
place in the area of interaction. The first development is that various 
players are no longer involved in the strategic process. In this context, 
the respondents referred to ‘Theory U’70 (Sharmer, 2009), which they use 
when writing the strategic plan for Florabank. The CEO explained that 
Sharmer works according to the principle that while writing a business 
 
70 Theory U describes a process to achieve fundamental change. The letter U illustrates 
the route along which this change is given shape. First ‘go deep’ and then take action 
step-by-step with the aid of these insights. Essentially, this process involves making 
unconscious and invisible information conscious and visible, and then being able to use 
this information in the process of change. This can be achieved by looking, communi-
cating and acting differently. In his book Theory U (2009), Otto Scharmer described this as 
observing, feeling, and acting with an "open mind, open heart and open will". 
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plan or strategic plan, one must force oneself to initially focus on the 
environment and listen to other players in and around the organization, 
before considering the content of the plan. According to the CEO, this 
method compels one to first enter into dialogue with the stakeholders in 
the broadest sense of the word. At Florabank, three months of discus-
sions were held with various stakeholders, internal as well as external. 
Not only employees were involved, but ‘inspirers' in the area of sustaina-
bility were also interviewed. One team from Florabank even went to the 
train station to ask the opinions of commuters about banking in the 
future. The second development that was referred to by various 
respondents is that a community of external and external parties is 
gradually being created in which the players can contact each other more 
easily, physically or digitally. At present, the average Florabank customer 
is older than 45 and is digitally not very opportune, although there is 
development towards more attention to this aspect, according to the 
COO (Interview with COO). 
 
These stories show that the interaction patterns between actors in and 
around the boards of governance determine the institutional logic. In this 
respect, the CEO is an important player. This story has revealed the 
characteristics of the CEO, such as striving for control and direction. The 
CEO controls and directs the consultation structures. The implicit 
message of this story is that actors in and around the boards of 
governance follow the informal consultation structures of the CEO. For 
example, they do not consult with other parties without informing the 
CEO about this. Otherwise, the respondents would see this as a kind of 
betrayal. The following five stories focus not on the logic of the institute, 
but on the logic of practice.  
5.3 Presentation of the logic of practice 
The various stories presented below address how the actors in and 
around the boards of governance deal with corporate governance in 
practice. These stories have the following titles: using grey space in rules 
and regulations, balancing between formality and informality, discus-
sions about ideals, and the completeness and timeliness of information. 
At the end of the various stories, the logic of practice is addressed.  
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5.3.1 Using grey space in rules and regulations  
The DNB is seen by the respondents as the primary external regulating 
authority and the AFM as the secondary external regulating authority. 
The DNB has a more emphatic presence at Florabank than at the pension 
fund. Nearly all respondents at Florabank stated that they have not 
noticed much about the AFM. However, the respondents did indicate 
that in the context of the financial crisis and bookkeeping scandals, the 
demands of both the DNB and AFM have grown and have become 
increasingly strict. Certainly in view of the financial crisis, the respondents 
understand this. The respondents indicated that they believe that rules 
and regulations help to prevent excesses. At the same time, cautious 
remarks were made about whether the current rules and regulations are 
really adequate. The underlying thought is that if someone really wants 
to go rogue, then they will do so regardless. Another aspect also 
emerged from the in-depth interviews: the CFO stated that a discussion 
had taken place about whether the responsibility for making and 
enforcing rules and regulations had been given to the right party. The 
CFO explained this as follows:  
 
So you have, for example, transaction monitoring. Banks are in fact 
responsible if money laundering or terrorism funding is run 
through the accounts, so we have to build detection systems into 
our ICT systems. In addition, we link up to lists of hundreds of 
thousands of names that have been selected by the government 
and determine whether these people are making transactions or if 
we can see if anything strange is happening. But that is an entire 
system in itself. You have to purchase software for this. You must 
have someone to look at this and analyse it. And what does it yield? 
This is a role for the police, not for a company. But at a certain 
point they said, you just have to implement it (Interview with CFO). 
  
The respondents also stated that a great deal of time and energy was 
required from employees to comply with legal requirements, indicating a 
less than positive attitude on this topic. This primarily concerns the des-
criptions in the annual report and the explanation of the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code. This is also why the metaphor “paper tiger” was used 
multiple times in the context of rules and regulations and with respect to 
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the DNB and AFM. According to the CEO, innovation in the financial 
sector is hampered by the increasing rules and regulations; the time and 
energy that are required to comply with these rules and regulations 
cannot be used for productive purposes, such as developing new pro-
ducts or analysing quarterly figures (Interview with CEO). The respon-
dents also remarked that the rules and regulations are not only time-
consuming, but also contradictory. This is because Florabank, due to its 
international environment, has to deal with both Anglo-Saxon and 
Rhineland rules and regulations. Moreover, the actors in and around the 
boards of governance do not always agree with the content of the rules 
and regulations. For example, the chairman of the supervisory board said 
that he thought it was rather incestuous that members of the super-
visory board are appointed by the General Meeting of Shareholders 
(ALV) based on recommendations from the supervisory board: 
 
A supervisory body that makes a binding proposal (I assume it's 
binding) to the ALV for new members of the supervisory board 
…how independent is that? (Interview with chairman of the 
supervisory board). 
 
The stories of the respondents show that actors in and around the 
boards of governance often seek the ‘grey’ areas in the rules and 
regulations (areas that are open to interpretation), often because the 
regulations lack clarity. According to the respondents, the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code, with its “comply or explain” provision, 
offers space for such interpretation. Within this interpretive space, 
people look explicitly for how they can safeguard their personal or 
organizational interests. Some respondents indicated that this is 
obviously the work of legal experts, who often know the legal loopholes 
and understand the space for interpretation. So they ask lawyers to find 
out where they can get tax breaks. The CEO also indicated that he 
sometimes deliberately initiates a discussion with the DNB to determine 
if there is room in the implementation of rules and regulations. In 
addition, both the CEO and CFO indicated that there are situations in 
which the DNB is used as a sparring partner to provide new ideas. These 
situations are experienced as very positive. As an example, the CEO 
referred to the fact that Florabank was expanding abroad. Although he 
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was not legally required to do so, he asked the DNB for its opinion 
beforehand on this expansion. The CEO was very pleased with the 
contribution of the DNB which consequently saved time throughout the 
process.  
 
This subsection shows that actors in and around the board governance 
have principle-based criticism of the rules and regulations. The implemen-
tation of the rules and regulations leads to extra workload that prevents 
actors in and around the boards of governance from doing more 
important work: sustainable banking. People therefore make use of the 
grey areas in the rules and regulations. This story also shows that rules 
and regulations are given a totally different interpretation in the formal 
context than in the informal one. The following subsection addresses the 
tension between formality and informality more directly.  
5.3.2 Balancing between formality and informality 
The interviews revealed an area of tension between formality and 
informality. Various examples from practice of these areas of tension at 
Florabank are given below. Section 5.2.2 contains a story on the reorgani-
zation and the informal approach of the CEO in this process. Before the 
reorganization plan was presented to the works council, steps had 
already been taken to arrange new jobs within the organization for 
employees who would be affected by the reorganization. This situation 
resulted in an area of tension for the chairman of the works council. On 
the one hand he was sincerely pleased that the employees had been 
treated well in the reorganization, but on the other hand the works 
council did not fulfil the expectations of its formal role. This is because 
the Works Councils Act (WOR) stipulates that formal permission is 
required from the works council for a reorganization. The chairman of 
the works council (OR) explained that such situations occur regularly. For 
example, in the distant past a member of the works council was 
informally requested to find a new pension fund, and the same individual 
then had to approve the proposal for a new pension fund as a member of 
the OR. He explained this dilemma as follows: “Actually, we continuously 
balance between the formal and informal” (Interview with chairman of 
the works council). Subsequently, the situation was discussed in the OR, 
and it was decided to establish a type of escape clause.  
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The interviews with other respondents also show that it is not easy to 
deal with the tension between formality and informality. Another reason 
why it is sometimes difficult to achieve this balance is that it is sometimes 
necessary to make quick decisions in practice; in this case it was not 
possible to coordinate everything formally. According to the bylaws, 
however, this is compulsory. For example, the chairman of the supervi-
sory board explained how the CEO sometimes phoned him with the 
question of whether the bank should participate in a holding. This 
decision could not wait until the next formal meeting. In such circumstan-
ces the chairman has to consider the options. If he has the impression 
that the supervisory board would simply approve the decision, then he 
also approves it immediately and presents it afterwards at the next 
meeting. But if he is in doubt, then he makes a series of phone calls, 
although the latter seldom happens, said the chairman. He then 
presented another example, which clearly shows that informality also 
has consequences for formality. The supervisory board was asked 
informally by the CEO to contribute ideas to the three-year strategic plan. 
After they had set out a plan during the "strategy day", together with the 
AAO, managing directors and executive board, the supervisory board 
began to discuss whether they would be involved in the further process. 
The opinions were divided. The chairman himself believed that the 
strategy day with the above-mentioned actors was a top-down process. 
This information subsequently went back to the bank, and a bottom-up 
process would ensue, according to the chairman of the supervisory 
board. When something entirely different began to emerge from the 
strategic plan, then the chairman of the supervisory board concluded 
that the managing director was not well-organized and was not directing 
the organization adequately. He thought that the supervisory board 
should have intervened. He continued his story:  
 
If something is very serious, then you have the option of dismissing 
the managing director, but in practice it will not come to that. In 
practice, you don't do that because you're not going to say "I 
reject the entire plan" because then you make him look foolish in 
front of the whole organization. So that is the game. You don't do 
it because you don't reject an entire plan that the organization has 
worked on for two years. You can't do that because you don't send 
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the plan back to the organization: Wow, the supervisory board is 
not going along with this. You should play that game better 
(Interview with chairman of the supervisory board).  
 
The above example shows that informality, in particular contributing 
ideas to the strategy, also has consequences for formality. The respon-
dents, especially the CEO, are very aware of this. If an important interest 
is involved, the respondents prefer a formal approach. For instance, the 
chairman of the works council used the example of changing the basis of 
the pension contribution for a new pension fund from final salary to 
average salary. For employees this is a very sensitive topic because it in-
volves a lot of money, but it is beneficial for the organization. According 
to the chairman of the works council, with this type of situation every-
thing is formalized. The opposite is also possible. Some parties do not 
have to be formally involved, but the actor does this anyway. For 
example, the CEO involved the supervisory board with the strategy day 
because he believes they should empathize with the organization, should 
account for certain choices and be given the opportunity to ask ques-
tions. Another example is that the CEO informed the DNB about establi-
shing a foreign branch. Formally, the CEO did not have to report this, but 
he did so with the aim of including their opinions and ideas in the pro-
cess, so the DNB couldn't bring up all kinds of concerns afterward that 
would still have to be implemented. In this way the CEO saved time in the 
process of establishing a foreign branch.  
This story shows how the tension between formality and informality 
involving actors in and around the board with governance of Florabank is 
expressed. The following story involves the area of tension in the 
provision of information to actors in and around the board governance. 
5.3.3 The completeness and timeliness of information  
Notably, nearly all respondents receive information from the executive 
board. For example, the supervisory board routinely receives the annual 
report, quarterly figures, financial summaries, budgets, plans, evalu-
ations, half-year reports, summaries of revised budgets, the operational 
plan, the three-year forecast and clippings from the media about 
Florabank. When the executive board is involved with takeovers, new 
plans, holdings, expansions, and new branches, then the supervisory 
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board is also supposed to receive this information. The members of the 
AAO receive figures, half-year reports, annual reports and internal memo-
randums about the credit policy and memorandums about operational 
management. According to the CEO, each actor receives information that 
is relevant for him or her, but the decision about what is or is not relevant 
is made by the CEO himself. Moreover, in practice it is sometimes difficult 
to determine whether the CEO has or has not shared certain information 
with various parties. The CEO indicated that he does not want to 
overload the actors with too much information. According to the CEO, it 
is sometimes quite an art to keep the meetings on track with the 
strategically important points. The CEO also indicated that the usefulness 
of the acquired information must be weighed against the efforts of the 
employees of the organization that are needed to acquire this infor-
mation. The chairman of the supervisory board and the AAO noted that it 
is rather strange to receive such pre-selected information from the 
executive board, because these bodies are actually supposed to 
supervise the executive board. 
The in-depth interviews show that in the daily practice of management, 
the information provision between the players concerned does not 
always proceed smoothly. The chairman of the works council indicated 
that this is not always self-evident. Following multiple requests, the 
works council now receives the annual report, but still does not receive 
documents such as the minutes of the executive board meetings. When 
he nevertheless requests this from the CEO, he is often asked what he 
wants to do with this information. According to the chairman of the 
works council, there must always be a utility or a necessity before he 
receives the information. He suspects that he does not receive the 
information because the members of executive board have the feeling 
that the works council would then get too involved with what the board 
is doing and would step out of its oppositional role. (Interview with 
chairman of the works council). The chairmen of the supervisory board, 
the AAO and the works council indicated that they almost always receive 
the information from the executive board too late. Several times, the 
supervisory board even ended up reading about events in the newspaper 
and were thus confronted with a fait accompli (Interview with chairman 
of the supervisory board). The supervisory board also informed the CEO 
that they were disgruntled about this. The AAO and works council are 
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also very annoyed when they do not receive the information on time. 
They do not like being dependent on the CEO for this information.  
Opposite to this dependence is the own responsibility of the actors in 
and around the boards of governance. These actors also feel that 
obtaining the information is their own responsibility. Virtually all respon-
dents indicated that they check the information that they receive, for 
example by comparing figures with those from the previous years, but 
that a great deal is based on trust. The chairman of the supervisory board 
commented as follows:  
 
Today, you can no longer get away with the excuse that you didn't 
receive the information. In that case you should have done better, 
asked more questions, etc. And that happens during the meetings; 
we make inquiries (Interview with chairman of the supervisory 
board).  
 
Other actors indicated that they bear some of the responsibility. The 
chairman of the works council explained this as follows: The managing 
director once said literally: all information is available, but employees are 
obligated to retrieve this information themselves (Interview with 
chairman of the works council). 
 
The respondents indicated that they also take matters into their own 
hands to accelerate the provision of information. For example, the super-
visory board begins each meeting with a presentation from a department 
head. In addition, the chairman of the supervisory and CEO meet 
together two or three times per year for drinks to discuss prominent 
topics or various matters they are involved with. According to the chair-
man of the AAO, problems with the lack of information are often solved 
very practically by changing the information when people disagree with 
it, or making agreements to prevent this in the future (Interview with 
chairman of the AAO).  
 
This story shows that actors in and around the boards of governance are 
faced with tension between independence and responsibility. On the one 
hand, and they are dependent on the information from the CEO, but on 
the other hand, they are themselves responsible for acquiring the correct 
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and complete information. According to the respondents, trust plays an 
important role in this process. They operate within this tensions and try 
to think of ways to acquire the information, such as requesting presen-
tations from heads of the departments. In the following subsection, the 
area of tension concerning ideals is addressed.  
5.3.4 Struggle between ideals 
Section 5.1.2 describes how roughly two types of ideals are pursued at 
Florabank: the sustainability ideals and the original ideals. The interviews 
show that these two types of ideals can clash in practice. The key motiva-
tion behind the sustainability ideal is the conviction that their method of 
banking improves society. The objective is to reach as many people as 
possible so they deal with money differently. In this story, the growth of 
Florabank is an important principal because it is assumed that more 
people can be reached and more impact can be generated. The CEO, the 
chairman and the other respondents are all in favour of growth. But the 
boards also have members who are opposed to growth, who believe it is 
important for the bank to retain its initial philosophy. For them, it is not 
important to expand this philosophy; the point is that people at 
Florabank continue to act according to this philosophy. Therefore, the 
group with sustainability ideals, including the CEO and the chairmen, 
wants Florabank to grow, and the group with original ideals wants 
Florabank to stay small and preserve its original philosophy. An argument 
in favour of growth expressed by the CEO and the other respondents is 
that the founders of Florabank also started with this intention for the 
bank. They also indicated that it is not appreciated in certain settings to 
announce that one supports the story of the original ideals. The chairman 
of the AAO commented as follows:  
 
If I would propose to begin the meeting with a lecture from 
someone who supports the original philosophy of Florabank, then I 
would see (first name CEO) raise his eyebrows to behind his ears. 
Because you can't do that in such a setting without consequences, 
because you see the risk of becoming a sectarian bank. And that is 
precisely what the founders did not want. I have been told that the 
DNB proposed this at the time, but the founders, who all believed 
in the original philosophy, indicated that they didn't want that 
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because sustainability doesn't stop with the original philosophy, 
but is for everyone, and there are only a few people in the country 
who support the original philosophy, and we believe it is important 
to disseminate that. If you do that in a sectarian fashion, then 
everyone turns away from the bank. We have seen that happen in 
Germany. The bank has also remained small (Interview with 
chairman of the AAO).  
 
The interviews show that this is a sensitive point for discussion at 
Florabank. The respondents said that the members of the boards are 
sometimes very principled in this respect. Regular discussions on this 
topic also take place internally within the supervisory board and AAO. 
The chairman of the AAO indicated that he discusses this during the 
informal conversations with the CEO, who then says that he thinks the 
chairman should be cautious about how these ideas can grow within the 
group. The respondent then includes this concern in his consultation 
(Interview with chairman of the AAO). This story again shows that the 
CEO tries to exercise control. 
Not only is there an internal discussion about ideals, but corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is also part of the public debate. There is primarily a 
discussion about the motivation of CSR, in which one motivation is 
particular given: money can be earned from sustainability. In discussions 
about CSR, the tension between economic and social values becomes 
apparent. Is CSR about profits and numbers, or is it about the intrinsic 
motivation to actually achieve something for society? In the public 
debate, Florabank takes a position and indicates that it supports the 
intrinsic motivation. During the interviews, the respondents indicated 
that for outsiders it appears that Florabank is not particularly involved 
with profits and numbers, but that is actually not the case. Nearly all 
respondents stated that much of the day-to-day practice at Florabank is 
based on profits and numbers. According to the respondents, money 
must be earned as well. Economic values are indeed important. 
According to various respondents, this is due to the fact that the 
customers want to bank in a sustainable fashion, but they also want to 
earn interest. Sustainability and profitability are linked together. 
Florabank states that the values of people, planet and profit are 
integrated in all its activities, which results in the creation of sustainable 
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banking (Annual Report Florabank, 2009). On its Internet site, the bank 
also states that its primary objective is to promote a sustainable society, 
and that making a profit is not an objective in itself, but is a measure of 
good banking. In its day-to-day work, the boards of governance are 
regularly involved with this trade-off, during which it continuously assess 
risks.  
The above narration shows that the various ideals of actors in and around 
the boards of governance can clash in practice. Notably, the ideals of the 
CEO are assumed to be the norm, and the other ideals are made 
subordinate by the historical stories and other arguments. One 
discussion that takes place in the public debate in the area of social 
values is about whether the motives of CSR have to do with financial 
benefit or social benefit. Viewed from the perspective of Florabank 
customer, the economic and social values are both important. As a result, 
the actors in and around the boards of governance regularly have to 
make a trade-off between these values, during which they continuously 
assess the risks.  
5.4 Synthesis 
This chapter presents the findings on Florabank case study. The findings 
are presented on the basis of three types of logic: the logic of the actor, 
the institute and the practice.  
 
In Section 5.1 the logic of the actors in and around the boards of 
governance is addressed. The respondents can be characterized as a 
homogeneous group consisting of middle-aged Dutch males with 
backgrounds in economics or law. The men hold ancillary positions at 
foundations and associations in the area of sustainability or which are in 
line with the original philosophy of Florabank. This background reflects 
their rational and utility-oriented thinking, but also their involvement 
with the ideals of the bank. Furthermore, Section 5.1 shows that the 
history of the founding of the bank appears to play an important role 
even today. In particular, the engagement with the sustainable character 
and original philosophy of the bank characterize the organization. This 
affinity with sustainability can also be seen in the CEO. Besides being an 
idealist, the CEO is also a pioneer and a visionary. He is accustomed to 
working in a solution-oriented fashion, and in his stories about how he 
Florabank 
 
195 
 
thinks about management, the logic of thinking in terms of control is 
dominant.  
 
Section 5.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. Based on stories about 
rules and regulation, culture, bylaws, authority and informal structures, it 
becomes clear which rules of thumb are important in the organization. 
People comply with the rules and regulations, even though this is not 
always compulsory, but they believe that this prevents excesses in the 
financial world. However, there are fundamental reasons to deviate from 
the Dutch Corporate Code, but this code –due to its "comply or explain" 
provision – also provides room for such deviation. The bylaws ensure that 
actors in and around the boards of governance of Florabank understand 
their formal role and what is expected of them. This is a very important 
point of departure for the actors in and around the boards of 
governance. Besides the formal rules, it appears that there is also an 
informal world within Florabank. In this informal world, the CEO has the 
space to play a directing and controlling role. The other unwritten rules 
that can be found in the above institutional logic are the following: You 
must feel an affinity with the mission of the bank, the CEO makes the 
final decision, and you must play the role that is expected of you 
according to the bylaws. These rules can also be described as the institu-
tional logic.  
 
Section 5.3 shows that stories about practice can be used to understand 
that people in practice are faced with various types of logic which are in 
conflict with each other. The story about the criticism of rules and regula-
tions shows that the respondents experience the implementation of 
rules and regulations as very burdensome. This is not only because the 
rules and regulations have increased enormously, but also because they 
require much time and energy that cannot be invested in the primary 
process of Florabank, i.e. sustainable banking. The respondents indicated 
that they look for the grey areas in the rules and regulations, with the 
aim of safeguarding their own organizational objectives. The story about 
informality and formality shows that there is space to choose how one 
acts, but that one is simultaneously held captive in the system of informal 
and formal rules. The story about striking a balance between ideals 
shows that people are struggling not only with the ideals of various 
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actors in and around the boards of governance, but also with the social 
and economic values of the customers. And finally, the story about 
information provision shows that there is an area of tension between 
dependence and responsibility. Now that the results of the final case 
study have been described in this chapter, the subsequent chapter 
focuses on the analysis.  
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6  A narrative analysis 
This chapter presents the analysis of the study into the sensemaking of 
areas of tension in corporate governance. This chapter consists of a 
descriptive and an explanatory section. Section 6.1 is descriptive. The 
starting point for section 6.1 is the theoretical framework of this study 
(Section 2.5). In this framework or narrative table, the grand narratives, 
subordinate narratives and counter narratives for both BPF and 
Florabank are linked with the three narrative concepts: the worldview, 
the institutional framework and the mode of practice. This has resulted 
in three grand narratives that are addressed sequentially in in this 
section: 1) corporate governance is complying with rules and 
regulations, 2) attaching value to written regulations and 3) balancing 
between various interests. At the end of each subsection, an overview 
of a completed narrative table is shown. The explanatory part is 
addressed in Section 6.2. This section explains the areas of tension and 
shows the tensions between the narratives (Section 6.2.1) and various 
levels of the narratives (6.2.2). Section 6.3 describes the similarities and 
differences within the three narrative concepts (6.2.3). This leads to the 
concluding section, which provides an answer to the third research 
question of this study: “Which explanatory factors can be identified in 
and around the boards of governance in the financial sector that 
elucidate the tensions in corporate governance?”. 
6.1 The descriptive part: the narrative table 
As stated previously, in this analysis the theoretical framework that 
emerged from the literature study is used as the starting point (Table 
2.2). The next step is to identify the various grand narratives, subordinate 
narratives and counter narratives of corporate governance and the world 
view, the institutional framework and the mode of practice. Identifying 
the narratives in all the data is difficult in practice. There is a sort of 
"narrative soup". This term was coined by Boje (2001), who argued that 
narratives are intended to put the "soup" of the collected stories into 
some kind of perspective (Section 2.2). This narrative soup results from 
various causes. For example, various topics are mapped out in various 
contexts. By zooming in on the text, zooming out on the environment 
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and linking the macro and micro levels with each other (Fairclough, 
1992), various narratives can be identified. The following three grand 
narratives emerged from the analysis: 1) corporate governance is comply-
ing with rules and regulations, 2) attaching value to written regulations 
and 3) maintaining a balance between various interests. These narratives 
are explained in the subsections below.  
6.1.1 Grand narrative I: Corporate governance is complying with 
rules and regulations 
From the study, it emerged that the executives and actors in and around 
the boards of governance see corporate governance primarily as comply-
ing with rules and regulations. In the grand narrative, the respondents at 
BPF referred to the Pensions Act and the Frijns and Goudswaard 
parliamentary commissions (Section 4.1.2). At Florabank, the respon-
dents referred to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and the Banking 
Code (Section 5.2.1). They comply with the prescribed regulations. When 
the background of the respondents is examined, it is notable that a 
significant proportion of respondents from both organizations have a 
background in law (Sections 4.1.1 and 5.1.1). Both organizations are 
characterized by actors in and around the boards of governance who 
have backgrounds in law or who have legal expertise; this also empha-
sizes the importance of compliance with rules and regulations. In this 
context, a background in law can be construed as a worldview. In both 
organizations the respondents have been trained to think and operate 
based on rules and regulations. They understand what they have to 
comply with and how to implement the rules and regulations, and they 
know the language to be used in this process. Notably, the respondents 
are convinced that it is useful to comply with the rules and regulations. 
This is because they believe that excesses in the financial sector can be 
prevented in part by rules and regulations. During the interviews, this 
utility-oriented thinking repeatedly returned. The prevalent background 
in economics of the actors in and around the boards of governance of 
BPF (Table 4.1) and Florabank (Table 5.1) can also be related to this utility-
oriented thinking. The utility-oriented thinking can therefore be regarded 
as a world view within this grand narrative of corporate governance on 
rules and regulations.  
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With respect to acting within the rules and regulations, it is notable that 
the actors in and around the boards of governance use rules and regula-
tions as a means to act legitimately. They do this during a meeting, for 
example when an executive or another actor in and around the boards of 
governance presents a plan of approach. During the meeting, it is 
determined whether the plan is based on the correct legal grounds and 
whether the resulting actions fall within the statutory norms. Moreover, 
the results (Sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.1) show that the actors in and around 
the boards of governance of both organizations take strategic as well as 
communicative action where rules and regulations are concerned. The 
strategic action is given shape because the respondents indicated that 
understanding rules and regulations is an important advantage. On this 
basis, they can play the game skilfully and can therefore protect them-
selves when this is required, or they can use this as an argument to get 
things done for each other. In both organizations, rules and regulations 
are used as a means to take strategic action, but communicative action is 
also used. To comply with the rules and regulations, both organizations 
involve the DNB in implementing certain plans (Sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.1). 
They indicated that they do this by making the DNB an active part of the 
process, so this organization can contribute ideas from the rules and 
regulations. In this situation, the boards of both BPF and Florabank act 
communicatively. They involve the DNB in their plans without knowing 
the outcome. The results show that the members of the board of both 
organizations have a positive attitude about this method of taking action. 
They like to have the DNB involved at an early stage, and they have the 
idea that this saves them much time and energy.  
Both case studies show that there is a subordinate narrative. At both 
organizations, the respondents emphasized that they deviate from the 
rules and regulations in a positive sense (Sections 4.3.4 and 5.2.1). At BPF, 
the respondents explicitly stated that, due to the cautionary principle, 
they deviated in a positive sense when writing the recovery plan. In its 
annual report, Florabank stated that it complies with the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code, even though this is not formally required 
because the bank is not listed on an indexed exchange (Annual Report 
Florabank, 2009). Although the legal obligation is to report deviations, it 
is notable that in their reporting, both organizations stated explicitly that 
they deviate in a positive sense. With respect to the worldview, history 
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plays a central role in both organizations. At BPF this concerns the history 
of the industry. In the past, the industry –and the actors in and around 
the boards of governance as well– has acquired a great deal of 
experience with and knowledge about rules and regulations. The world-
view of the actors in and around the boards of governance consists 
largely of thinking in terms of rules and regulations based on their 
professional background. At Florabank, due to the origin of the organiza-
tion, the actors have an affinity with positive social action (Section 5.1.2). 
This sense of ethics can also be seen in the background of the actors in 
and around the boards of governance. Many of the respondents hold 
ancillary positions at organizations involved with sustainability (Table 
5.1.2). They think in terms of wanting to do something good for society, 
and therefore want to demonstrate that they are also doing good in 
terms of rules and regulations. At Florabank a normative characteristic is 
clearly involved as well. They feel that it is a social obligation to comply 
with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, even though this is not 
compulsory according to the regulations. Moreover, the findings have 
shown that the positive deviation from the rules and regulations in both 
organizations has to do with the cultural-cognitive characteristic. At BPF, 
the high ambition level of the pension fund plays an important role in the 
positive deviation from rules and regulations. The people in the organiza-
tion endeavour to do better than the other pension funds. At a Florabank 
the conviction that they are better than other banks also plays a role in 
the positive deviation from rules and regulations.  
The grand narrative about complying with rules and regulations also has 
a counter narrative. It should be noted that at both BPF and Florabank, a 
sense of doubt about the usefulness of rules and regulations was 
revealed throughout the interviews. An example is the narrative about 
resistance against the organizational model (Section 4.3.2). In practice, 
people do not always see the usefulness of the rules and regulations. In 
the eyes of the respondents, they do not yield a direct result, but often 
lead only to additional work. To symbolize this situation, they regularly 
use the metaphors “paper tiger” and “decorating the Christmas tree”. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the respondents indicated that they 
are not only paid to implement rules and regulations, but that they are 
also expected to provide good leadership to a company or organization. 
Transaction monitoring is an example of this situation in the banking 
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industry. Banks are obligated to construct their ICT systems in such a way 
that they can input lists with hundreds of thousands of names provided 
by the government. During a specific period, the banks are required to 
monitor these lists of people regarding unusual transactions. Florabank 
invested heavily in the ICT system, but the CFO, for example, expressed 
doubt that this would provide any benefits for the bank. At both 
organizations, result-oriented thinking is expressed in terms of financial 
figures and thus in terms of continuity, profit and growth of the organiza-
tion. This result-oriented thinking, and the corresponding worldview of 
this counter narrative, is not surprising. In this era, when the financial 
crisis has placed even more pressure on financial performance (Section 
4.1.3), this result-oriented thinking becomes paramount. Attaining results 
is the most important objective of the organization, and therefore of the 
members of the boards of governance as well. The training in economics 
of the actors in and around the boards of governance also enhances the 
focus on financial performance, including continuity and profit and loss. 
The members of the boards of governance believe that achieving a good 
financial performance is their responsibility. However, the time they 
invest in activities such as mandatory reporting is at the expense of their 
financial performance. Good financial performance can be defined as a 
cultural-cognitive characteristic for both boards of governance. The regu-
lative characteristic also plays a role. At BPF, the narratives emphasize 
that deviation from the rules and regulations is hardly possible, but at 
Florabank it emerged that there are such possibilities. According to the 
respondents at Florabank, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, with 
its "comply or explain" provision, offers space for one's own interpreta-
tion. With respect to the mode of practice it can be stated that both 
organizations act strategically. The members of the governance board at 
both organizations indicated that they also look for the grey areas in the 
rules and regulations in order to see if they can apply them to their 
advantage. For example, they request legal experts to study whether 
choosing a certain legal form can yield tax benefits, or ask the DNB to 
determine if the rules and regulations can be interpreted more broadly.  
The second reason is that rules and regulations are not always feasible in 
practice. The study showed that the actors and members of the boards 
of governance have the intention to comply with the rules and regula-
tions, but due to the complexity of daily practice, they cannot always do 
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exactly what the rules and regulations require. For example, because the 
various branches of Florabank are located in countries with either Anglo-
Saxon or Rhineland models, they have to deal with conflicting rules and 
regulations (Section 5.3.1). At both organizations, the negative associa-
tion with rules and regulations is also given shape in their opinion of the 
DNB, and to a lesser extent of the AFM. The respondents at both BPF and 
Florabank reported that the rules and regulations continue to increase. 
Some of the respondents see the DNB, and to a lesser extent, the AFM, 
as the creators of the conditions in which they have to operate, while 
other respondents see the DNB, and to a lesser extent AFM, as bodies 
that determine what happens in the organization. A similarity between 
both groups of respondents is that they all believe that both bodies are 
exerting more and more pressure on the financial sector. Respondents at 
both BPF and Florabank used terms such as "box-ticking mentality" and 
parochialism. They indicated that the DNB pays little attention to the 
feasibility of their rules and regulations. Notably, the interviews show 
that both organizations enter into discussions with the DNB (Sections 
4.3.4 and 5.2.1). They do not know what the outcome of this approach 
will be, and are therefore acting communicatively. When BPF submitted 
its recovery plan, it deliberately indicated that it deviated from the 
framework, and Florabank regularly holds discussions with the DNB. This 
approach leads to discussions and to consensus about the result. At both 
the DPF and Florabank, the players act communicatively. 
 
The above grand narrative on complying with rules and regulations, the 
corresponding subordinate narrative and counter narrative and the three 
narrative concepts as described above are summarized in Table 6.1.
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6.1.2 Grand narrative II: Corporate governance is attaching value 
to written rules  
Virtually all respondents, when asked what corporate governance means, 
referred not only to rules and regulations but also to bylaws and internal 
regulations. At Florabank, the actors also referred to the corporate 
principles. The second grand narrative concerns bylaws, internal 
regulations and corporate principles, which I refer to collectively as 
written rules. The difference with the previous grand narrative is that 
rules and regulations are imposed by external regulating authorities and 
that written rules are formal matters that the organization gives shape to 
itself. Regarding the bylaws and internal regulations of both 
organizations, it can be noted that the tasks and roles of the actors in 
and around the boards of governance are clearly defined. For example, 
the supervisory council and the accountability body at BPF and the 
supervisory board at Florabank have a supervisory role, and the 
participants council at BPF and the works council at Florabank have an 
advisory role. The grand narrative shows that when the actors do not 
comply with the prescribed formal rules or deviate from them, they are 
held to account or they feel that their behaviour is not appreciated. For 
example, the chairman of the supervisory board at Florabank stated that 
he is aware that he should not take an executive role, but should remain 
independent.  
The approach of adhering to the bylaws, internal regulations and corpo-
rate principles is inherent to the culture of both organizations (Sections 
4.2.2 and 5.2.3). At BPF, due to the history of the industry, the actors have 
affinity with formal processes and procedures. At Florabank, most of the 
actors have worked for a long time at Florabank or another bank and are 
accustomed to working with formal processes and procedures; banks are 
traditionally permeated with such processes and procedures. The actors 
in and around the boards of governance at both organizations are accus-
tomed to thinking in terms of formal corporate governance. The cultural-
cognitive characteristic that plays a major role here is the unwritten rule: 
a promise is a promise. Not only the cultural-cognitive characteristic plays 
role, but also the written rules or the regulative characteristic. The 
bylaws must be written according to the provisions in the Pensions Act 
(Article 111: bylaws), and if the bylaws of an industry-wide pension fund 
are amended, the DNB must be informed. The bylaws of Florabank must 
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comply with the Civil Code (Article 123), which states that the AVA must 
approve a proposed amendment to the bylaws.  
 
In this grand narrative, people at both BPF and Florabank act strategically 
as well as communicatively. The interviews showed that actors in and 
around the boards of governance frequently refer to bylaws when this 
suits them. For example, when responding to requests from other actors, 
members of the governance board frequently look at the bylaws, and if a 
request is not in accordance with their organizational aim, they do not 
refer to the bylaws, but use other arguments. In other situations, for 
example when the situation requires an amendment to the bylaws, at 
both organizations communicative action is used. At BPF, it is often the 
case that the initiative may originate from either the employers organiza-
tion or employees organization, and that, following consultation with the 
chairman of the employers organization and the secretary of the employ-
yees organization, the director of executive affairs makes a proposal that 
is discussed in the board meeting. And at Florabank it is often the case 
that the initiative for amendment originates from the CEO and is then 
discussed in advance with the chairman of the AAO, who then considers 
whether to discuss this (if the situation allows this) in advance with the 
members. In short, all parties are not always involved, but the parties 
who must give their formal permission are involved: the AVA and the 
executive board. The institutional logic and the implicit rule that the 
actors play the role that they are expected to play are therefore related 
in part to this grand narrative. 
Like the previous one, this grand narrative also has a counter narrative. 
For both organizations, an informal world also exists in parallel to the 
formal world. At BPF the account manager of Portfolio Management 
described the formal meetings as “a stage play” (Interview with account 
manager Portfolio Management) (Section 4.3.3). The reason for this is 
that preceding the formal meeting, agreement has already been reached 
between the employer and employee organizations, after which the 
formal meeting only ratifies the agreement. The cultural-cognitive 
characteristic of BFP is that the informal organization is well organized. 
The research shows that it is very important to know what the constitu-
ency wants and that the representatives of the constituency must be 
able to predict this accurately. The respondents at BPF keep this in mind 
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continuously; an important unwritten rule is therefore: “Do not make any 
decisions that are in conflict with the interests and ideas of the 
constituency” (Section 4.2.4). The case study of Florabank shows that 
the cultural-cognitive characteristicalso plays a role because the bank is 
in a transitional phase as it grows from a small to a midsized organi-
zation. According to the respondents, certain matters must be given a 
more formal shape (Section 5.2.2). The fact that Florabank is in a growth 
phase is also related to the fact that actors at the bank regularly choose 
an informal management solution (Section 5.2.2). Besides the cultural-
cognitive characteristic, the personality traits of the actors in and around 
the boards of governance also play a role. The paternalistic attitude and 
result-orientation of the CEO ensure that he has a tendency to solve 
problems quickly and in an informal fashion.  
 
The personal characteristics of the actors in question determine whether 
they act strategically or communicatively. Besides the personality of the 
actors in and around the boards of governance, some situations also 
require quick decisions. For example, at Florabank a financial question 
about participating in a specific fund must be presented to the supervi-
sory board. In such situations, people must act quickly. According to the 
bylaws of Florabank, the entire supervisory board should meet and make 
a clear recommendation to the executive board. In practice, due to the 
lack of time, the CEO chooses to coordinate matters on the phone with 
the chairman of the supervisory board. This chairman then considers 
whether he can make the decision, or whether it is necessary to coor-
dinate with the entire board. In some cases, he takes the responsibility of 
making decisions, even though the bylaws require consultation with the 
entire board. This example clearly shows that the actors in and around 
the boards of governance have the intention to follow the formal 
procedures, but this is not always feasible in practice.  
 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the second grand narrative on attaching 
value to written rules, the corresponding counter narrative and the three 
narrative concepts. 
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The area of tension results from the contrasts between the grand narra-
tive and the counter narrative. Although the actors attach value to the 
formal world, they also appreciate the informal world in which other 
rules apply. These written and unwritten rules are not always equivalent. 
They are two different worlds. This can be illustrated with the narrative 
about the executive board meeting (Section 4.3.3), where some actors 
indicated that this meeting is more like a ritual or circus than a meeting in 
which consensus is achieved. Preceding the meeting, an entire space is 
created in which members of the board can coordinate matters with 
their constituencies and other parties. It is also an unwritten rule that 
new business cannot be presented in the boardroom. But this cannot be 
because this leaves no space for the informal world. Remarkably, the 
informal world is visible at BPF. The members of the board consult jointly 
beforehand and also identify the difficulties with the constituency. At 
Florabank, the informal world is less visible for the other actors in and 
around the boards of governance. The area of tension at Florabank 
between formality and informality is addressed especially in Section 5.3.2, 
which is about balancing between formality and informality. According to 
various respondents, Florabank is experiencing a growth phase from 
informality to formality; many problems were previously solved informal-
ly, even though the situation actually required formal solutions. Many 
matters are coordinated informally, but are not always visible for the 
other actors in and around the board governance or become visible too 
late. Many respondents expressed difficulty in dealing with this, such as 
the chairman of the works council who indicated that he was expected to 
formally approve the reorganization, but was informed about this too 
late, or the supervisory board, which is also required to give formal ap-
proval for certain matters, but ended up reading about this in the news-
paper. It can also happen the other way around. In such cases, actors are 
intensively involved on an informal basis with the project, while at a later 
time they must make a formal decision about the same project. An 
example of this is the informal involvement of the supervisory board in 
the strategy day, but at a later time it must make a formal decision on the 
strategy (Section 5.3.2).  
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6.1.3 Grand narrative III: Corporate governance is balancing 
between interests 
The third grand narrative is about balancing between interests. Although 
the theme of the grand narratives for both case studies is the same, the 
interpretation of the grand narrative and the counter narrative is 
different. Unlike the structure of the other subsections, the grand 
narrative and counter narrative of BPF are presented first, followed by 
that of Florabank.  
The grand narrative of BPF starts with the Pensions Act, which stipulates 
that representatives of employers and employees organizations both 
have seats on the executive board. For that matter this construction 
applies not only to the executive board, but also to other bodies such as 
the supervisory board and the accountability body. This is sometimes 
referred to as organized solidarity (Section 4.2.2). The underlying idea is 
that by giving membership on the board to representatives of employer 
and employee organizations, the executive board will consider the 
interests in a balanced fashion. In the grand narrative, it is notable that –
due to this model– the opposing interests are soon apparent. When 
discussing a point on the agenda, a member of the board must predict 
how his constituency will think about this point and then take a corres-
pondent position. The case study showed that members of the board 
representing the employers frequently insist that they want to pay as 
little as possible, and the members representing the group of employees 
aim for as much pension accrual as possible. By holding formal and 
informal consultations with their constituency, these actors know how 
their constituency thinks about certain issues. In nearly all the interviews 
at BPF, the respondents emphasized that the members of the board are 
socially engaged with the stakeholders. This can be described as the 
world view of BPF. In this grand narrative, it is striking that the regulative 
characteristics for the interests of the stakeholders, such as the Pensions 
Act or the recommendations of the Commission on Investment Policy 
and Risk Management (Frijns Commission) are dominant. Besides the 
regulative characteristics, the cultural-cognitive characteristic is also 
dominant. At BPF, the respondents expressed confidence that co-
governance by representatives of employee and employer organizations 
safeguards a balanced consideration of interests; they believe it is 
important to be faithful to their constituencies. This cultural-cognitive 
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characteristic determines the implementation of a governance position 
at a pension fund; when a member of the governance board represent-
ting an employee or employers organization is not faithful to his constitu-
ency, he loses credibility with both the board and the constituency. 
Remaining faithful to the constituency means that actors in and around 
the boards of governance tend to act strategically. 
Unlike the grand narrative, the counter narrative of BPF is not about 
balancing interests, but about pursuing the collective mandate. Accor-
ding to the Pensions Act, the social partners (trade unions and employ-
ers) must give the governance board a mutual mandate, and the board 
must accept this mandate (Article 102a). The mandate for the board of 
BPF is to invest properly so that in the future there are enough assets to 
pay pensions or earn the desired yield. The narrative of BPF shows that 
the members of the governance board all have the intention to pursue 
the public interest. The results show that self-interest is also a compo-
nent of this counter narrative. However, it should be noted that this 
aspect plays a subordinate role. Neither BPF nor Florabank use financial 
stimuli such as bonuses. At BPF, people receive the agreed salary they 
would also earn in the sector (this is different for members of the 
governance board in the rest of the financial world). The self-interest at 
BPF is related to the fact that actors in and around the boards of 
governance have the freedom to promote their own pet projects 
(Section 4.2.3). The results show that communicative action is a strong 
element in this counter narrative. The people at BPF realize that they 
have a collective mandate, and from this perspective they attempt to 
achieve consensus in and around the boards of governance. The results 
from BPF show that the chairman, the board secretary and the director 
of the Executive Office chairman and secretary have the space in drawing 
up the agenda to act strategically (Section 4.3.3). According to the 
respondents, little or no strategic action is taken at present, but a 
previous chairman did take such action. The personality of the chairman 
and the composition of the rest of the board appear to play a major role 
in the amount of strategic action.  
At Florabank, the grand narrative is structured differently. The 
stakeholders are not represented in the governance model, but there are 
boards of governance that are appointed to keep the interests in 
balance. At Florabank the portfolios are divided between three board 
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members. In general terms, the CEO holds the portfolio on strategy, de 
CFO the finance portfolio and the COO the operations portfolio. The CEO 
and CFO bear the statutory responsibility (Section 5.2.3). The CEO of 
Florabank is the "spider in the web" (Section 5.2.5) regarding the 
coordination with the various stakeholders. He also takes the initiative in 
this respect and is described as directing the management of constella-
tions. The CEO himself also sees this as his task and referred to this as 
maintaining a balance in the management of constellations (Section 
5.1.3). At Florabank, everyone accepts that the CEO has taken on this 
directing role. This is also the role that people expect him to play. The 
cultural-cognitive characteristic consists of generally accepted beliefs. 
Besides the cultural-cognitive characteristic, the regulative characteristic 
is also dominant; this is similar to the situation at BPF. The legislation 
applying to the stakeholders, such as the Work Councils Act for 
employees and the rules and regulations of the AFM for customers, are 
the frameworks for the actors in and around the boards of governance. 
In this grand narrative, it is primarily strategic action that is strongly 
apparent. To illustrate this, I will use an example in which the CEO, on the 
day before the interview, was approached by a member of the 
commercial staff who informed him that more customers were asking 
whether the bank could also be open in the evenings. The CEO decided 
not to take action on this information, because he thought that the 
employees would be unhappy about such a change. He thought that this 
would disrupt the relationships and consequently affect the balance 
between various actors. The CEO then decided that he would perhaps 
bring up this topic during customer days.  
The counter narrative shows that the members of the governance board 
have joint responsibility to pursue the organization's interests. It also 
shows that the CEO of Florabank is visionary and result-oriented. These 
character traits are greatly appreciated by the respondents, but at the 
same time they also indicate a weakness of the CEO: due to his focus on 
results, he “forgets” to listen to other actors. According to the respon-
dents this is typical behaviour for many CEOs in the financial sector. 
Similar to BPF, in this counter narrative of Florabank the cultural-cogniti-
ve characteristic and the regulative characteristic are dominant. The 
cultural-cognitive characteristic is expressed primarily in the pursuit of 
the organization's interest, in which the mission of the bank is an 
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important component. All actors in and around the boards of governance 
stated that they pursue a higher ideal: a better society. They want to 
achieve this by working in the financial sector. The regulative character-
ristic is expressed by the fact that the CEO and CFO are both statutory 
directors. This means that they can be held personally liable for mismana-
gement. If a statutory director is subject to serious allegations, he can be 
held liable for the damage suffered by the company, and in case of 
bankruptcy he can be liable for the entire shortfall in the assets. In 
contrast to the counter narrative of BPF about the collective mandate in 
which communicative action is dominant, this counter narrative shows 
that strategic action is dominant at Florabank. However, a remark must 
be made in this context. The actors in and around the boards of govern-
ance not only act strategically, they also act communicatively. During the 
informal preliminary discussions between the CEO and the chairmen, for 
example, time is made available to achieve consensus on certain matters.  
 
Both case studies show that there is a subordinate narrative which is the 
same for both organizations: acting in accordance with social convic-
tions. This narrative emphasizes that the societal context is important for 
taking action in and around the boards of governance. The image that 
society holds, or that will be created, about the actors in and around the 
boards of governance of the financial sector causes the members of the 
board to be alert (Sections 4.3.5). The respondents stated their 
awareness that their behaviour can result in a public debate in which 
their organization and their corresponding role can come under fire. This 
can have serious consequences not only for the organization (fewer 
clients), but also for the reputation of the members of the board. An 
example that shows that the opinion of society is important and that the 
media play a major role in this process concerns the Zembla broadcast on 
pension funds that invest in companies or funds that finance cluster 
munitions (Section 4.3.5). At both organizations, the members of the 
board, internal supervising authorities, shareholders and clients were 
questioned about this and discussions were held. These discussions 
primarily concerned the normative characteristic. At both organizations, 
it emerged that it is essentially a social obligation to comply with this 
normative characteristic. At BPF, the respondents referred to the 
responsibility of the sector and at Florabank they referred to the mission 
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of the bank. Figure 2.3.2 shows that the normative characteristic is 
dominant in this context. The respondents also emphasized that events 
in the media are given increasing attention. The reporting on the cluster 
munitions resulted in both organizations scrutinizing their investment 
policy.  
The interviews with respondents show that smaller banks and pension 
funds look at how larger banks and pension funds act. They essentially 
imitate the large banks and pension funds. According to the respon-
dents, when the large organizations respond to or anticipate such 
events, then the small organizations almost always follow suit. This is 
equivalent to the cultural-cognitive characteristic in which the imitative 
aspect plays a role (Figure 2.3.2). At Florabank the ideals of the people in 
the organization are compatible with the ideals of society. The social 
perspective is moving increasingly in the direction that organizations 
should be sustainable. Sustainable banking therefore suits the present 
era. The cultural-cognitive characteristic of the organization is compatible 
with the social perspective.  
With respect to the mode of practice, the story about dealing with social 
issues (Section 4.3.5) shows how actors in and around the boards of 
governance consider the risks for the sector, the organization and 
themselves before they decide to participate in a societal debate. The 
actors at both BPF and Florabank act strategically. For example, actors in 
and around the boards of governance deliberately allow some input for 
the societal discussion to be made on behalf of other bodies such as the 
NVB or the VB (Section 4.3.5). In this way the actors implicitly participate 
in the debate, but incur the smallest risk of damage for the organization 
or the individual members of the board. In a different situation, actors do 
not comply with a request from the media because the risk that they will 
cause damage to the organization is too great. And in still other 
situations, they express their opinions in such a politically cautious 
fashion that they cannot be held to account for the content. The story 
about is study shows that actors at both BPF and Florabank act 
strategically in this narrative. BPF primarily stays out of the spotlight and 
rarely participates in the public debate, while Florabank actually 
advertises itself in the debate. The bank attains much recognition by 
associating itself with topical theme of sustainability, and it present itself 
as a bank that has better social aims (Section 4.3.5). It should be noted 
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that actors in and around the boards of governance of Florabank also act 
strategically in their contact with society. Its actors seek the public 
debate to initiate discussions on sustainability. They do this not only as 
representatives of their organization, but also in a personal capacity or 
on behalf of another organization with the intention of realizing their 
mission: the pursuit of a better society.  
The above third grand narrative on maintaining a balance between 
interests, the corresponding subordinate narrative and counter narrative 
and the three narrative concepts are shown in Table 6.3.  
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The study shows that corporate governance is a dynamic concept which 
changes continuously. This dynamic can be explained by the changes in 
the three grand narratives of corporate governance. According to the 
respondents, the three most important changes in the area of corporate 
governance are the following: the increasingly stringent rules and 
regulations, the increasing demands of the stakeholders (participants 
who want more or customers who demand more) and the increasingly 
outspoken view of society on boards of governance in the financial 
sector. For that matter, these major changes can all be placed within the 
developments described in Section 1.2. The increasing rules and 
regulations concern the proliferation of law and the increasing demands 
of stakeholders and society, who increasingly have an opinion on the 
democratization of governance policy (Section 1.2). Because these 
developments and events are taking place in rapid progression, the 
content of the narratives also changes rapidly. For example, the 
Tabaksblat71 Commission (2003), Frijns Commission72 (2009), the Banking 
Code (Commissie Maas, 2009) and the Principles for Good Pension 
Management (2006) have caused the rules and regulations applying to 
banks and pension funds to change almost continuously; as a result, the 
actors in and around the boards of governance must comply with 
different, and increasingly strict, requirements. This also applies to the 
other developments. Because stakeholders, including customers and 
participants, have more and different demands, the content of the 
narratives about customers has changed. And the fact that society is 
becoming increasingly involved with boards of governance means that 
the actors in and around these boards have to be informed about the 
continuously changing developments and events in the public debate 
and in the corresponding public opinion.  
 
71 Tabaksblat was the chairman of the Tabaksblat committee. He was a former CEO of 
Unilever. 
72 The Frijns Commission under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Jean Frijns, former chairman of 
the ABP Pension Fund and Professor of Investments at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
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6.2 The explanatory part: analyzing the tensions  
The analysis has shown that there are various tensions, which are 
explained in the following subsections.  
6.2.1 Tensions between the grand narrative and counter narrative  
Table 6.4 provides an overview of the three narratives of corporate 
governance. From this table it can be seen that there are few 
subordinate narratives and that every grand narrative has a counter 
narrative. According to De Heer et al. (2010), this could mean that the 
grand narratives of corporate governance are powerful; the less space 
there is for a subordinate narrative, and the sooner counter narratives 
emerge, the more powerful the concept becomes (De Heer et al., 2010).  
 
Table 6.4 Overview of three grand narratives of corporate governance 
Grand narrative Subordinate narrative  Counter narrative  
Adhering to rules and 
regulations.  
Positive deviation from 
rules and regulations. 
In practice, rules and 
regulations are difficult to 
implement. 
Attaching value to 
written rules. 
- There is also an informal 
world. 
Maintaining a balance 
between various 
interests.  
Acting in accordance 
with the social view.  
Pursuing the collective 
interest (BPF) and the 
organizational interest 
(Florabank). 
 
The results of the study show that there are tensions between the grand 
narratives and counter narratives (Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3). The 
findings revealed that certain situations cause tensions to increase. 
Below these areas of tension and the situations in which they occur are 
unraveled.  
 
Area of tension I: Adhering to rules and regulations versus difficulty with 
implementation in practice.  
The tensions in this narrative is about rules and regulations. On the one 
hand, people want to comply with the rules and regulations (Section 
4.1.2, 4.3.4, 5.3.1), but on the other hand, this is not always feasible due to 
practical problems and organizational interests (Section 4.3.4 and 5.3.1). 
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The results show that actors in and around the boards of governance in 
this area of tension act situationally. They try to find sufficient room to 
act within the rules and regulations. For example, they have legal experts 
investigate whether specific legal constructions can be found that are 
more advantageous. At the same time, they also do not want to take the 
risk of being held accountable for violating the rules and regulations. The 
actors move within this grey area, as shown by case studies of BPF 
(Section 4.3.4) and Florabank (Section 5.3.1). In this way, the actors 
sometimes enter into discussions with the DNB to see if there is space in 
the rules and regulations, also with the aim of involving the DNB in the 
plans so that they do not commit legal violations. The actors in and 
around the boards of governance carefully consider the contacts they 
make and the space that they take with respect to the rules and 
regulations. They consult about this and choose a strategic approach in 
which the risks are weighed. In summary, the results show that when 
major interests of the organization are at stake, actors in around the 
boards or governance become involved in the areas of tension between 
the rules and regulations and the practical problems on the one hand and 
the organizational interest on the other.  
 
Area of tension II: Attaching value to written rules versus the informal 
world.  
Although the actors attach value to the formal world, they also appre-
ciate the informal world in which other rules apply. The formal and 
informal world are two different worlds. This can be illustrated with the 
narrative about the executive board meeting at BPF (Section 4.3.3), 
where some actors indicated that this meeting is more like a ritual or 
circus than a meeting in which consensus is achieved. Preceding the 
meeting, an entire space is created in which members of the board can 
coordinate matters with their constituencies and other parties. The 
tension at Florabank between formality and informality is addressed 
especially in Section 5.3.2, which is about balancing between formality 
and informality. According to various respondents, Florabank is 
experiencing a growth phase from informality to formality; many 
problems were previously solved informally, even though the situation 
actually required formal solutions. Many matters are still coordinated 
informally, but are not always visible for the other actors in and around 
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the board governance or become visible too late. Many respondents 
expressed difficulty in dealing with this, such as the chairman of the 
works council who indicated that he was expected to formally approve 
the reorganization, but was informed about this too late, or the 
supervisory board, which is also required to give formal approval for 
certain matters, but ended up reading about them in the newspaper. It 
can also happen the other way around. In such cases, actors are 
intensively involved on an informal basis with the project, while at a later 
time they must make a formal decision about the same project. An 
example of this is the informal involvement of the supervisory board in 
the “strategy day”, but at a later time it must make a formal decision on 
the strategy (Section 5.3.2). Another example of this second area of 
tension is where a member of the board of BPF was on the committee 
to write a communication plan, but also had to approve this plan. The 
results show that actors in and around the boards of governance are 
involved in the tension between formality and informality and find it 
difficult to play their formal roles in the grey area between formality and 
informality. 
 
Area of tension III: Maintaining a balance between various interests and 
pursuing the collective interest (BPF) and the organizational interest 
(Florabank). 
On the one hand, a member of the executive board of BPF wants to 
maintain a balance between the interests of the employee organization 
and the board, but on the other hand he also wants to pursue the 
organizational interest. This relates to the narrative of the dual roles 
(Section 4.3.1). It should be noted that not only the members of the 
governance board have to deal with the phenomenon of dual roles, but 
also other actors at BPF. For example, the account manager of the 
Pension Administration has to deal with both his constituency and with 
the organization. The members of the governance board of PPF, 
particularly the director of the Executive Office, put pressure on the 
account manager to deliver good quality, but at the same time, he has to 
deal with a constituency that cannot always supply the desired quality. 
The tension of the phenomenon of dual roles increases when major 
interests are at stake and the situation requires a clear standpoint. When 
the member of the governance board of an employee organization at 
Chapter 6 
224 
BPF is asked to take a standpoint on whether indexation is required, then 
this area of tension becomes active. The constituency then puts its 
representatives under pressure to represent their interests. On the one 
hand, the representative of the employee organization has the mandate 
to be faithful to his constituency, but on the other hand, from his role as 
a member of the governance board he must acknowledge that this is not 
advisable when considering the continuity of the pension fund. The 
results show that when this situation occurred at BPF, a decision against 
indexation was made within five minutes. People acted in accordance 
with the organizational interest. The members of the governance board 
were able to justify this decision adequately to their constituency. 
However, if the constituency does not accept a decision –which has 
never happened at BPF– the situation can escalate and even lead to 
strikes. For that matter, the respondents at BPF indicated that this was 
not always the case with every member of the governance board 
(interview with investment committee adviser). The results show that 
this has to do with personality traits of the members of the governance 
board and the composition of the board (Section 4.1.1). The previous 
governance board of BPF focused much more on serving the interests of 
the constituency, and the collective mandate was given much less 
attention.  
At Florabank, the tension between keeping various interests in balance 
and the organizational interest was also addressed by the respondents. 
This can be illustrated by the narrative about the clash between ideals 
(Section 5.3.4). The CEO acted in accordance with the belief that he had 
to keep the various interests in balance. The narrative about ideals shows 
that there are essentially two types of ideals at Florabank. There are 
stakeholders who support the growth of the organization and stake-
holders who believe that growth is not very important at all, but want to 
adhere to their original principles. These differing beliefs create a conflict 
within the organization. On the one hand, the members of the govern-
ance board have to keep the various interests in balance, and on the 
other hand they must pursue the organizational interest. The personal 
vision of the CEO is in accordance with the organizational interest: the 
pursuit of growth. He chooses to carry out this vision. Section 5.3.4 
illustrates how he demonstrated to the organization that is carrying out 
his vision, and that the other actors (chairman of the AAO) are expected 
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to follow suit. In a consultation with the chairman of the AAO, he 
indicated that the chairman should prevent this conviction (that growth 
is not important) from taking root in his group. The chairman, who shares 
a personal preference for the vision of growth with the CEO, is also faced 
with tension. On the one hand, he has a personal preference, but on the 
other hand, he represents a constituency and wants its voice to be heard. 
He wants to maintain a balance between the various interests. This 
example illustrates the various areas of tension between the interests at 
play.  
Regarding the aforementioned areas of tension between grand narra-
tives and counter narratives, it can be said that in a situation in which the 
actors in and around the boards of governance have major interests, the 
areas of tension become apparent. Besides the above mentioned areas 
of tension, there are also areas of tension within and between the levels 
of narratives on corporate governance.  
6.2.2 Tensions between the levels of narratives  
In the footsteps of Gabriel (2004) the several stories in chapter 4 and 5 
shows there are personal, organizational and societal narratives. The 
present study focused on the organizational level, but the personal level 
and the societal level both influence the organizational level. For 
example, it is notable that the narrative of the CFO of Florabank, who has 
a background in law and who is responsible for the legal activities on the 
board, starts with rules and regulations, goes on to the various interests 
and only then addresses the written rules. The case study of BPF shows 
that the chairman of the supervisory board looks at corporate 
governance in an entirely different sequence. He and the supervisory 
board begin with written rules and then look at whether the board has 
followed the correct processes and procedures.  
Besides the individual level, the study shows that the societal level of the 
narrative also affects the organizational level (Section 4.3.5). Figure 6.1 
shows the three grand narratives at the societal level shown on a 
timeline. In the much publicized case of investments in cluster munitions 
and the sequence in which the three narratives are given attention in the 
case studies. This figure emerged from the respondents' explanation of 
how the societal level of corporate governance affects the organizational 
level. As a result, a pattern in the various narratives became visible, as 
Chapter 6 
226 
experienced by the actors in and around the boards of governance. The 
first period, or the starting point in the media, is a story about an 
unbalanced allocation of interests. The newspaper article in Section 4.3.5 
is an example of this starting point, in which the third grand narrative 
about interests is dominant. This concerns the discrepancy between the 
various interests: those of pensioners, investors and society. This 
involves a clash between economic and social interests due to various 
factors. A prohibition on investments in cluster munitions would mean 
smaller pensions for current and future pensioners, because these 
investments are very profitable. At the same time, the media and various 
interest groups emphasized that investment and cluster munitions is 
irresponsible behavior, which has severe consequences for society at 
large. The situation shows that the starting point of the cluster munitions 
controversy concerns the narrative about balancing between interests. 
The Zembla broadcast initiated a societal debate in which there was an 
unbalanced allocation of interests: the incomes of pensioners versus the 
social values of the rest of the world. The first narrative about rules and 
regulations was virtually absent at this starting point, while the second 
narrative about attaching value to formal processes and procedures 
became more dominant.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 The three grand narratives at the societal level shown on a timeline 
 
March 2007 April 2007 January 2013
Balancing
between 
Value to written 
rules
Complying with 
rules and 
① ② ③
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This resulted in the start of the second period in which the actors in and 
around the boards of governance were initially involved with the second 
narrative. In the interviews, the majority of actors regularly referred to 
the fact that when something appeared in the media about a topic such 
as cluster munitions or other precarious topics, this certainly came up for 
discussion the next day or during the next meeting (Section 4.3.5). The 
internal supervising authorities, members of the governance board, 
shareholders (Florabank), Participants Council (BPF) and customers start 
asking each other questions for example whether cluster munitions play 
a role in the organization concerned. According to the respondents of 
BPF and Florabank, the focus was on large banks and pension funds and 
then on their policies. In the media, the initial focus was also on the larger 
banks and pension funds, and quickly shifted to the second narrative. 
Very soon after the Zembla broadcast, newspaper articles appeared 
about other financial organizations that were investing in cluster 
munitions. For example, the initial media attention was on ABP and 
PGGM (NRC, 20 March 2007).  
 
During the third period, the sequence of narratives changed again, 
resulting in more attention for rules and regulations. On the first of 
January 2013, a law banning investments73 in companies involved in the 
production of cluster munitions went into force. There was less attention 
for the unbalanced allocation of interests and for attaching value to 
internal processes or procedures (written rules). This is partly because 
the investment policy had already been implemented in many cases. 
A salient feature of Figure 6.1 is that the first narrative about interests 
passed relatively quickly, and that the attention shifted rapidly to the 
second and third grand narratives, which are much more about the 
institutionalization of agreements, but not about the moral roots of the 
matter. It is notable that the debate was rarely waged on the fundamen-
tal point that financing clustermunitions means that pensioners will 
receive lower benefits. It is striking that most actors in and around the 
boards of governance clearly addressed the consequences for pensio-
 
73 The new regulations are contained in the Amending Act Financial Markets 2013 (see 
besluit, artikel III). 
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ners of the change in investment policy. This input was virtually absent 
from the public debate. Actors in and around the boards of governance 
stated that they did not dare to say much on this topic due to the 
potential harm to their reputation.  
 
The above shows that the individual and societal level of the narrative 
affects the organizational level, but these levels of narratives can also 
clash with the organizational level. This can lead to areas of tension. 
Examples of these areas of tension are presented below. 
 
Conflict between the individual level and organizational level of narratives 
Section 5.3.4 describes how actors in and around the boards of govern-
ance argue about the practicality of the organization's ideals. The CEO, 
the chairman and the other respondents are all in favor of growth, but 
there is also another group that is opposed to growth. They believe that 
it is important for the bank to retain its original philosophy. For them, it is 
not important to expand this philosophy. The latter group believes it is 
important to continue to act according to this original philosophy within 
Florabank. One group, including the CEO and the chairmen, thus wants 
Florabank grow, while the other group wants Florabank to remain small 
and retain its original character. Section 5.3.4 shows that the CEO is the 
one who determines that the narrative of growth is adhered to. If 
someone nevertheless declares that he or she adheres to the second 
narrative, it is made clear that this is not appreciated at Florabank. 
Internally (especially in the Supervisory Board and the AAO) this creates 
tension because the actors in these two bodies espouse different ideals. 
In the various narratives, personal stories collide with the organizational 
stories.  
 
Conflict between the societal and organizational level  
Respondents frequently spoke of the societal level of corporate 
governance. They referred to the financial crisis, and in particular to the 
‘crisis of trust’ described in the Sketches of Context preceding chapters 
four and five. This context is felt by respondents in both case studies as 
an increase in pressure from different stakeholders such as consumers, 
DNB and AFM, who pay increased attention to conduct of actors in and 
around boards of governance (Section 4.1.3). Besides this tension, 
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Section 4.3.5 shows that there is an area of tension between the societal 
level and the organizational level of the narrative. From the societal level 
of the narratives, it is clear that investing in cluster bombs is rejected. 
Implementing this social norm means that the organizational level is 
affected: investing in cluster bombs is relatively profitable, and refraining 
from investing might thus prove costly. If such investments are rejected, 
then the pensioners must settle for a smaller pension. For the actors in 
and around the boards of corporate governance, this tension between 
social values and financial yield occurs at the organizational level. Actors 
in and around the boards of governance believe that the media play 
major role in the tension between the societal and organizational levels. 
Today, cases are often highlighted from the societal level, and there is 
much less attention to the organizational level. Notably, actors in and 
around the boards of governance often evade the media to avoid the risk 
of the media portraying the organization negatively, resulting in damage 
to its reputetion or that of the board.  
 
In summary, the different levels of narratives result in areas of tension 
within corporate governance. Following this discussion of the areas of 
tension in the narratives, the focus now shifts to possible areas of 
tension within the narrative concepts.  
6.2.3 Tensions within the narrative concepts  
This section focuses on the three narrative concepts: world view, institi-
tutional framework and mode of practice. In this subsection the narrative 
concepts are explained sequentially. First, based on the ideal types of 
narrative concepts (Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3), the ideal type that 
applies to both case studies is determined, followed by the 
corresponding areas of tension.  
 
The Newtonian worldview is showing cracks 
Looking at the worldview column for BPF and Florabank in the narrative 
table (Table 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3), it is notable that the interpretations of the 
worldviews are almost identical. The analysis shows that the worldview 
of the two organizations is dominated by result-oriented, instrumental 
and utility-based thinking. The dominance of this thinking is not only due 
to the legal and financial backgrounds of the actors in and around the 
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boards of governance, but also to the ambition of these actors to achieve 
objectives for the organization or themselves. These objectives are not 
just about profits, but also –and especially– about ideals (Florabank) and 
representing the interests of their constituencies (BPF). Notably, this 
result-oriented, instrumental and utility-based way of thinking corres-
ponds with the content of the three grand narratives of corporate 
governance. In the three grand narratives about compliance with rules 
and regulations, the instrumental character is clearly evident in the 
importance that is attached to written rules and balancing interests. 
Furthermore, it is striking that corporate governance is not a moral 
concept in actors’ discourse, while the theory suggests that corporate 
governance includes ethics (Freeman, 1984).  
 
With respect to worldview, the theoretical component of the study 
(Section 2.2.3) refers to two ideal types of worldview: the Newtonian 
worldview and holistic worldview. These ideal types do not exist in social 
reality as such, but can manifest themselves to a greater or lesser extent. 
The narratives of the respondents from BPF and Florabank show that the 
Newtonian worldview is dominant. At both BPF and Florabank, it is 
assumed that the governance board determines the strategy, objectives 
and guidelines, makes the choices and that the rest of the organization 
endorses these choices and follows them carefully. By looking at reality 
from the Newtonian worldview, one assumes closed models in which the 
alternatives and circumstances are known. The actors in and around the 
boards of governance think in terms of manageability, accountability, 
rationality, competition, optimization of capital, linearity, planning and 
mitigation (Bommerez & Hoppenbrouwers, 2007). In particular, 
accountability and manageability are prominent elements in the 
narratives of respondents at both BPF and Florabank. One example 
concerns the CEO who uses mechanisms to stay in control, such is the 
leapfrog model. Leapfrogging, as the name indicates, means that he 
doesn't always go to the people who are directly under him, but skips 
one level in order to hear what is actually going on. In the narratives of 
the respondents at BPF, control is mentioned explicitly, for example how 
the governance board maintains control over which external experts are 
engaged.  
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The dominant Newtonian worldview is confirmed in the narratives by 
actors in and around the boards of governance. Actors in and around the 
boards of governance indicated that the personality of board members 
and the composition of the board determine the actions taken by the 
board. This shows that the respondents assume that the board deter-
mines the strategy and steers the organization. For example, the case 
study of Florabank shows that the ideals of the CEO determine how 
action is taken in and around the board. When people adhere to the 
same ideals, they can show this, but when people adhere to different 
ideals, this is not appreciated by the CEO (Section 5.3.4). The personality 
traits of the respondents on the board and the interplay between these 
personality traits also determine action. For example, the respondents 
from Florabank referred to the entrepreneurial and visionary traits of the 
CEO, and the fact that he listens poorly and does not always tolerate 
contradiction. And the respondents from BPF indicated that the perso-
nality traits of the current members of the boards of governance are 
compatible with pursuing the common goal, but in the past their 
personalities resulted in them pursuing their own goals. At that time, a 
dominant charismatic chairman wanted to get his own way much more 
often, and tolerated little contradiction from other members (Section 
4.1.1). These examples provide insight into how actors around the boards 
of governance also adhere to the Newtonian worldview, and due to this 
worldview also allow the direction of the organization to be determined 
by the board. The Newtonian worldview has been shown to be dominant 
not only in the case studies of BPF and Florabank. In the exploratory 
interviews with experiential experts, this Newtonian worldview was also 
dominant elsewhere in the sector. The dominance of backgrounds in law 
and economics of the actors in and around the boards of governance 
plays a role in the Newtonian worldview. During their education, respon-
dents learned to think in a utility-oriented and result-oriented fashion. 
The era in which the actors grew up and currently live can also explain 
why the Newtonian worldview is dominant. The actors in and around the 
boards of governance were born after World War II. They grew up in the 
post-war reconstruction period, during which welfare increased 
enormously as did methods with which to manage this growth.  
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It should be noted that at both BPF and Florabank, the narratives have 
shown that the context leads to doubt about the Newtonian worldview. 
For example, various respondents (interview with a board member at 
BPF representing an employees organization, interview with account 
manager Portfolio Management at BPF, interview with CEO of Florabank 
and interview with chairman of the supervisory board at Florabank) 
explained how people have begun to doubt the tenability of financial 
models due to the financial crisis. According to the respondents, the 
crisis made it clear that financial issues could not always be captured in a 
model. This is equivalent to signals from chaos theory, as formulated in 
Section 2.3.1. Notably, the respondents indicated that not only the 
financial crisis, but also the present-day context is a problem from their 
perspective. One example is the story of the CEO of Florabank, in which 
he explains that he spends all his time managing social relationships 
(Section 5.1.3). He stated, for instance, that it is difficult for him to keep 
the freethinkers (journalists and professors) under control in the societal 
debate, and he wonders how he should tackle this problem. The 
respondents understand that the environment, such as the social 
context, is very important, but they do not adhere to the idea that the 
organization can be managed by providing maximum freedom to 
individuals (Fox, 1966). Finally, this is all based on thinking in terms of 
control and manageability, and not on the idea that an appeal can be 
made to an autonomous, self-organizing and self-correcting capacity74, 
which is assumed in chaos theory. 
 
In summary, this section has shown clearly that the Newtonian world-
view is dominant among actors in and around the boards of governance 
but it has also shown that this worldview is not always tenable in the 
present era. This leads to areas of tension. The study shows that actors in 
and around the boards or governance do not know how to deal with the 
uncertainty that resulted when the models failed to work and when the 
certainty that was taken for granted seemed to disappear (Section 4.1.3).  
 
74 Tetenbaum (1998) described five principles that establish the basis for the control and 
initiation of self-organization: organizing and sharing knowledge and information, 
organizing creativity and innovation focusing on teamwork and projects, organizing 
diversity and ensuring strong core values.  
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Conflicting characteristics of the institutional framework 
The theoretical part of the study refers to three characteristics of the 
institutional framework: the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
characteristics dominate discourse (Section 2.3.1). The findings (Table 6.1, 
6.2 and 6.3)) show that the regulative and cultural-cognitive characteris-
tics are dominant. Several remarks can be made about this table and the 
results of the study. First, it is notable that the cultural-cognitive and the 
regulative characteristics are dominant and the normative characteristic 
remains subordinate. Notably, the normative characteristic has a subordi-
nate role in both cases (Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). The only grand narrative in 
which the normative characteristic recurs is the narrative on attaching 
value to written rules. This concerns the formulation of corporate 
principles. However, at BPF it is notable that corporate principles are 
anchored in the Pensions Act, and that each pension fund has a certain 
amount of freedom to structure the PFG principles (Section 4.1.2) 
according to its own situation and characteristics. In its annual report, 
BPF has chosen to link a number of principles with their pension fund. 
Notably, these themes also returned during the interviews. For example, 
the interviews showed that people are working actively on expertise and 
transparency because they believe that these are two important themes 
within BPF. Furthermore, the normative characteristic returns in two 
subordinate narratives: the positive deviation from corporate 
governance (only at Florabank) and compliance with the social 
viewpoint. At Florabank it is notable that nearly all respondents indicated 
that they must comply with rules and regulations based on their ideals. It 
is also notable that reasons of principle are given to justify deviating from 
the code (Section 5.2.1). In both case studies the normative characteristic 
is the starting point for wanting to comply with the societal view. This is 
not based on intrinsic motivation, but more on the reasoning that a 
sustainable bank or sector cannot deviate from societal values.  
Second, the results (Sections 4.2.1 and 5.1.2) show that history plays an 
important role. For example, at BPF reference is made to the establish-
ment of the pension fund management, during which the employee 
organizations and employer organizations jointly requested the manage-
ment to arrange the pension scheme. This was based on the underlying 
idea that a collective can achieve more than an individual, and on the 
solidarity of sharing and bearing risks together. The regulative character-
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ristic is dominant in the historical narrative of BPF. And at Florabank, the 
ideals of the founders play an important role. According to the narrative, 
they wanted to use money as a means to play an important role in 
improving society. As a result, the cultural-cognitive characteristic 
becomes distinctive. However, it is notable that the normative 
characteristic is also referred to in the historical narratives of both organi-
zations and receives much more attention. At BPF, the respondents 
referred to the traditional social involvement of the sector, and at 
Florabank they referred to the ideals of the bank: to contribute to a 
better society. The dominance of the regulative characteristic is also 
explained by the respondents as follows. Historically, rules, regulations 
and procedures have played an important role at BPF, while Florabank is 
currently in a growth phase between a small and middle-sized bank, 
which means that formal processes and procedures are becoming 
increasingly important.  
 
The results show that not only the grand narratives and counter 
narratives clash (Section 6.2.1), but also that the characteristics clash with 
each other. Table 6.5 identifies the anchors of the grand narratives and 
counter narratives, and clearly shows which characteristics clash. Table 
2.6.3 shows that the tensions in corporate governance concern the 
regulatory and cultural cognitive characteristics and not the normative 
characteristics. Clashes occur within cultural-cognitive characteristics and 
regulative characteristic. For example, in the grand narrative about 
attaching value to written rules, in the cultural-cognitive characteristic 
the rule is expressed that "a deal is a deal". At the same time in the 
counter narrative, from the cultural-cognitive characteristic it emerges 
that is important to be faithful to the constituency. These cultural-
cognitive characteristics can clash in certain situations. For example, if 
commitments at BPF have already been made on the board, and the 
constituency does not agree with them, then actors on the board 
encounter an area of tension. The study reveals that members of the 
boards of governance at BPF try to resolve this tension as much as 
possible by making agreements (rules). The external parties or 
committees are not allowed to bring up new topics during the board 
meeting. If this was allowed, the members of the boards of governance 
would not have time to coordinate with their constituencies.  
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Table 6.5 Conflicting characteristics of the institutional framework 
Narrative Grand narrative 
characteristics 
Counter narrative  
characteristics 
Counter narrative  
I Corporate 
governance is 
complying 
with rules 
and 
regulations. 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
Adhering to rules and 
regulations.  
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
Otherwise legal action 
could be taken against 
the organization 
and/or its reputation 
could be damaged. 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic: 
Results-oriented action 
 
Regulative 
characteristic: 
There is room for 
deviation.  
I Rules and 
regulations are 
not always 
feasible due to 
practical 
problems and 
organizational 
interests. 
 
II Corporate 
governance is 
attaching 
value to 
written rules. 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
A promise is a promise.  
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
Example: When 
amending the bylaws, 
the DNB must be 
informed. 
 
Normative 
characteristic: 
corporate principles 
and compliance with 
them.  
BPF 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
It is important to know 
what the constituency 
wants.  
 
Florabank 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
Florabank has grown 
into a middle sized 
organization very 
recently, so the actors 
have little historical 
basis for solving 
problems informally.  
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
There is room for 
interpretation. 
II There is also an 
informal world. 
III Corporate 
governance is 
balancing 
between 
interest. 
BPF 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
collectivism and 
solidarity 
Faithful to the 
constituency. 
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
The governance board 
consists of 
representatives of 
stakeholders (Pensions 
BPF 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
Convinced that 
organizes solidarity is 
effective.  
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
The pension funds 
have a mandate based 
on rules and 
regulations (Pensions 
Act 102a). 
III Corporate 
governance is 
pursuing the 
collective 
interest (BPF) 
and 
organizational 
interest 
(Florabank).  
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Act).  
Florabank 
 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
The CEO is focused on 
control the interests. 
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
Interests of employee 
(WOR), shareholder 
(Corporate Code) and 
customer (AFM).  
 
Florabank 
Cultural-cognitive 
characteristic:  
Convinced that the 
mission of the bank is 
effective. 
 
Regulative 
characteristic:  
The statutory directors 
are personally liable. 
 
  
 
An example of the regulative characteristic is shown in the third grand 
narrative on balancing interests, in which the board is involved with rules 
and regulations that support both the grand narrative and the counter 
narrative. On the one hand, the board has to deal with rules and regula-
tions which ensure that the interests of various actors are protected, 
such as WOR for the employees or AFM for the customers. On the other 
hand, the board has to deal with rules and regulations that safeguard the 
interests of shareholders. Members of the board must function within 
and comply with all the laws and regulations. It should be noted that at 
Florabank, the shareholders and the supervisory board can dismiss the 
statutory directors if they do not function properly. This could have 
resulted in an area of tension, but according to the respondents, this has 
never occurred at Florabank. However, this study shows that this area of 
tension does occur in the minds of the actors in and around the boards of 
governance.  
 
Another area of tension that is expressed more in practice than in the 
minds of the actors is that between the regulative characteristic and 
cultural-cognitive characteristic. The following is an example from the 
casestudy of Florabank. For the CEO of Florabank, it was often customary 
to inform the works council and the supervisory board only after a 
decision had been made. For instance, the works council should have 
been given the right of consent prior to the reorganization, but the CEO 
coordinated with them afterwards when everything had already been 
arranged. In Section 5.3.2, it is stated that this situation resulted in 
tension for the chairman and members of the works council. On the one 
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hand he was sincerely pleased that the employees had been treated well 
in the reorganization, but on the other hand the works council did not 
fulfil the expectations of its formal role. This example illustrates the 
relationship between the member of the governance board and the OR. 
Bader and Benschop (1989:265) stated that there are mechanisms which 
focus explicitly on maintaining or changing the unequal status quo. 
However, it is questionable whether the right of consent at Florabank 
would have had consequences for the reorganization, especially conside-
ring that the board gave shape to the reorganization with the best 
intentions. However, the relationship between the board and the works 
council would have improved if the CEO had involved them prior to the 
reorganization. Moreover, he could have included their suggestions and 
ideas at an early stage, which might have saved time and money. 
Nevertheless, the example of Florabank does not mean that the cultural-
cognitive characteristic always creates tension; an example from the BPF 
case study shows that a cultural-cognitive characteristic may also be in 
accordance with the regulative characteristic and can even cause 
changes in the status quo. The BPF case study shows that the represent-
tatives of employers and employees customarily consult with each other 
before the meeting, while corresponding actors at other pension funds 
do not. This mechanism is used to change the relationships between the 
employers and employees. In this way, they attempt to reach a 
consensus. These are examples of mechanisms that are used at both 
organizations. Notably, at both organizations, the regulative characteris-
tics are used by everyone as a fixed mechanism on the basis of which 
people can be held to account, whereas the cultural-cognitive mecha-
nisms, such as customs, are much less likely to be negotiable. 
 
In summary, this section has shown clearly that the cultural-cognitive 
characteristics and the regulative characteristics have their own areas of 
tension. This section has also shown that the cultural-cognitive and 
regulative characteristics can clash due to their own space for interpret-
tation. The cultural-cognitive characteristics can determine the behaviour 
of actors in and around the boards of governance. In the above section it 
was shown that the characteristics determine the social structures. In 
this regard, reference can be made to the actor-structure debate 
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(Giddens, 1979, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977, 1984). The final subsection shows 
that taking action depends not only on structures, but also on the actors.  
 
Acting strategically can lead to tensions 
Habermas assumed two ideal types (Section 2.3.1) of responsible action: 
strategic action and communicative action. Strategic action is result-
oriented and communicative action is consensus-oriented. Looking back 
on the worldview and the institutional framework, the study shows that 
the result-oriented approach is dominant in the actors’ worldviews in the 
two case studies (Sections 4.1, 4.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.3, 
5.2.4). Considering the result-oriented characteristics of the institutional 
framework, people at Florabank would be expected to act strategically. 
In the case study of BPF, consensus building is more apparent. However, 
during the analysis it was difficult to identify which ideal type dominates 
the action. For both case studies, the analysis (Appendix IV) shows both 
strategic and communicative action. Both case studies show that 
communicative action results in positive experiences for members of the 
board and other actors. For example, the fact that the CEO of Florabank 
involved the DNB in a question about the expanding abroad (section 
5.3.1) or that the executive board of BPF involved the DNB in the 
discussion about a professional board. In both examples, they did not 
know beforehand what the result would be, but both organizations were 
satisfied with the outcome. In such cases, the actors often become 
involved early in the process, they listen to each other and then reach 
consensus based on argumentation. In his theory, Habermas (1987) 
argued that creating space for communicative action not only increases 
the substantive quality of the narratives, but also the quality of the social 
interaction (corporate culture); this was confirmed by the respondents in 
the present study.  
Although the case studies show that communicative action takes place at 
both organizations (intention to achieve consensus), there is no 
communicative symmetry (Section 2.3.3). The ideal discussion situation 
rarely occurs in the daily practice of corporate boards, which is due to 
four reasons. First, all parties do not have an equal opportunity to 
participate in the discussion; this is because the organization is often 
structured so that the board meets with representatives, or at BPF, 
where the board itself consists of representatives. The representatives 
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replace the individual employee or employer, but these individuals are 
not participants in the discussion. Because the individuals must be repre-
sented by someone, they cannot be heard themselves. Second, not all 
assertions, conclusions, explanations, interpretations, ideas, suggestions, 
questions, doubts and criticisms of all actors can be heard. This is not 
possible in practice because there are too many stakeholders with too 
many individual wishes. Third, during the discussion between the actors, 
no power relationships should exist that could cause specific arguments 
to be deliberately avoided or to acquire an unassailable character. The 
case studies show that the agendas at both organizations are prepared 
by specific people; although they do not always act deliberately on this 
basis, power relations can indeed play a role. It should be noted that 
power can also be exercised by the way meetings are chaired, for 
example (Section 4.3.3). And fourth and perhaps most important, it does 
not always have to be clear whether the actors are honest in their 
intentions. Habermas argued that it is only when all of these aforemen-
tioned conditions are met that there can be a critical-rational (fair) 
discussion situation in which all arguments are weighed rationally against 
each other. This discussion situation did not emerge in either of the case 
studies.  
The results from Chapters 4 and 5 show that strategic and communi-
cative action both depend on the context and the personal values and 
composition of the board. The example from BPF, in which a comparison 
is made between the action taken on the executive board of BPF and the 
action taken during the cao negotiations, shows that the application of 
strategic or communicative action is context-dependent. During cao 
negotiations, in which most of the actors are represented, the respon-
dents indicated that much more strategic action is involved. This is 
because much greater interests are at stake. In this situation, the 
individual board members must achieve the best results for their consti-
tuencies, while the pension fund board as a whole has already completed 
the most important agreements during the cao negotiations, and the 
board is primarily involved with the implementation. The study has 
shown that the personality traits of the board members and the 
composition of the board determine the choice for communicative or 
strategic action. This can be explained based on the BPF case study. At 
this organization the boards of governance consist of representatives of 
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employers and employees organizations, who together are responsible 
for the collective mandate. They must invest together in such a way that 
there are sufficient assets in the future to pay pensions or earn yield on 
investment. The narratives of BPF show that the governance board 
engages in communicative action especially when major interests are at 
stake, such as during the indexation decision. The narratives show that 
other pension funds often act strategically. According to the respon-
dents, this has to do with the personality traits of the chairman and the 
composition of the board. A number of years ago, the board at BPF 
consisted of different individuals, and strategic action was much more 
dominant. At that time, the chairman provided little room for communi-
cative action. Another explanation for communicative action, according 
to the respondents, is that less important interests are at stake.  
Strategic action can be both positive (directive, guiding) and negative 
(manipulative). Strategic action that is negative, sometimes called 
manipulative action, can lead to areas of tension. Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 
show that manipulative action is a part of all counter narratives. As the 
Florabank case study shows in the counter narrative about laws and 
regulations, the actors in and around the boards of governance seek 
space for interpretation (grey areas) in order to deviate from Corporate 
Governance Code. In the second counter narrative, certain actors in and 
around the boards of governance use informal consulting to machinate, 
make alliances and manipulate the other actors in order to deviate from 
the written rules. And in the third counter-narrative from BPF, decisions 
are not based on balancing between interests, but on organizational 
interest. In that case, some actors are not invited to meetings. The BPF 
case study shows similar strategic actions, not all of which lead to better 
corporate governance. Instead, these strategic actions lead to areas of 
tension. When seeking the grey areas, the actors come close to violating 
the rules and regulations; they risk being prosecuted and incurring 
reputational damage. Another example from the case study of BPF: 
When employee representatives do not act in the interests of their 
constituency, but go along with the collective interests, then they risk 
strikes and even the loss of their own job. These examples show that the 
areas of tension can put the legitimacy of the organization or the actor 
under pressure, which can lead to additional tension.  
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6.3 Conclusion: Explanatory factors for areas of tension in 
corporate governance  
A pivotal driver of the empirical part of the study is the third research 
question: “Which factors can be identified to explain how actors in and 
around the boards of governance in the financial sector deal with the 
areas of tension in corporate governance?”. Three factors can explain 
these tensions: scene, space for improvisation and conflicting plotlines. 
De starting point for this analysis is the narrative table in the chapter on 
theory (Table 2.2). The findings from the case studies have shown that 
this can best be described as a narrative soup (Boje, 2001). This narrative 
table was filled in by zooming in on the text and zooming out on the 
environment, and by linking the micro and macro levels with each other 
(Fairclough, 1992). Three grand narratives about corporate governance 
can be distinguished: 1) corporate governance is complying with rules 
and regulations, 2) corporate governance is attaching value to written 
rules, and 3) corporate governance is maintaining a balance between 
various interests. Appendix IV contains a summary of these three 
narratives. The areas of tension in corporate governance lie between the 
grand narratives and the counter narratives (Section 6.2.1), between the 
levels of the narratives (6.2.2) and between the narrative concepts 
(6.2.3). In the descriptions of these various tensions, three factors appear 
to explain the tension within corporate governance.  
These three factors –scene, space for improvisation and conflicting 
plotlines– are discussed below. The choice to formulate these factors 
using metaphors from the theater and film industry was deliberate; it 
was inspired by the dramaturgical perspective of the American 
sociologist Goffman. The dramaturgical perspective of Goffman (1959) 
invites the reader to see the world as a spectacle, a stage on which 
people appear as actors and attempt make an advantageous impression. 
Goffman argued that people play a certain role; they attempt to have 
others acknowledge them in a specific role by manipulating their 
clothing, attitudes, poses, statements and other symbols. They make it 
clear that they meet a number of expectations, which Goffman refers to 
as impression management. During the interviews with respondents of 
BPF and Florabank, and during the exploratory interviews, terms were 
regularly used which are in line with Goffman's views. For example, the 
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CEOs of financial organizations were typified as artists in managing 
expectations and were described as masters at wearing different masks.  
 
Scene  
The results of the study indicate that the areas of tension in corporate 
governance depend on where, when and under which conditions the 
narrative takes place. The study reveals that respondents were almost 
constantly aware of the context of financial sector as described 
preceding Chapter 4 (Sketching the context of the financial sector: a 
brief overview). The financial crisis, credit crunch and banking crisis –but 
especially the crisis of trust– resulted in tensions (Section 4.1.3). The 
background of the people and the history of the organization play an 
important role. For example, in Section 5.3.4 it is shown that the history 
of the founding of the bank (Section 5.1.2) continues plays a major role in 
the current conflict between ideals. Section 6.2.1 has shown that areas of 
tension occur in situations where major interests are at stake. These 
areas of tension also depend on the organization in which the actors 
operate. As shown in Table 6.2, the same characteristics may play an 
important role, but the specifics of the various areas of tension depend 
on the corresponding organization. Finally, the results of the study show 
that the Newtonian worldview, which still dominates the current 
context, is starting to show cracks; this also leads to areas of tension 
(Section 6.2.3).  
 
Space for improvisation 
Space for action and interpretation (grey areas) is the second important 
factor to explain the areas of tension. The results show that there is 
space for action, which provides actors with a certain degree of freedom. 
At BPF, a large informal space underlying the formal meeting was 
revealed, in which people could reach consensus or act strategically. This 
informal space can lead to areas of tension. One example is the informal 
contribution of ideas from the works council at Florabank regarding 
pension fund planning, even though the same works council will have to 
make a formal decision about these plans at a later time. Besides space 
for actors to take action, there is space within the cultural-cognitive and 
regulative characteristics. Consequently, actors also have space to make 
choices (Section 6.2.3).  
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Conflicting plotlines  
Finally, the areas of tension can be explained by the third factor: values. 
From the results, it appears that values are expressed in various ways. 
First, both case studies have shown that the levels of the narratives can 
clash. The examples from Section 6.2.2 shows that this is about the clash 
of values. The personal values can clash with the values of the 
organization (Section 6.2.2). The case study of Florabank exemplifies this 
in the narrative about conflicting ideals. Moreover, organizational value 
and societal value can also lead to areas of tension. This can be seen in 
the narrative about the cluster munitions. The results also show that the 
cultural-cognitive characteristic plays a major role in the areas of tension 
between the grand narrative and counter narrative (Section 6.2.3). This is 
because contradictory values are inherent to the cultural-cognitive 
characteristic at both BPF and Florabank. These values are based not only 
on the great historical affinity with rules and procedures (grand 
narratives I and II), but also on the results-orientated approach (counter 
narratives I and II).  
 
Reflecting on these three explanatory factors for tensions in corporate 
governance, it can be stated that these factors are not truly innovative in 
the social sciences, but they are innovative in the context of corporate 
governance. In current theory, corporate governance is often seen as an 
unequivocal and straightforward concept, in which power and interests 
hardly play a role, whereas this study has shown that the opposite 
emerges from the tensions in corporate governance. According to the 
results of this study, corporate governance is actually dynamic and 
complex, and interests and power play an important role. It is dynamic 
because not just one narrative is involved; there are several basic 
narratives, subordinate narratives and counter-narratives. This diversity 
of narratives shows that corporate governance is a broad concept. The 
complexity lies in the implementation of corporate governance, which 
depends on the specific situation and specific actor. Goffman (1959) 
argued that when people interact, they transfer only that information 
which is important for their own definition of the situation; similarly, the 
present study has shown that people use narratives that are in their own 
interest in a specific situation. Consequently, actors can use corporate 
governance as a strategic instrument to achieve their own interests.  
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7  Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to contribute to both the theory and the daily 
practice of understanding of the areas of corporate governance in the 
Dutch financial sector. Therefore, the narrative lens was adopted in 
order to make sense of tensions in corporate governance (Section 2.2). 
This narrative lens has led to an insight into the following aspects:  
 
- Tensions in corporate governance;  
- The relationship with corporate governance at the level of the 
actor, the organization and society;  
- The specific context of a small sustainable bank and a value-
based pension fund. The influence of organizational context on 
the way in which the areas of tension within corporate 
governance manifest themselves; 
- The diversity of boards of governance in the financial sector;  
 
Before presenting the contributions to theory and practice in Section 
7.2, I will answer the research questions for this study in Section 7.1. 
Finally, Section 7.3 ends the chapter with closing thoughts.  
7.1 Answering the reseach questions 
This section provides an answer to the central research question of this 
study:  
 
How do actors in and around the boards of governance in the financial 
sector make sense of tensions in corporate governance, and how do 
these tensions manifest themselves in practice at a pension fund and a 
bank?  
 
The general conclusion of this study is that the tensions in corporate 
governance involve the search for a balance of power. This is consistent 
with the assertion of Cools (2005) that corporate governance is about 
the balance of power. These general conclusions can be explained in 
threefold. Firstly, both case studies clearly showed that the tensions 
within corporate governance involve conflicting interests and dual roles 
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(Section 6.2.1). Secondly, the tensions within corporate governance are 
about seeking a balance of power between everyday practice and the 
individual and society. In this respect, the study revealed a gap between 
this everyday practice and the individual and society in which there is a 
power struggle between economic and social values (Section 6.2.2). And 
thirdly, the actors in and around the boards of governance in both case 
studies the new era that is characterized by power shifts confronted, in 
which people struggle with terms such as democracy and international-
lization (Section 6.2.3). This general conclusion is articulated by the 
answer given below to the research questions of this study. In addition, 
the three subconclusions described above will be supported below.  
 
A relatively large number of studies have previously been conducted on 
the rational approach to corporate governance. As indicated in Section 
2.1 the rational approach in turn consists of three dominant theories: 
game theory (Morgenstern & Von Neumann, 1944), agency theory 
(Alchian and Demsets 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 
1983) and transaction theory (Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1985). These three 
theories are all based on rational and utility-centric philosophy. However, 
considerably fewer studies have focused on the cultural perspective, 
which is the point of departure of the present study (Section 2.1). From a 
cultural perspective, anthropology is the field of science that studies 
culture (Tennekes, 1995). Anthropology links up with the social-
constructivist perspective. The organizational anthropologist Bate (1997) 
described the anthropological perspective as thinking about organiza-
tions from two worlds: the constructed world and the social world. The 
Dutch anthropologist Koot (1995) stated that in the constructed world 
people themselves make sense of their organization, which means that 
they determine “to what extent they can accept new conceptions of 
reality and values to guide their behaviour” (Koot 1995: 33). People make 
sense in their stories about their life situation and their relationships with 
others. To study the perceptions of the actors in and around the boards 
of governance, the narrative approach was used, which is explained in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. I have adopted the definition of Flory and Iglesias 
(2010: 116-117): “Narrative is the reflective product of looking back and 
making sense of stories constructed to make sense of life”. To study 
corporate governance from the narrative approach, I used the 
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designations of narratives of Van Duijnhoven (2010) and the classification 
of De Heer et al. (2011). This resulted in a distinction between grand 
narratives, subordinate narratives and counter-narratives. After this, 
narrative concepts were chosen that say something about the process of 
sensemaking, and themes were chosen that relate to being, valuing and 
acting (Section 2.4). These were worldview (Section 2.4.1), institutional 
framework (Section 2.4.2) and mode of practice (Section 2.4.3), respect-
tively. By linking the grand narratives, subordinated narratives and 
counter narratives with the three narrative concepts, the sensemaking of 
areas of tension in corporate governance were identified. This linking 
resulted in a theoretical framework (Table 2.2) which was used as the 
starting point for the analysis. The theoretical framework contains the 
answer to the first research question: “How is the concept of sense-
making of tensions in corporate governance operationalized in the 
literature?”. 
 
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on the two case studies. The findings 
were presented based on descriptions of stories about the logic of the 
actor, institutional logic, and the logic of the practice of corporate 
governance. In this chapters, based on the findings, the second research 
question of the study was answered: “How do actors in and around the 
boards of governance of BPF and Florabank deal with tensions in 
corporate governance?”. The start ing point for the analysis (Chapter 6) 
of this study is the theoretical framework (Table 2.2). This theoretical 
framework or narrative table was filled in by zooming in on the text and 
zooming out on the environment, and by linking the micro and macro 
levels with each other (Fairclough, 1992). In Section 6.1 the findings from 
the case studies have shown that this can best be described as a 
narrative soup (Boje, 2001). Three grand narratives about corporate 
governance can be distinguished: 1) corporate governance is complying 
with rules and regulations, 2) corporate governance is about attaching 
value to written rules, and 3) corporate governance involves maintaining 
a balance between various interests. The three narratives and the 
corresponding narrative concepts are described in detail in Sections 6.1, 
6.2 and 6.3, and are summarized in table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.  
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The narrative approach clearly shows that corporate governance is a 
broad, dynamic, and complex concept. The broad concept is reflected in 
the variation in the three narratives (Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). Instead of 
being linked to a single theme, corporate governance is linked to three 
distinct grand narratives (rules and regulations, written rules and 
interests), each of which has their own subordinate narratives and 
counter-narratives. This is notable because in the corresponding theory it 
is frequently a delineated concept. The dynamic part of corporate 
governance can be explained by the changes in the three grand 
narratives of corporate governance. According to the majority of the 
respondents, the three most important changes in the area of corporate 
governance are the following: the increasingly stringent rules and 
regulations, the increasing demands of the stakeholders (participants 
who want more or customers who demand more) and the increasingly 
outspoken view of society on boards of governance in the financial 
sector. For that matter, these major changes can all be placed within the 
developments described in Section 1.2. These most important changes 
can be connected by the various narratives of corporate governance. The 
increasingly stringent rules can be linked to the first grand narratives 
about rules and regulations, the increasing demands of the stakeholders 
can be connected to the third grand narrative about maintaining the 
balance between interests and the third change about the increasingly 
critical view of society can be linked to the subordinate narratives from 
the third grand narratives which is about corporate governance acting in 
accordance with the societal view. This makes corporate governance a 
dynamic concept (Section 6.1.3).  
The study also shows that corporate governance is a complex concept in 
which the various grand narratives are used interchangeably. The analysis 
showed that the narratives that are used depend greatly on the actor 
and the situation. A CFO with a legal background will interpret the 
concept of corporate governance much differently than a CEO with a 
background in economics. Moreover, in a different situation, for example 
when negotiating about wages, the same CFO will tend to use the third 
grand narrative about maintaining a balance between various interests. 
The complexity of the concept of corporate governance is not only due 
to the fact that corporate governance is dependent on the actor and the 
situation in which narratives play a role, the study also showed that 
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within the various narratives different meanings are assigned to various 
topics or themes. For example, the CFO of Florabank asserted that he did 
not see the organizational interest as representing the interests of 
society. Furthermore, the same CFO also stated that transaction 
monitoring75 (corporate governance means complying with rules and 
regulations) is not the responsibility of the banking sector, even though 
transaction monitoring also enhances the safety of society. Notably, the 
respondents themselves were often unaware of these different 
interpretations of the themes, which led to conflicting elements in their 
statements. 
The large number of stories shows that corporate governance is not only 
a broad, dynamic and complex concept, but also a powerful one. Besides 
the three narratives, this study also revealed that every grand narrative 
has a counter narrative, and two of the three grand narratives have a 
subordinated narrative (Table 6.2.1 and Appendix IV). In line with De Heer 
et al. (2010), this study shows that the existence of a counter narrative 
and a minimum number of variants indicates that corporate governance 
has great narrative power. Due to the large number of stories, for the 
individual actor there is room to choose a particular interpretation of 
corporate governance (Section 2.3). During this process, people can also 
act strategically; as a result corporate governance can also be a powerful 
concept for the individual actor.  
 
Although it is now clear how actors in and around the boards of 
governance make sense of corporate governance, the central research 
question of this study has not yet been answered. The answer to the 
central research question of this study is that the various tensions in 
corporate governance lie between the grand narratives and the counter 
narratives (Section 6.2.1), between the levels of narratives (Section 6.2.2) 
and within the narrative concepts: the worldview, institutional 
 
75 The aim is to determine whether these institutions adequately comply with obligations 
from the Act on Preventing Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Wwft) and 
obligations from the Sanctions Act, such as keeping client data up-to-date, monitoring 
transactions, detecting and reporting unusual transactions and screening customers 
against the sanction lists.  
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framework and mode of practice (Section 6.2.3). The rest of this Section 
will describe each of these tensions in turn.  
 
Tensions between grand narratives and counter narratives: it’s about 
conflicting interests, and dual roles  
In the first narrative, about complying with the rules and regulations 
there is tension between the grand narrative and the counter narrative. 
On the one hand, people want to comply with the rules and regulations 
(Section 4.1.2, 4.3.4, 5.3.1), but on the other hand this is not always 
feasible due to practical problems and organizational interests (Section 
4.3.4 and 5.3.1). The results show that actors in and around the boards of 
governance in this area of tension act situationally. They try to find 
sufficient room to act within the rules and regulations. For example, they 
have legal experts investigate whether specific legal constructions can be 
found that are more advantageous. At the same time, they also do not 
want to take the risk of being held accountable for violating the rules and 
regulations. The actors move within this grey area, as shown by case 
studies of BPF (Section 4.3.4) and Florabank (Section 5.3.1). In this way, 
the actors sometimes enter into discussions with the DNB to see if there 
is space in the rules and regulations, also with the aim of involving the 
DNB in the plans so that they do not commit legal violations. The study 
shows (Sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.1) that the actors in and around the boards 
of governance carefully consider the contacts they make and the space 
that they take with respect to the rules and regulation. They consult 
about this and choose a strategic approach in which the risks are 
weighed. In summary, the results show that when major interests of the 
organization are at stake, actors in around the boards or governance 
become involved in the areas of tension between the rules and 
regulations and the practical problems on the one hand and the 
organizational interest on the other.  
The tensions in the second set of narratives concern balancing between 
the formal and informal roles. One example is the story about the 
executive board meeting at BPF (Section 4.3.3), where some actors 
indicated that this meeting is more like a ritual or circus than a meeting in 
which consensus is achieved. Preceding the meeting, an entire space is 
created in which members of the board can coordinate matters with 
their constituencies and other parties. In this story, it is clear that the 
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actors in and around the boards of governance experience tension in 
some situations, for example when a decision must be made that 
displeases their constituency. In that case, they must explain to their 
constituency why they agreed to this decision as a member of the boards 
of governance. This can lead to tension or even to strikes or removal of 
the board member concerned. The tensions at Florabank between 
formality and informality are addressed especially in Section 5.3.2. 
According to various respondents, Florabank is experiencing a growth 
phase from informality to formality; many problems were previously 
solved informally, even though the situation actually required formal 
solutions. Many matters are still coordinated informally, but are not 
always visible for the other actors in and around the board governance or 
become visible too late. Many respondents expressed difficulty in dealing 
with this, such as the chairman of the works council who indicated that 
he was expected to formally approve the reorganization, but was 
informed about this too late, or the supervisory board, which is also 
required to give formal approval for certain matters, but ended up 
reading about this in the newspaper. The results show that actors in and 
around the boards of governance are involved in the tension between 
formality and informality and find it difficult to play their formal roles in 
this grey area. 
And in the third grand narrative, on one side people attempt to maintain 
a balance between the various interests, and the other side they pursue 
the collective interests (BPF) or the organizational interests (Florabank) 
(Section 6.1.3). On the one hand, a member of the executive board of 
BPF wants to maintain a balance between the interests of the employee 
organization and the board, but on the other hand he also wants to 
pursue the organizational interest. This relates to the narrative of the 
dual roles (Section 4.3.1). It should be noted that not only the members 
of the governance board have to deal with the phenomenon of dual 
roles, but also other actors at BPF. For example, the account manager of 
the Pension Administration has to deal with both his constituency and 
with the organization. The members of the governance board of PPF, 
particularly the director of the Executive Office, put pressure on the 
account manager to deliver good quality, but at the same time, he has to 
deal with a constituency that cannot always supply the desired quality. 
The tension of the phenomenon of dual roles increases when major 
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interests are at stake and the situation requires a clear standpoint. When 
the member of the governance board of an employees organization at 
BPF is asked to take a standpoint on whether indexation is required, then 
this area of tension becomes active. The constituency then puts its 
representatives under pressure to represent their interests. On the one 
hand, the representative of the employee organization has the mandate 
to be faithful to his constituency, but on the other hand, from his role as 
a member of the governance board he must acknowledge that this is not 
advisable when considering the continuity of the pension fund. The 
results show that when this situation occurred at BPF, a decision against 
indexation was made within five minutes. People acted in accordance 
with the organizational interest. The members of the governance board 
were able to justify this decision adequately to their constituency. 
However, if the constituency does not accept a decision –which has 
never happened at BPF– the situation can escalate and even lead to 
strikes. For that matter, the respondents at BPF indicated that this was 
not always the case with every member of the governance board 
(interview with investment committee adviser). The results show that 
this has to do with personality traits of the members of the governance 
board and the composition of the board (Section 4.1.1). The previous 
governance board of BPF focused much more on serving the interests of 
the constituency, and the collective mandate was given much less 
attention.  
At Florabank, the tension between keeping various interests in balance 
and the organizational interest was also addressed by the respondents. 
This can be illustrated by the narrative about the clash between ideals 
(Section 5.3.4). The CEO acted in accordance with the belief that he had 
to keep the various interests in balance. The narrative about ideals shows 
that there are essentially two types of ideals at Florabank. There are 
stakeholders who support the growth of the organization and stake-
holders who believe that growth is not very important at all, but want to 
adhere to their original principles. These differing beliefs create a conflict 
within the organization. On the one hand, the members of the govern-
ance board have to keep the various interests in balance, and on the 
other hand they must pursue the organizational interest. The personal 
vision of the CEO is in accordance with the organizational interest: the 
pursuit of growth. He chooses to carry out this vision. Section 5.3.4 
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illustrates how he demonstrated to the organization that is carrying out 
his vision, and that the other actors are expected to follow suit. In a 
consultation with the chairman of the AAO, he indicated that the 
chairman should prevent this conviction (that growth is not important) 
from taking root in his group. The chairman, who shares a personal 
preference for the vision of growth with the CEO, is also faced with an 
area of tension. On the one hand, he has a personal preference, but on 
the other hand he represents a constituency and wants its voice to be 
heard. He wants to maintain a balance between the various interests. 
This example illustrates the various tensions between the interests at 
play.  
 
Tensions between the levels of the narratives: gaps between everyday 
practice and the expectations of the individual and society 
This study revealed a variety of tensions between individual and 
organizational level and between the organizational and societal level of 
corporate governance. Section 5.3.4 describes how actors in and around 
the boards of governance at Florabank argue about the practicality of 
the organization's ideals. There is an internal discussion about how our 
ideals must be given shape in practice. In Section 5.3.4 it becomes clear 
that differences in insight between actors in and around the board of 
governments can lead to tension. Section 4.3.5 shows that there is also 
tension between the societal level and the organizational level of the 
narrative. Actors are aware of the societal level of the discussion on 
corporate governance. The results of the study show that this societal 
level certainly affects the actions taken in their organization. Both BPF 
and Florabank scrutinized their investment policy. Nevertheless, both 
organizations experienced tensions in this area because the media norm 
rejected investments in cluster munitions, but if this is converted to 
policy, then it has consequences for pensioners: they must settle for a 
smaller pension. For the actors in and around the boards of corporate 
governance, this tension between social values and economic values 
occurs at the organizational level. It should be noted that these 
conflicting values not only occur at the societal level, but also within 
organizations. For example, in her study of the development of 
sustainability policy at a commercial bank, Kok (2015) showed that 
conflicting logics are involved which are incompatible with each other.  
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Tensions within the narrative concepts: confronted by a new era 
Regarding the worldview, the institutional framework and the mode of 
ractice, it can be concluded that areas of tension are involved with all 
three concepts. In both cases, concerning the worldview of actors in and 
around the boards of governance, it can be concluded that the dominant 
Newtonian worldview is starting to show cracks, which leads to tension. 
One example is that people do not understand how to deal with interest 
groups or freethinkers, because the various actors in and around the 
boards of governance believe they are unmanageable. Another example 
is that the financial crisis revealed that the current financial models do 
not always work as intended, otherwise the crisis would have been 
anticipated. This uncertainty results in tension. A conclusion of this study 
is that actors in and around the boards of governance believe that they 
are living in an exceptional time in which changes will take place. When 
this assertion is compared with how the philosopher of science Kuhn 
views the phases of a paradigm shift, it is apparent that the actors in and 
around the boards of governance find themselves between normal 
science (phase 2) and a crisis (phase 3). According to Kuhn, the crisis 
phase is imminent when unexplainable phenomena within a theory are 
openly acknowledged. The present study has shown clearly that unex-
plainable phenomena occurred, such as the failure to anticipate the 
financial crisis. As a result it was openly acknowledged that something 
was wrong, but the actors continued to hold on to the dominant 
thinking. This worldview is still dominant, but is showing cracks; 
consequently people are starting to doubt this worldview. This doubt 
and uncertainty results in tensions (Section 4.1.3).  
 
Regarding the second narrative concept, i.e. the institutional framework, 
it was shown that the characteristics determine the social structures. In 
this regard, reference can be made to the actor-structure debate 
(Giddens, 1979, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977, 1984). It can be concluded that the 
tensions are caused by clashing characteristics. Table 6.5 identifies the 
anchors of the grand narratives and counter narratives, and clearly shows 
which characteristics clash. Table 2.6.3 shows that the areas of tension in 
corporate governance concern the regulatory and cultural cognitive 
characteristics and not the normative characteristics. Clashes occur 
within cultural-cognitive characteristics and regulative characteristic and 
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between the cultural-cognitive and regulative characteristics. In certain 
situations the characteristics can clash. Section 6.2.3 presents examples. 
Notably, there are situations in which the regulative characteristic and 
cultural-cognitive characteristic collide. The following is an example from 
the casestudy of Florabank. For the CEO of Florabank, it was often 
customary to inform the works council and the supervisory board only 
after a decision had been made. For instance, the works council should 
have been given the right of consent prior to the reorganization, but the 
CEO coordinated with them afterwards when everything had already 
been arranged. In Section 5.3.2, it is stated that this situation resulted in 
tensions for the members of the works council. This situation indicates 
that corporate governance is not only about rules and regulations, but 
also that culture can ensure that people do not comply with the 
regulative characteristics of corporate governance.  
 
The tensions in the third narrative concept involve the mode of practice. 
Based on Section 6.2.3 (narrative practice), it can be concluded that 
strategic action (action focusing on results) is dominant, and that 
communicative action (action focusing on consensus) is subordinate. The 
interviews showed that action focusing on one's own results can be 
experienced negatively by the actors in and around the boards of 
governance. One example is a member of the employee organization 
who promoted his personal favorites or a CEO who unilaterally enacted a 
pension scheme because it was advantageous to the organization. This 
mode of practice is not consistent with the current era in which 
democracy, justice and participation are given a greater role. This leads 
to tensions among actors in and around the board. A striking aspect, 
however, is that communicative action resulted in a positive experience 
for all actors. Actors have the feeling that they are listened to and that 
the process is running smoothly. Although they feel positively about this 
mode of practice, this information is not exchanged mutually or 
discussed. It is perhaps advisable to exchange modes of practice more 
often.  
 
The third research question of this study is: “Which explanatory factors 
can be identified in and around the boards of governance in the financial 
sector that elucidate the tensions in corporate governance?”. Three 
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factors can explain these tensions: scene, space for improvisation and 
conflicting plotlines (Section 6.3). Scene refers to where, when and 
under which conditions the narrative takes place. The types of actors 
that are part of narratives play a key role. The study has shown that the 
personality traits of the board members and the composition of the 
board determine the choice for action. The case study on BPF shows that 
a number of years ago, due to a different chairman and a different 
composition of the board, strategic action was much more predominant. 
Respondents from other pension funds also indicated that the persona-
lity traits of the individuals and the composition of the board determine 
the type of action at the pension fund. The tension in this concept does 
not concern communicative action, but strategic action. Actors in and 
around the boards of governance indicated that they sometimes suffer 
from strategic actions that are detrimental to them. Section 6.2.1 has 
shown that areas of tension occur in situations where major interests are 
at stake. Section 6.2.2 shows that the societal level of the narratives is 
important for the areas of tension. And section 6.2.3 shows that the 
Newtonian world view, which still dominates the current context, is 
starting to show cracks; this also leads to areas of tension (Section 6.2.3). 
Space for improvisation refers to space for interpretation and action 
(grey areas). The results show that there is space for action, which 
provides actors with a certain degree of freedom. Besides space for 
improvisation for actors to take action, there is also freedom within the 
cultural-cognitive and regulative anchors. Consequently, actors also have 
space for improvisation to make choices (Section 6.2.3). The third factor 
that explains the tensions in corporate governance is conflicting 
plotlines. From the results, it appears that the plotlines are expressed in 
various ways. First, between the grand narratives and the counter 
narratives (Section 6.2.1), between the levels of narratives (Section 6.2.2) 
and within the narrative concepts: worldview, institutional framework 
and mode of practice (Section 6.2.3).  
7.2 Theoretical and practical contribution 
The theoretical contribution of this study consists of the following six 
components, of which the first three have been addressed in Chapter 2:  
- The narrative approach which has been added to the literature on 
corporate governance; 
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- The narrative model about being, valuing and acting (Figure 2.3); 
- The theoretical framework of this study (Table 2.2); 
- The presentation of the results by means of various types of 
logic; 
- Factors that explain the areas of tension in corporate govern-
ance; 
- A description of the different types of tensions that surface 
through the narrative approach. 
 
The first contribution is the use of the narrative approach for studying 
corporate governance. In contrast to the dominant literature, in which 
corporate governance is viewed as objective, in the narrative approach it 
is seen as subjective. In this study, corporate governance is defined as a 
process of sensemaking and sensegiving in the dynamics of everyday 
interactions in and around organizations. Until now, little research has 
been conducted into the narrative approach to corporate governance 
(Brown, 2005), i.e. focusing on stories and narratives about corporate 
governance as an object of study. The present study shows that the 
narrative approach yields knowledge for theory and practice. The second 
theoretical contribution is the narrative model concerning the worldview, 
institutional framework and mode of practice (Figure 2.4). This new 
model was developed in the present study and distinguishes between 
being, valuing and acting (Figure 2.4) These concepts are a way of 
looking at how actors in and around corporate management negotiate 
about the meaning and interpretation of corporate governance.  
The combination of the first and second components can be viewed as 
building blocks for the third component, which answers the first research 
question of this study: “How is the concept of sensemaking of tensions in 
corporate governance operationalized in the literature?”. The third theo-
retical contribution is a connection between the narrative approach with 
the grand narratives, subordinate narratives and the counter narratives 
and the narrative concepts (worldview, institutional framework and 
mode of practice). Together they compose the theoretical framework of 
this study (Table 2.2). In investigating the three aforementioned 
components, this framework is a conceptual improvement.  
The fourth theoretical contribution is a new way of presenting the 
stories. To this end, this study used agent logic, institutional logic and 
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practical logic (Chapters 4 and 5). The fifth theoretical contribution 
provides an answer to the third research question of the study: “Which 
explanatory factors can be identified in and around the boards of 
governance in the financial sector that elucidate the tensions in 
corporate governance?” Three factors emerge from the analysis that can 
explain the areas of tension within corporate governance: scene, space 
for improvisation and conflicting plotlines (Section 6.3). The sixth 
theoretical contribution is to use the narrative approach to distinguish 
three different types of tensions for actors in and around the boards of 
governance, namely tensions between grand narratives and counter 
narratives, tensions between the levels of the narratives and tensions 
within the narratives concepts. The literature on the narrative approach 
recognizes the tension between grand narratives and counter 
narratives.This study adds to this literature by conceptualizing two other 
types of tensions, namely the tensions between the levels of narratives 
and the tensions within the narrative concepts. Considering these two 
other types of tensions opens up new avenues for research. 
 
Besides making a theoretical contribution, in this thesis I also aimed to 
contribute to the scientific debate on corporate governance. The litera-
ture study shows that corporate governance has primarily been studied 
by economists or legal experts, and hardly at all by scholars from other 
fields. It is also remarkable that the theme of corporate governance has 
scarcely been studied holistically. This scientific insight is expected to 
result in scholars from other approaches studying the phenomenon of 
corporate governance. The present study also shows that normative 
action is subordinate. A study into reflexive action76 among actors in and 
around the boards of governance would provide in-depth knowledge 
about the normative approach to corporate governance. The present 
study also shows that culture is an important factor for the interpretation 
of corporate governance. This approach has not been adequately 
addressed for many years. Researchers generally take an economics 
 
76 Reflexive action is based on "stop thinking and choose". Reflexive individuals are no 
longer pushed forward by the force of the past. Such individuals should think about the 
direction in which they want to go (Vincke, 2007).  
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approach to corporate governance. Consequently, there is a lack of 
knowledge about how people experience corporate governance, how 
they talk and think about it, and how they act as a result. In subsequent 
research, it would therefore be advisable to study the perceptions 
(lifeworld) of corporate governance outside the financial sector. It can be 
concluded that the study has shown clearly that multidisciplinary 
research into corporate governance is essential, because it is an 
interdisciplinary concept.  
The present study has contributed to practice at three levels: the indi-
vidual level, the organizational level and the societal level. At the indivi-
dual level, the identification of the areas of tension within corporate 
governance enables recognition. As a result, the study makes profession-
nals in and around the boards of governance aware of their thinking, 
talking and acting about corporate governance. Furthermore, the study 
shows that the individual actor in and around the boards of governance 
plays an important role in the areas of tension in corporate governance 
(Section 5.3.4). The individual values determine the action. The intention 
of the conclusion of this study is to initiate reflexive action in the 
individual actor. In this way it can contribute to the development of good 
corporate governance. Furthermore, the study shows that a discrepancy 
has arisen between the individual and the organization. A possible 
explanation of this discrepancy is the lack of sensegiving. For example, 
the process of institutionalization has continued to such an extent that 
the original values BPF –collectivity and solidarity– are now experienced 
much less often in daily practice. At Florabank, the lack of individual 
sensegiving is revealed differently. In this context a specific group of 
actors (members of various boards) suppress their personal values in the 
organization because the organization has decided to pursue different 
organizational ideals. This leads to the following question: What does this 
do to individuals in an organization, and what are the consequences? It 
appears that they become removed from themselves, estranged from 
the intrinsic values and they are sometimes fooling themselves.  
 
At the organization level, this study, which identifies the areas of tension 
in corporate governance, provides a framework for further discussion 
within the organization. For people in organizations, the findings of my 
thesis will probably elicit questions and discussions about their own 
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organization. Concepts such as agent logic, institutional logic and the 
logic of practice can be used to make things explicit. At the organiza-
tional level, three sub-conclusions can be distinguished. The first sub-
conclusion is that the personality traits of the board members and the 
composition of the board play an important role within the areas of 
tension in corporate governance. The second sub-conclusion at the 
organizational level is that not only the actor determines the actions 
taken within corporate governance, but that social structures are also 
important. The case study of BPF shows that the structure of the 
organization can help participants to focus more on achieving consensus, 
but a good structure does not lead automatically to good corporate 
governance. The third sub-conclusion is that actors in and around the 
boards of governance have good experiences with communicative action 
(acting in consensus). Furthermore, a number of topics in the narratives 
on corporate governance remain to be elucidated; these topics refer to 
how corporate governance will take shape in the future. This sketch of 
the future image of corporate governance is summarized in Section 7.4.  
 
At the societal level, this study provides insight into the lifeworld of 
actors in and around the boards of governance. This study reveals a 
discrepancy between the societal level and the organization level of 
corporate governance. If the societal debate on corporate governance is 
approached from social values, there is usually an unbalanced division of 
interests, while the present study has shown that the interpretation of 
corporate governance in the organization is approached on the basis of 
economic value. This study shows that the societal debate puts pressure 
on the organizations to pay attention to the social values (Section 6.2.2). 
The exorbitant remuneration of executives, another topic that is widely 
discussed in the media, does not apply to either of the case studies. The 
actors in and around the boards of governance indicated that they do not 
believe that the members of the board have immoral intentions. On the 
contrary, they referred to the board members with great respect. 
Occasionally, at both BPF and Florabank, it was revealed that a role is 
played by the preference of actors in and around the boards of 
governance to continue with the duties in their portfolios or to place 
their own favorite projects on the agenda. Another contribution to the 
societal debate is that this study shows that the structure of the organi-
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zation (social and otherwise) leads to a specific way of acting and limits 
the freedom of action of the actors. The bonds of daily practice prevent 
people from acting otherwise. However, it should be noted that it is not 
only the system itself, but the individual members of the board and the 
composition of actors in and around the boards of governance, that 
determine the action taken in this context. In this regard, reference can 
be made to the actor-structure debate (Giddens, 1979, 1984; Bourdieu, 
1977, 1984). 
This study provides a contribution to the societal debate on corporate 
governance, and also touches on the concept of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR). This study shows similarities with the concept of CSR; 
corporate governance is also a broad concept (Banerjee, 2001; Hender-
son; 2001; Göbbels; 2002). The definition of CSR in the advisory (2000) of 
the Social and Economic Council (SER) shows similarities with the 
findings of the present study on corporate governance. CSR (SER, 2000) 
consists of two characteristic elements. The first element concerns the 
deliberate focus of business activities on value creation in three 
dimensions (profit, people and planet) and consequently on the 
contributions to long-term social welfare. The second element of the 
definition concerns maintaining a relationship with the various stake-
holders based on understanding and dialogue, in which answers are 
provided to legitimate questions from society. It is not surprising that the 
first element of the definition makes a strong appearance in the 
narratives of Florabank. This element is anchored deeply in the values of 
the organization. At BPF, however, this element was scarcely mentioned 
by the respondents. The second element of the definition appeared in 
the narratives in both case studies. Although one would expect that the 
normative approach would be dominant at Florabank, this is not the 
case. The institutional environment plays an important role in this 
process. This conclusion is in accordance with the findings of Devinney et 
al. (2013); in their article about the comparison between CSR and 
corporate governance, they argued that institutional environment and 
culture play an important role in the relationship between corporate 
governance and CSR.  
Chapter 7 
264 
 
7.3 Closing thoughts  
Reflecting on the study, it is remarkable that the same themes set forth 
in the introduction still play a role today. The discussion still concerns the 
distribution of social and economic value. This contemporary relevance is 
shown by the newspaper article (Table 1.1), which asks whether 
sustainability considerations can be allowed to reduce the investment 
yield of pension funds. The debate about the consequences of rules and 
regulations and the skewed income distribution between executives and 
employees (Table 1.1) also remains a topic of conversation today. In 
short, not much appears to have changed in recent years with respect to 
the central issues of corporate governance. This study shows that the 
concept of corporate governance is seen as an answer to the problems 
of the financial sector, but also that the concept of corporate 
governance goes astray in the boardroom: the board members make 
mistakes about the path they must take. They commit a wrong deed or 
cherish an incorrect thought, while believing they are acting and thinking 
correctly. Corporate governance thus appears to be more of a narrative-
based reinforcement of the problems than an effective solution.  
One main reason that this happens is that corporate governance to 
actors in and around the boards of governance is primarily an 
instrumental concept. This concept of corporate governance emerged in 
chapter 6, which distinguished three grand narratives. In each grand 
narrative corporate governance is approached instrumentally, that is as 
the means to other ends. The first grand narrative focuses on compliance 
with rules and regulations (Section 6.1.1). In the second grand narrative, 
value is attached to the internal processes and procedures (Section 
6.1.2). The third grand narrative consists of maintaining a balance 
between interests (6.1.3). The prominence of instrumental thinking also 
shows itself in the narrative concepts (worldview, institutional 
framework and mode of practice) of this study (Section 2.4). In both the 
grand narratives and counter narratives, the Newtonian worldview is 
dominant (Sections 4.1, 4.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.3, 5.2.4). 
This Newtonian worldview is based on the assumption that the executive 
board determines the strategy, the objectives and the guidelines, makes 
the choices, with the rest of the organization endorsing these choices 
and following them carefully. Other characteristics of this Newtonian 
thinking are control, rationality, competition, optimization of capital, 
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linear thinking, creating order and limitation (Bommerez & 
Hoppenbrouwers, 2007). The analysis suggested that the utility-oriented 
and results-oriented thinking can be explained by the backgrounds in law 
or economics of the actors in and around the boards of governance, by 
their personality traits, by their sex, but also by the era –with increasing 
welfare and free markets– in which they have grown up (Section 6.2.1). 
On the other hand, regarding the second narrative concept, the institu-
tional framework dominates the regulative characteristic and the cultural 
and cognitive characteristics, but normative characteristics are hardly 
present. The normative characteristics appears only a few times in the 
narratives (Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3): in the subordinated narrative of the 
rules and regulations narrative at Florabank and in the grand narrative 
about written rules and the variant about complying with the social view 
at both BPF and Florabank. But even in these situations, the normative 
characteristic has an instrumental connotation. For example, the positive 
deviation from rules and regulations at Florabank is justified on the basis 
of principles. It should be noted that the subordinated narrative about 
complying with the social view is receiving more and more attention. 
Society is increasingly demanding moral attention for issues concerning 
corporate governance. For example, the case studies show that present-
day organizations are expected not to invest in cluster munitions. If they 
do so regardless, they risk harming their reputations. In short, considera-
tions of morality were generally subordinate to instrumental considera-
tions.  
 
Considering the instrumental and normative approaches to the areas of 
tension in corporate governance that emerged from the theory presen-
ted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4), the analysis and conclusions indicate the 
following: for actors in and around the boards of governance, corporate 
governance is not about the normative approach of corporate govern-
ance. In the interviews people scarcely raised issues such as, how is the 
function of the organization interpreted? How are the moral and the 
philosophical guidelines for the implementation and management of the 
organization interpreted? Are the social values such as freedom and the 
foundation of self-esteem applied to everyone? Is there agreement 
between the values propagated by the executive board and the values of 
society? This absence of moral considerations in grand narrative is 
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consistent with the view of Habermas (1981), who indicated that what is 
referred to as rationality in this capitalistic society is silent on this matter. 
It applies only to ascertaining the correct technical instruments (means) 
to achieve predetermined aims; rationality with respect to value-bound 
objectives is excluded, and is thought to be impossible. It is striking that 
corporate governance is not a normative concept, while the theory 
suggests that corporate governance includes ethics (Freeman, 1984).  
A term that is sometimes used in this context is bounded morality (Beitz; 
1979; Torsello, 2015). The study shows that moral thinking is not part of 
the daily repertoire of members of the board; they appear to think and 
talk much more in terms of profit and entrepreneurship. The observation 
of this study that there is bounded morality is consistent with the 
argument of Luyendijk (2015). This Dutch journalist and anthropologist 
moved to London in 2011, where he wrote about the financial world of 
the City of London from an anthropological perspective for the British 
newspaper The Guardian. Although Luyendijk's study is about bankers in 
the city of London, and the present study is about actors in and around 
the boards of governance of a value-based pension fund and a small 
sustainable bank in the Netherlands, the observations about the lack of 
moral behavior are similar. Luyendijk referred to the lack of moral 
behavior as amoral behavior, which he contrasted with the term immoral 
behavior. He defined the latter term as criminal behavior and violation of 
rules and regulations. Considering the results of the present study, it can 
also be stated that actors in and around the boards of governance do not 
display immoral behavior, but they might engage in amoral behavior. In 
light of this apparent lack of moral talk on a topic supposedly morally 
weighted, this leads to the following questions: What is the consequence 
of the dominance of instrumental thinking and the subordinate attention 
for the normative approach and reflexive action? And does this instru-
mental thinking yield the same result as normative thinking? These would 
be interesting questions for subsequent research and reflection.  
 
A second closing thought emerges in light of the findings of my study. 
They show that it is debatable whether laws and regulations help people 
to be behave properly in all cases. Not only Luyendijk, but also politicians, 
assume that laws and regulations will ensure proper behavior on the 
boards of governance from financial enterprises. The present study 
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shows that laws and regulations are only part of the solution: wherever 
there is space between the grand narrative and the counter-narrative, 
the actors will try to use this space. In the first narrative on rules and 
regulations, this could mean that more stringent laws and enforcement 
will result in less ability to make use of the gray area, thus increasing the 
likelihood of actions generally thought of as “good corporate govern-
ance”. In the example on cluster munitions, after laws were passed 
forbidding such investments, further discussion was impossible and all 
parties simply had to comply. As stated previously, the study also shows 
that more stringent rules and regulations are only part of the solution; 
although people might want to apply rules and regulations, in practice 
the rules don't always work as intended. A good example is the right of 
consent of the Works Council (in Dutch referred to OR). In practice, the 
CEO informed the OR only after decisions had been made; as a result the 
right of consent did nothing to change the status quo of the mutual 
relationships. The observation that rules and regulations do not always 
help organizations towards proper behavior led me to the thought that 
the moral perspective is lacking here. This observation is not new in the 
social sciences. Acker (2006), a gender studies scientist, previously used 
the term inequality regimes to describe how interlocked practices and 
processes result in continuing inequalities in all work organizations.  
In short, more stringent rules and regulations and corresponding 
enforcement will be a partial solution at best, but this will not necessarily 
lead to good governance in every situation. The cultural-cognitive 
characteristics, such as a CEO who acts informally and other actors who 
accept this, play a major role in the implementation of corporate 
governance.  
 
A third closing thought involves the question that everyone is bound to 
ask: what is the future of corporate governance? This is not an easy 
question to answer. In this study, two visions of the future can serve to 
indicate where the answer to this question lies. The first vision is based 
on the writing of the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1922-
1996) described the evolving nature of knowledge in the form of 
paradigms (1962). He stated that the application of a scientific method 
results in the continual emergence of new perceptions that are 
compatible with existing models or paradigms. For some time it is 
Chapter 7 
268 
 
possible to fit the new observation to a model by making minor 
adjustments, but these accumulating adjustments may put the model 
under increasing pressure: the model is no longer beautiful; it has too 
many exceptions or situations. At such times, a new set of theories can 
arise, a new paradigm that can explain all known observations in a 
different way. A group of scientists will begin to adhere to the new 
theory, but at the same time other scientists will resist this change. When 
the new theory proves successful and gains more and more adherents, 
this is called a paradigm shift. According to Kuhn, such a paradigm shift 
does not mean that a more highly evolved paradigm replaces the 
previous one. He argued that successive paradigms are equivalent, but 
that the human context transforms so profoundly with every change that 
the world looks incomparably different. 
Contrasting with the vision of Kuhn is another vision in which man 
himself, and no one else, is responsible for the affairs of state and 
society. Adherents of this vision are convinced of the possibility of 
change. This vision is also common in management literature, such as the 
change management model of Lewin (1951). Using the metaphor of the 
transformation of a cube-shaped ice block into a star-shaped ice block, he 
refers to the three phases of change: unfreezing, changing and 
refreezing. Change can be initiated by unfreezing the existing balance 
(old situation) and then refreezing a new balance (desired situation). A 
comparable example is the eight steps of Kotter (1996), in which he 
starts by establishing a sense of urgency and ends by anchoring new 
approaches in the culture 77. In contrast to Kuhn, who claims that a new 
generation is required to effect change, Lewin (1951) and Kotter (1996) 
argue that man himself can bring about change. The underlying vision is 
that practitioners can learn from good experiences, and abandon other 
experiences in favour of better ones, which leads to changing practices. 
 
77 The 8 steps of Kotter are: 1. Increase the urgency for change. 2. Build a team dedicated 
to change. 3. Create the vision for change. 4. Communicate the need for change. 5. 
Empower staff with the ability to change. 6. Create short term goals. 7. Stay persistent. 8. 
Make the change permanent. 
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The adherents to this narrative believe that all practices will ultimately be 
rejected and replaced by better ones.  
During the study, the respondents subscribed to both these change 
visions. One characteristic of Lewin (1951) and Kotter (1996) emerges 
from the third narrative concept: the worldview. From this it emerged 
that the executives and actors in and around the boards of governance 
had good experiences with communicative action. If these good 
experiences continue, then all other practices will ultimately be rejected 
and replaced by better ones. Considering this narrative, it would be 
advisable to share good experiences with each other; in this way the 
other practices can automatically be replaced by better ones. In the other 
narrative, Kuhn asserted that a change in the worldview is occurring. This 
was also shown –cautiously– in the present study. Section 4.1.3 indicates 
that the current Newtonian worldview is starting to show cracks. 
Furthermore, the respondents also stated that it would take a full 
generation before real change is going to occur in the implementation of 
corporate governance. This narrative actually indicates that people simply 
must wait, because change is going to happen in the subsequent 
generations, in one way or another. The study made one thing clear: both 
of the above narratives are credible. Moreover, although the opinions and 
ideas about change differ, in both narratives a change within corporate 
governance does take place. Notably, however, in both narratives there is 
no urgency for change. Even today it seems that no real urgency for 
change is felt or experienced. The lack of a moral perspective could 
possibly play a role here as well. Actors do not look at their own boards in 
this way, and are not accustomed to looking any boards in this way.  
If readers expect me to make recommendations in this section in the 
form of a step-by-step plan, I must disappoint them. This study has 
shown that corporate governance is a broad concept. Although broad 
patterns are distinguishable in the narratives, it should be remembered 
that they refer to very specific context. No step-by-step plan is available 
to solve all these problems. They are simply too complex. A tailor-made 
approach will be required. Nevertheless, there are a number of ideas that 
I want to draw attention to, which could also lead to positive change.  
The most important remark is that it is important for actors in and around 
the board of governance being (worldview), valuing (institutional 
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framework) and acting (mode of practice) at corporate governance from 
a broader perspective.  
 
The worldview of actors in and around the boards of governance will 
shift more and more from a Newtonian worldview to a broader 
perspective: the holistic worldview. They will view corporate governance 
from the perspective of the individual and the environment (being) and 
could try to learn to how perceive and act from a broader societal 
perspective. They must learn to manage the expectation of society. 
When changes occur, such as investing in cluster bombs no longer being 
socially acceptable, they must consider not only cluster bombs but also 
(more broadly) other things that may not be accepted in the future, such 
as investing in fossil fuels. 
 
In the institutional framework, the emphasis should not be on narrow 
regulatory characteristics such as stringent laws and regulations, but 
should also be placed in a broader perspective. Actors in and around the 
boards of governance will have to pay more attention to cultural aspects. 
They should reflect on the present tensions and then initiate a discussion 
on the established structures for interaction, behaviour and control. The 
actors in and around the boards of governance should enter into a 
dialogue with their stakeholders. Important criteria for a good dialogue 
include listening, demonstrating expertise, being vulnerable, admitting 
mistakes, calling each other to account, explaining abuses and decisions, 
and expressing expectations. It is also important to demonstrate and 
value this process in organizations. A notable finding in this study is that 
many tensions surrounding corporate governance actually involve the 
lack of attention to normative characteristics (see Table 1.2). Within 
organizations, actors should more frequently ask themselves essential 
questions, such as: How is the function of the organization interpreted? 
How are the moral and philosophical guidelines for the implementation 
and management of the organization interpreted? Are the social values 
such as freedom and the foundation of self-esteem applied to everyone? 
Is there agreement between the values propagated by the executive 
board and the values of society?  
The mode of practice for actors in and around the board of governance 
calls for a broader perspective: reflection on action. Why do things go the 
Conclusions 
271 
 
way they do, with what consequences? Not only the actors in and around 
the boards of governance, but also supervisory organizations such as the 
AFM and the DNB would do well to ask themselves such questions. 
Reflexive action deserves attention, but for that to happen people have 
to be open. They must have sense for urgency. When do they feel this 
urgency? This question could be investigated in future research. Perhaps 
the most important finding of this study is that communicative action 
which aims at consensus, and not at results, leads to positivity in all 
stakeholders.  
 
In closing, and final train of thought from my research efforts, in line with 
Kuhns more radical change vision is: What would happen if actors no 
longer assumed that the executive board is responsible for the results of 
an organization, but held the executive board accountable for the 
process, in which consensus is important? When I look at this study, I 
expect that totally different dynamic could occur in which the conflicting 
interests and dual roles play a smaller role and in which there would 
presumably be more attention to the moral perspective. In this new 
structure, governance might then be based much more on seeking a 
balance of power from a broader perspective in which moral thinking, 
next to instrumental thinking, is given attention. And what would this 
type of thinking mean for the content of organizations? Would people 
not have a much more humane organization in which people would take 
much more account of each other and achieve alignment? In short, 
should we not base our actions on the mode of practice in which 
consensus is more important than results? In other words, I want actors 
in and around the boards of governance to take a broader perspective. 
Currently, actors are focused on their own interests and roles. This is 
because their role in the organization makes them responsible for 
results. Changing their roles and thereby their responsibility would mean 
a change of perspective would be possible. This new perspective could 
be a more holistic one taking into account societal interests as well. The 
point of this dissertation has been that tensions will be present and they 
might even increase but this new way of working might leave actors 
better equipped to engage with, rather than ignore, tensions in the 
boardroom. 
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Appendix I: Context study 
 
Job titles and background of interviewed respondents as part of the context 
study 
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CDB1 Corporate   
Director 
6 03 2007 V  V V  V  Bank 
DB2 Director 31 03 2007 V  V V  V  Bank 
HBB3 Head of 
Administrative 
Affairs  
9 03 2007 V  V V  V  Bank 
BP4 Member of the 
executive board 
24 10 2007  V V V  V V V Pension 
fund 
HBP5 Head of 
Administrative 
Affairs 
30 11 2007   V   V  Pension 
fund 
LOB6 Member of the 
Works Council 
15 02 2008 V  V V  V V Bank 
BB7 Member of the 
executive board 
3 06 2008 V  V V  V  Bank 
ABB8 Investment 
Advisor 
executive board 
10 09 2008  V V V V  V  Bank 
MAP9 Manager 
Accounting & 
Reporting 
14 01 2009  V  V V    Pension 
fund 
SAP10 Strategic Advisor 
Corporate 
Governance 
14 01 2009  V  V V  V  Pension 
fund 
BP11 Member of the 
executive board  
16 022009  V V V   V  Pension 
fund 
LDP12 Member of 
Participants 
Council  
5 03 2009  V V   V V Pension 
fund 
HGU13 Professor of 
Governance 
30 06 2010  V  V  V V V Univer˗ 
sity 
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Observation locations or meetings for the context study 
Code Description of the location 
or meeting where the 
observation was made 
Concerns Date 
WBP1 Workplace of a member of 
the executive board 
Pension 
fund 
24 October 2007  
RP2 Reception area  Pension 
fund 
30 November 2007  
RB3 Reception area Bank 1 April 2008  
WBB4 Workplace of members of 
the executive board  
Bank 17 June 2008 
HBP5 Gentlemen’s club  Banks 
and 
pension 
funds 
14 April 2010 
SP6 Seminar "investing in 
society", organized by the 
ABP pension fund 
Pension 
fund 
21 June 2007 
BO7 Meeting with local residents Bank 23 April 2009 
SBP8 Symposium “Toezicht bij de 
les” (“Supervision at class”) 
organized by the National 
Registry of Members of 
Supervisory Boards  
Banks 
and 
pension 
funds 
13 May 2009  
TP9 Presentation of Governance 
Toolkit for pension funds 
organized by the National 
Registry of Members of 
Supervisory Boards 
Pension 
funds 
31 August 2011  
SBP10 Symposium on Corporate 
Governance handbook  
Banks 
and 
pension 
funds 
30 May 2011 
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Appendix II: Case studies  
 
The job titles of the respondents of the interviews for the case studies  
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VWGF1 Executive 
board BPF 
(employers 
organization) 
BPF 
Chair  
 
 
28 Apr 2010 V  
 
V V V V V 
SWNF2 Executive 
board BPF 
(employee 
organization) 
BPF 
Board Secretary  27 Jan 2010 V V  
 
  V V 
LWGF3 Executive 
board BPF 
(employers 
organization) 
BPF 
Member 16 Apr 2010  
 
  V  
 
V V 
LWGF4 Executive 
board BPF  
(employee 
organization) 
BPF 
Member 9 Apr 2010 V V  
 
  V V 
DBBF5 Executive 
Office 
BPF  
Director  14 Apr 2010 V  
 
V V  
 
  
ACPF6 Pension 
Administratio
n BPF 
Account 
Manager  
27 Apr 2010 V V V  
 
 V V 
ACVM7 Portfolio 
Management 
BPF 
Account 
Manager 
27 Apr 2010 V  
 
V V  
 
V V 
LBACF8 Investment 
Advisory  
Committee 
BPF 
Member 13 Apr 2010 V  
 
V V  
 
V V 
VDRF9 Participants 
Council BPF 
 
Chair  12 Apr 2010 V V  
 
  V V 
VRvTF10 Supervisory 
Council BPF 
Chair 14 Apr 2010 V V V  
 
 V V 
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CEOF11 Executive 
board 
Florabank 
CEO 17 Feb 2009 V V V V  
 
V  
 
CFOF12 Executive 
board 
Florabank 
CFO 2 July 2008 V V V  
 
V V  
 
COOF13 Executive 
board 
Florabank 
COO 20 Nov 2008 V  
 
V  
 
 V  
 
ADF14 Daily 
management 
of 
Netherlands 
branch 
Florabank 
Managing 
Director 
17 Nov 2008 V V V V V V  
 
VAAOF15 Depository 
Receipt 
Holders 
Florabank 
Foundation 
President 
Administration 
Office 
29 July 2008 V V V  
 
V V V 
VRvCF16 Supervisory 
Board 
Florabank 
Chair of 
Supervisory 
Board 
1 Apr 2008 V V V  
 
V V V 
VORF17 The Works 
Council 
Florabank 
Chair of the 
Works Council 
20 Nov 2008 V  
 
 V  
 
V V 
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Appendix III: Matrix with interview questions 
 
BPF Matrix Interview Questions 
* 1= most often and 12/13/14= least often 
 
 
 
 
No. Actor Interest Who’s in 
charge? 
 1-12/13/14* 
Who interact most 
frequently with the 
exective board? 
1-12/13/14* 
1 The AFM    
2 The DNB    
3 Supervisory Council     
4 Executive board     
5  IAC    
6 Participants Council     
7 Ececutive Office     
8 Portfolio Management    
9 Portfolio Management 
Advisor 
   
10 Accountability Body    
11 Pension Administration    
12 VB     
13 Other:  
…………………… 
   
14 Other:  
…………………… 
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Florabank Matrix Interview Questions  
* 1= most often and 11/12/13= least often 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Actor Interest Who’s in 
charge? 
 1-11/12/13* 
Who interact most frequently 
with the exective board? 
1-11/12/13* 
1 The AFM    
2 The DNB    
3 Supervisory Board     
4 CEO     
5 CFO/COO    
6 AAO     
7 Managing Director    
8 The Works Council    
9 Interest groups    
10 Consumers 
(customers) 
   
11 Government    
12 Other:  
………………… 
   
13 Other:  
………………… 
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English Summary  
 
Chapter 1: The introduction of corporate governance in the Dutch 
financial sector 
We read about it in newspapers, see it on television and talk about it during 
birthday parties, but do we really know what it means to work every day as 
an executive at an organization in the financial sector?  
 
This dissertation tells stories about corporate governance from actors in 
and around the board of governance in the financial sector. After an 
extensive introduction to this research theme, Chapter 1 begins by 
making a distinction between objective and subjective corporate 
governance. This approach to corporate governance, which focuses on 
the number of incidents, can be referred to as the objective approach 
(Duijnhoven, 2010). A striking aspect of this approach is that rules, 
competencies, duties and responsibilities are considered as principles for 
good corporate governance. A question that periodically arises in the 
context of the objective corporate governance is whether laws, 
regulations and codes help to prevent fraud and accounting scandals. In 
accordance with the notion of Duijnhoven (2010), I refer to this attention 
to more implicit aspects as the subjective approach. The present study 
focused on the subjective approach to corporate governance of the 
executives, members of supervisory boards, works councils, employers 
associations, shareholder associations and other actors in and around 
corporate governance. Current developments and a historical overview 
of corporate governance show that corporate governance today is not 
only more about the shareholder and the owner, but also other 
stakeholders such as employees, advocacy groups, media and society. In 
addition, corporate governance is no longer limited to the economic 
distribution of profits, but also involves laws and regulations, ethics and 
corporate social responsibility. Within this broad concept of corporate 
governance, in which many actors and themes play a role, there are also 
various tensions.  
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The theoretical background to the tensions of corporate governance can 
best be explained by referring to Table 1.2. In theory, corporate 
governance can be roughly divided into three categories: the 
shareholder, the stakeholder and the community state welfare 
dimension (Waldman et al., 2006). In addition, two types of approaches 
can be used: instrumental and normative (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In 
the instrumental approach, shareholders, stakeholders and the 
community welfare dimension are defined as individuals or groups that 
provide an important contribution to the continued existence of the 
enterprise (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Janssen (1998) referred to 
target-utility ethics or utilitarianism, in which efficiency thinking is 
dominant. In the normative approach, corporate management not only 
has to deal with financial values, but also with intrinsic values (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). In this section it becomes clear that the theoretical 
tensions of corporate governance link up with the view of the de World 
Bank, which stated that corporate governance aims to ensure a balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals, (Sir Adrian Cadbury at the Global Corporate Governance 
Forum, World Bank, 2000). When a study focuses on how actors give 
shape to the tensions within corporate governance, then particular focus 
is required on how people in everyday life talk about and cope with 
tensions that are related to corporate governance. This means that if one 
wants to know more about how people give shape to corporate 
governance, then one is compelled to delve into how people in everyday 
life make sense of this concept. Building on this approach, the following 
research question is central in this study:  
 
How do actors in and around the board of governance in the financial 
sector make sense of the tensions in corporate governance and how 
does this manifest itself in practice at a bank and a pension fund? 
 
Chapter 2: Making sense of corporate governance  
In the second chapter, the first research question is answered: “How is 
the concept of sensemaking of tensions in corporate governance 
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operationalized in the literature?”. This study began from a cultural 
dimension of corporate governance. It is therefore not surprising that 
the study, the research object and the methodology all have an 
anthropological starting point. In the present study, corporate 
governance is not viewed as a static concept, but as a dynamic one: 
people interact and exchange meanings about corporate governance, 
and they create the effective corporate management themselves. 
According to Weick (2005), the process of sensemaking does not involve 
an accurate and verifiable answer, but a plausible argument. The 
researcher must empathize with the sensemaking of the actor, and place 
herself in the role and the mindset of the subject. In this context, 
Veenswijk (1996) referred to shared signification frameworks and value 
orientations. Berger and Luckmann (1966) introduced the term social 
construction for this process. They assumed that the world is essentially 
meaningless, and is given meaning only by the observer. In other words, 
reality is a construction that takes place in a social context. One way to 
examine how language constitutes a social reality is by doing discourse 
analysis. Roughly speaking, there are two approaches to discourse 
analysis: the linguistic approach and the narrative approach. The 
linguistic approach was inspired by De Saussure (1966), Wittgenstein 
(1976), Derrida (1967, 1972) and Chomsky (1957), and is closely related to 
linguistic theory. Adherents of the narrative approach, such as Barthes 
(1957), Boje (1991), Burke (1969), Czarniawska (1998), Frye (1959), Gabriel 
(2000) and Gergen (1999), are not concerned with how people create 
meanings, as in the linguistic approach, but what they do with meanings: 
causing change and stopping change in textual, real-world and social 
contexts. However, the boundary between the linguistic and narrative 
approach is not clearly demarcated (Pijnenburg, 2004:31), and the 
approaches do not exclude each other. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that in this study, following the example of Alvesson & Karreman (2000), 
Chia, (2000) Grant et al. (2004) Grant and Iedema (2005), Hardy et al. 
(2000), Keenoy et al. (2000) and Oswick et al. (2000), the narrative 
approach is emphasized.  
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The choice of the narrative approach to corporate governance in the 
present study has certain implications. A conceptual framework is 
needed to better understand the practices of corporate governance. The 
conceptual framework of this study is based on two pillars that are linked 
to each other in the conceptual framework. The first pillar consists of the 
narrative lens, which is characterized by stories and narratives. These 
stories provide the data for the analysis, but more importantly they form 
the core of the theoretical part of the study. In this study, the grand 
narratives, variants and counter narratives of corporate governance 
provide the means to look at how actors in and around the board of 
governance make sense of corporate governance and the tensions that 
play a role in this process. The second pillar, which helps to elucidate the 
sensemaking and sensegiving of corporate governance, is the use of 
three narrative concepts: the worldview, institutional framework and 
mode of practice. To operationalize the narrative concepts, the concept 
of ideal types was used. By using ideal types, researchers can map out 
the tensions and provide a theoretical yardstick. In this way, the narrative 
concept of the worldview was operationalized using the ideal-typical 
Newtonian worldview and the ideal-typical holistic worldview. For the 
narrative concept of the institutional framework, the ideal type involved 
the regulatory, cognitive and normative characteristics of institutions 
(Scott, 2001: 33 and Table 2.3.1). And the mode of practice was 
operationalized based on the ideas of Habermas, in which he made a 
distinction between two ideal types (Section 2.3.1) of responsible action: 
strategic action in the systems world and communicative action in the 
lifeworld. By linking the three types of stories to the narrative concepts, a 
narrative table is created which serves as a theoretical point of departure 
for the analysis (Figure 2.4).  
 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
In this chapter, the philosophical and methodological considerations of 
this study are outlined. Ontology is the first philosophical standpoint 
from which to view science. If the description of the three positions of 
ontology is related to the central topics of this study –sensemaking, 
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sensegiving and interaction– then it becomes clear that idealism is the 
most suitable ontological position from which to view reality. The 
ontological assumptions are closely related to the epistemological 
assumptions. The social constructivist perspective of the present study 
has a direct link with interpretivism. The supporters of the interpretative 
approach share an appreciation for the role of language. This focus on 
language also increases the interest in the narrative perspective by the 
supporters of the interpretative approach. This study is qualitative in 
nature in accordance with idealism and interpretivism as philosophical 
standpoints. To understand how executives interpret and make sense of 
corporate governance, an organizational anthropology approach was 
chosen. In contrast to many other scientific disciplines, organizational 
anthropology pays much attention to history, context and processes 
(Bate, 1997). Besides its holistic viewpoint, anthropology has two ways of 
looking at reality: from an emic and etic perspective (Martin, 2002). 
During the various steps of the research process (Table 3.2) for this 
study, both the emic and the etic perspective were used. The researcher 
argues that there could never be a completely insider or outsider 
perspective in research. There is entanglement, but both perspectives 
can be present at the same time. Furthermore, in this study the principles 
of the Code of Conduct of the Association of Dutch Universities such as 
precision, reliability, verifiability, impartiality and independence applied 
(VSNU, 2012). 
 The ontological and epistemological standpoint and the organizational 
anthropology approach had consequences for the research 
methodology. This study into the sensemaking of areas of tension in 
corporate governance takes a organizational anthropology approach and 
is therefore explorational-qualitative in character. It is about identifying 
the guiding principles of corporate governance and improving the 
understanding of the reality construction about corporate governance. 
The fieldwork was split into two phases. The first phase was an 
explorative context study, and the second phase consisted of two case 
studies: BPF and Florabank. Both phases were conducted largely in 
parallel between March 2007 and August 2011. The context study was 
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exploratory in nature; its aim was to acquire knowledge and 
understanding of the sensemaking about corporate governance in the 
financial sector. The following research methods were used to conduct 
the context study: interviews, observations and documentary analysis. 
Phase two of the field research focused on the executives and actors in 
and around the board of governance in a specific organizational context. 
In view of the importance of the context in social constructivist research, 
a case study approach was chosen. Two data collection methods were 
used for the case studies: in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. 
These methods are explained in more detail below. To structure both the 
context study and the case study, Creswell's (2006) six steps for 
analyzing and interpreting qualitative data were used.  
 
Sketches of the context of the financial sector: a brief overview  
This section sketches the context which surrounds both casestudies. 
Financial crisis, greed and bonus culture are key words of this discursive 
context and a brief discussion of them serves to introduce the case 
studies (BPF and Florabank).  
 
Chapter 4: BPF  
This chapter presents the case study of BPF, a sector-wide pension fund, 
with the aim of answering the second research question: “how do actors 
in and around the boards of governance of BPF and Florabank deal with 
tensions within corporate governance”? The findings of this case study 
are presented in this chapter with the aid of logic. Three types of logic 
can be distinguished: the logic of the agent, of the institute and of 
practice. These three types of logic can be considered as three separate 
concepts that can be given shape based on quotations from the 
interviews or narratives from the case study. In Section 4.1 the logic of 
the key players or the actors is addressed. Although the actors in and 
around the board of governance were diverse, it turned out that they 
were all representatives of a constituency or organization, and they 
oriented their thinking accordingly. And due to their education in 
economics or law and their background, they thought in a utility-oriented 
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and rational fashion. The results show that all respondents saw corporate 
governance as rules and regulations. From the findings it is also evident 
that the actors and around the board of governance experienced 
pressure and uncertainty due to the financial crisis, credit crisis and 
banking crisis but in particular by the crisis of trust. Section 4.2 focuses 
on the logic of the institute. Based on the narratives about the initial 
values, the organizational model, the authority and the management 
methods, it is clear which written and unwritten rules are important in 
the organization. The following rules of thumb can be found in the 
narratives: you must be faithful to your constituency, the executive 
board has the final decision, and you must play the formal role that you 
are expected to play. These rules can also be described as the 
institutional logic. Section 4.3 shows that narratives about practice can 
be used to understand that people in practice are faced with various 
types of logic, which are in conflict with each other. The narrative about 
the dual roles shows, for example, that you not only must be faithful to 
your constituency, but that you must also fulfill the collective mandate 
(the formal role). And the tension in the grey area of rules and 
regulations and in the interaction with the DNB shows that there is room 
for action within the areas of tension.  
 
Chapter 5: Florabank  
Like the previous chapter, this chapter also answers the second research 
question, and it presents the findings of the Florabank case study with 
the aid of various types of logic. The aim is not to compare the case 
studies, but to gain insight into the sensemaking about corporate 
governance. The topics in the various sections are therefore not identical 
to the topics in the previous chapter. However, like the previous chapter, 
the three types of logic –actor logic, institutional logic and logic of 
practice– are used to explain the narratives from the case studies. 
Section 5.1 focuses on the logic of the actors. The respondents from 
Florabank can be characterized as a homogeneous group consisting of 
middle-aged Dutch males with backgrounds in economics or law. The 
men hold ancillary positions in foundations and associations in the area 
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of sustainability or which are in line with the original philosophy of the 
Florabank. This background reflects the rational and utility-oriented 
thinking, but also the involvement with the ideals of the bank. 
Furthermore, Section 5.1 shows that the history of the founding of the 
bank appears to play an important role even today. In particular, the 
involvement with respect to the sustainable character and original 
philosophy of the bank characterize the organization. This affinity with 
sustainability can also be seen in the CEO. Besides being an idealist, the 
CEO is also a pioneer and a visionary. He is accustomed to working in a 
solution-oriented fashion, and in his narratives about how he thinks 
about management, the logic of thinking in terms of control is dominant.  
Section 5.2 focuses on the logic of the institute. Based on narratives 
about rules and regulation, culture, bylaws, authority and informal 
structures, it becomes clear which rules of thumb are important in the 
organization. Although this is not mandatory, the actors complied with 
the rules and regulations, but they felt that this is how it should be. The 
bylaws ensure that actors in and around the board of governance of 
Florabank understand their statutory roles and what is expected of them. 
Besides formal rules, there is also an informal world within Florabank. In 
this informal world, the CEO plays a directing and controlling role. 
Another important unwritten rule is that you must feel connected to the 
mission of the bank. Section 5.3 shows that narratives about practice can 
be used to understand that people in practice are faced with various 
types of logic, which are in conflict with each other. The narrative about 
the criticism of rules and regulations shows, for example, that the 
respondents experience the implementation of rules and regulations as 
very burdensome. The respondents indicated that they look for the grey 
areas in the rules and regulations. The narrative about informality and 
formality shows that there is space to choose how one acts, but that one 
is simultaneously held captive in the system of informal and formal rules. 
The last story about the balance between ideals shows that actors have 
different ideas about the implementation of their ideals. These different 
views provide tension. 
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Chapter 6: A narrative analysis 
This chapter presents the analysis of this study. The starting point for this 
analysis was the narrative table in the chapter on theory (Table 2.4). This 
narrative table was filled in by zooming in on the text and zooming out 
on the environment, and by linking the micro and macro levels with each 
other (Fairclough, 1992). The findings from the case studies have shown 
that this can be described as a narrative soup (Boje, 2001). Three basic 
narratives about corporate governance can be distinguished: corporate 
governance is complying with rules and regulations (Section 6.1.1), 
corporate governance is attaching value to written rules (Section 6.1.2), 
and corporate governance is maintaining a balance between various 
interests (Section 6.1.3).  
 
This study has shown that the tensions in corporate governance occur in 
three ways.  
First there is tension between the grand narratives and the counter 
narratives (Section 6.2.1). In the first narrative, although people want to 
comply with the rules and regulations, they simultaneously have to deal 
with practical considerations that sometimes make this impossible, and 
with the fact that they are operating a company or organization and are 
held to account for the financial results. In the second narrative on 
corporate governance, the tension is between the formal and informal 
worlds. And in the third basic narrative, people act on one side to 
maintain a balance between the various interests, and the other side they 
pursue the collective interest (BPF) or the organizational interest 
(Florabank). Based on the examples from the case studies, the tensions 
are explained.  
Second, there is a diversity of tensions between the individual, 
organizational and societal levels of corporate governance (Section 
6.2.2). One example of tension between the individual and organizational 
level is the conflict about the practical feasibility of the bank's ideals. An 
internal discussion took place within the bank about how the ideals 
should be given shape in practice. In Section 5.3.4, it is shown how this 
can lead to tensions. Section 4.3.5 also shows how the tension between 
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the organizational and social levels of corporate governance influence 
the actions within an organization. Due to pressure from the media and 
from the societal debate on investing in cluster munitions, both DPF and 
Florabank revised their investment policies.  
Third, the analysis showed that there are tensions within and between 
the narrative concepts. In Section 6.2.1 it becomes clear that the 
Newtonian worldview is dominant among actors in and around the board 
governance at both BPF and Florabank. Personality traits also turned out 
to be decisive for actions in and around the board governance. For 
example, the personality traits of the CEO have consequences for these 
actions. Moreover, the neoliberal context of this era can be 
determinative for the worldview. Notably, the interviews at both BPF and 
Florabank showed that developments were ongoing which could not be 
dealt with by the Newtonian worldview. One example is how the actors 
deal with journalists and freethinkers who are important opinion leaders 
in the societal debate. From Section 6.2.2, it emerged that the regulative 
and cultural-cognitive anchors are dominant. The historical narratives 
turned out to play a major role in this respect. It is striking that the 
normative anchors played a subordinate role. The regulative, cultural-
cognitive and normative anchors showed that habits, morals and 
interests –as unintended side effects– also produce and transform 
unequal relationships. Section 6.2.3 makes it clear that both strategic and 
communicative action took place at BPF and Florabank. From both case 
studies it emerged that communicative action resulted in positive 
experiences for executives as well as other actors. The study also 
revealed that the personality traits of the members and the composition 
of the board determine the choice for communicative or strategic action.  
 
The third research question “Which explanatory factors can be identified 
in and around the boards of governance in the financial sector that 
elucidate the tensions in corporate governance?” is also answered in this 
chapter. Three factors emerged from the analysis that can explain the 
areas of tension within corporate governance: scene, space for 
improvisation and conflicting plotlines (Section 6.3).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
The general conclusion of this study is that the tensions in corporate 
governance involve the search for a balance of power. This is consistent 
with the assertion of Cools (2005) that corporate governance is about 
the balance of power. This general conclusion can be explained in three 
ways. Firstly, the analysis showed that the tensions between the grand 
narratives and the counter narratives always involve conflicting interests 
and double roles. Secondly, in corporate governance there are tensions 
between the individual and organizational level and the societal and 
organizational level. The study also showed that there is a gap between 
this everyday practice and the individual and society, in which there is a 
power struggle between economic and social values. And thirdly, the 
actors in and around the board of governance in both case studies were 
confronted with a new era characterized by power shifts in which people 
struggled with concepts such as democracy and internationalization.  
The contribution of this study to theory lies in its narrative approach. This 
narrative approach contributed to the insights on corporate governance 
and showed that corporate governance is a broad, dynamic, complex and 
powerful concept. The narrative model about being, valuing and acting 
(Figure 2.3) showed how the practice of corporate governance can be 
viewed from the perspective of theory. Furthermore, this study has 
provided a conceptual framework which could potentially be used to 
perform future research. A number of theoretical insights also emerged 
from the study, such as the explanatory factors for the tensions in 
corporate governance. The study contributes to practice at three levels: 
the individual, the organizational and the societal. These practical 
insights are presented in Section 7.2.  
 
The final section of the study closes with a number of reflections and 
predictions about the concept of corporate governance. This study 
shows that the concept of corporate governance is not only seen as an 
answer to the problems of the financial sector, but also that this concept 
goes astray in the boardroom: the board members make mistakes about 
the path they must take. They commit a wrong deed or cherish an 
incorrect thought, while believing they are acting correctly. Corporate 
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governance thus appears to be more of a narrative-based reinforcement 
of the problems than an effective solution.  
 
One of the main reasons this happens is that all of the narratives showed 
that corporate governance is almost always viewed instrumentally and 
rarely from a normative approach. This could be explained with the term 
bounded morality (Beitz, 1979; Torsello, 2015). A second closing thought 
is that this study has shown that rules and regulations are only part of 
the solution, but that there is also space for the actors in and around the 
boards of governance. The observation that rules and regulations do not 
always help organizations towards proper behavior led me to the 
thought that the moral perspective is also lacking here. This observation 
is not new in the social sciences. Acker (2006), a gender studies scientist, 
previously used the term inequality regimes to describe how interlocked 
practices and processes result in continuing inequalities in all work 
organizations.  
 
My final closing thought concerns the question, what is the future of 
corporate governance? Answering this question is not a simple task. For 
this purpose, I used two visions. The first vision is based on the writing of 
the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1962) is convinced that 
change occurs through sudden paradigm shifts, i.e. changes in 
worldview. The existing worldview will be replaced because the 
corresponding generation of executives will die, and new worldviews will 
emerge with new generations of executives. Contrasting with the vision 
of Kuhn is another vision in which people can actually make a difference. 
Two examples are the change management model of Lewin (1951) and 
the 8-step model of Kotter (1996). The underlying vision is that 
practitioners can learn from good experiences, and abandon other 
experiences in favour of better ones, which leads to changing practices. 
The study made one thing clear: both of the above narratives are credible. 
Moreover, although the opinions and ideas about change differ, in both 
narratives a change within corporate governance does take place. 
Notably, however, in both narratives there is no urgency for change. Even 
today it seems that no real urgency for change is felt or experienced. The 
lack of a moral perspective could possibly play a role here as well.  
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According to the researcher, corporate governance must be viewed from 
a broader perspective. The Newtonian worldview will shift to the broader 
perspective of the holistic worldview. Actors must view corporate 
governance from the perspective of the individual and the environment 
(being). When changes occur, such as investing in cluster bombs no 
longer being socially acceptable, one must consider not only cluster 
bombs but also (more broadly) other things that may not be accepted in 
the future, such as investing in fossil fuels.  
 
In the institutional framework, the emphasis should not be on narrow 
regulatory characteristics such as stringent laws and regulations, but 
should be placed in a broader perspective. Actors in and around the 
boards or governance will have to pay more attention to cultural aspects. 
They should reflect on the present tensions and then initiate a discussion 
on the established structures for interaction, behaviour and control. A 
notable finding in this study is that many tensions surrounding corporate 
governance actually involve the lack of attention to normative 
characteristics. Within organizations, people should more frequently ask 
themselves essential questions, such as how is the function of the 
organization interpreted? How are the moral and philosophical guidelines 
for the implementation and management of the organization 
interpreted? Are the social values such as freedom and the foundation of 
self-esteem applied to everyone? Is there agreement between the values 
propagated by the executive board and the values of society? 
 
Moreover, the mode of practice for actors in and around the boards of 
governance calls for a broader perspective: reflection on action. I close 
with a reflection. What would happen if actors no longer assumed that 
the executive board is responsible for the results of an organization, but 
instead held the executive board accountable for the process in which 
consensus is important? According to the researcher, this new approach 
would mean viewing things more from a broader perspective in which 
moral thinking, and not just instrumental thinking, receives more 
attention.  
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There will always be tensions in the future and these may even increase, 
but by viewing corporate governance from a broader perspective, actors 
in and around the boards of governance will be better equipped to deal 
with Tensions in the boardroom. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch Summary)  
 
Hoofdstuk 1: Introductie 
Wij lezen er over in kranten, kijken er naar op televisie en praten er over 
tijdens verjaardagen, maar weten wij wat het betekent om elke dag te 
werken als bestuurder van een organisatie in de financiële sector?  
 
Dit proefschrift vertelt verhalen over corporate governance van actoren 
in en rondom het bestuur in de financiële sector. Na een uitgebreide 
inleiding van dit onderzoeksthema start hoofdstuk 1 met een 
onderscheid in objectieve en subjectieve corporate governance. 
Corporate governance, waarbij het aantal incidenten centraal staat, kan 
in navolging van Duijnhoven (2010) de objectieve benadering worden 
genoemd. Opvallend is dat in deze benadering regels, bevoegdheden, 
taken en verantwoordelijkheden als beginsel worden beschouwd voor 
good corporate governance. Een vraag die in de context van de 
objectieve corporate governance regelmatig naar voren komt is of de 
wet- en regelgeving en codes helpen om fraudes en boekhoud-
schandalen te voorkomen. De aandacht voor meer impliciet 
gegevenheden noem ik in navolging van Duijnhoven (2010) de 
subjectieve benadering. In deze studie zal de subjectieve benadering van 
de bestuurders, commissarissen, leden van ondernemings-, werkgevers- 
en werknemersraden en stichtingen van aandeelhouders en andere 
actoren rondom het bestuur ten aanzien corporate governance centraal 
staan. De huidige ontwikkelingen en een historische schets van corporate 
governance laten zien dat corporate governance heden ten dagen niet 
alleen meer gaat over de aandeelhouder en de eigenaar, maar ook over 
andere belanghebbenden zoals werknemers, belangengroepen, media 
en de maatschappij. Daarnaast gaat corporate governance niet alleen 
meer over de verdeling van economische verdeling van winsten, maar 
over wet- en regelgeving, ethiek en maatschappelijk verantwoord 
ondernemen. Binnen dit brede begrip van corporate governance, waar 
vele verschillende actoren en thema’s een rol spelen, is sprake van 
verschillende spanningsvelden.  
De verschillende theoretische spanningsvelden van corporate 
governance worden toeglicht in tabel 1.2. Corporate governance kan 
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theoretische grofweg ingedeeld worden drie soorten categorieën, 
namelijk de shareholder, stakeholder en community state welfare 
dimensie (Waldman et al., 2006). En daarnaast kan er gebruik worden 
gemaakt van twee soorten benaderingen namelijk de instrumentele en 
normatieve benadering (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In de instrumentele 
benadering worden shareholders, stakeholders en community state 
welfare dimensie aangemerkt als individuen of groepen die een 
belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan het voortbestaan van de onderneming 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Janssen (1998) spreekt van doel-nut ethiek 
ofwel het utilitarisme waarbij het efficiëntie denken domineert. In de 
normatieve benadering heeft het bestuur niet alleen te maken met 
financiële waarden maar ook met de intrinsieke waarden (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). In deze paragraaf wordt duidelijk dat de theoretische 
spanningsvelden van corporate governance overeen komen met de 
opvatting van de World Bank, die aangeeft dat corporate governance tot 
doel heeft te zorgen voor een balans tussen economische- en sociale 
doelen en tussen individuele en gemeenschappelijke doelen (Sir Adrian 
Cadbury in Global Corporate Governance Forum, World Bank, 2000). 
Wanneer een onderzoek zich richt op de wijze waarop actoren vorm 
geven aan de spanningsvelden binnen corporate governance, dan is 
verdieping vereist in hoe mensen in het dagelijks leven praten over en 
omgaan met spanningsvelden die met corporate governance te maken 
hebben. Dit betekent dat wanneer men meer kennis wil vergaren over de 
manieren waarop mensen vorm geven aan corporate governance, men 
genoodzaakt is zich te verdiepen in hoe mensen in het dagelijks leven 
hier betekenis aan geven. Voortbouwend op deze zienswijze staat de 
volgende onderzoeksvraag centraal in deze studie:  
 
Op welke wijze geven actoren in en rondom het bestuur van de 
financiële sector betekenis aan de spanningsvelden van corporate 
governance en hoe manifesteert dit zich in de praktijk van een bank en 
een pensioenfonds? 
 
Hoofdstuk 2: Betekenis geven aan corporate governance  
In het tweede hoofdstuk is antwoord gegeven op de eerste 
onderzoeksvraag: Hoe is het concept van betekenisgeving van 
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spanningsvelden van corporate governance geoperationaliseerd in de 
literatuur? Dit onderzoek start vanuit een cultureel perspectief van 
corporate governance. Het is dan ook niet vreemd dat zowel het 
onderzoeksobject als de methodologie van deze studie een 
antropologisch vertrekpunt kent. In deze studie wordt corporate 
governance niet beschouwd als iets statisch, maar als een dynamisch 
concept: mensen interacteren en wisselen betekenissen uit over 
corporate governance en zullen zelf het deugdelijk 
(ondernemings)bestuur maken. Het proces van betekenisgeving gaat 
niet over een accuraat en verifieerbaar antwoord, maar om een 
aannemelijke redenering aldus Weick (2005). De onderzoeker moet zich 
inleven in de zingeving van de actor, zich verplaatsen in de rol en de 
gedachtewereld van het subject. Veenswijk (1996) heeft het in deze 
context over gedeelde zingevingskaders en waardeoriëntaties. Berger en 
Luckmann (1966) introduceerden hierbij de term sociaal constructie. Zij 
beweren dat er sprake is een betekenisloze wereld die pas zin krijgt door 
de zingevende waarnemer. Met andere woorden de werkelijkheid is een 
constructie die plaats vindt in een sociale context. Een manier om te 
onderzoeken hoe taal een sociale werkelijkheid wordt is het doen van 
discoursanalyse. Grofweg zijn er twee verschillende benaderingen van 
discoursanalyse, de linguïstische benadering en de narratieve 
benadering. De linguïstische benadering werd geïnspireerd door De 
Saussure (1966), Wittgenstein (1976), Derrida (1967, 1972) en Chomsky 
(1957) en is nauw verwant met de taalkundige theorie. Aanhangers van 
de narratieve benadering zoals Barthes (1957), Boje (1991), Burke (1969), 
Czarniawska (1998), Frye (1959), Gabriel (2000) en Gergen (1999) gaan 
niet zoals bij de linguïstische benadering uit naar hoe mensen 
betekenissen maken maar wat mensen doen met betekenissen: 
veranderingen bewerkstelligen en tegenhouden in tekstuele, reële en 
sociale context. De grens tussen de linguïstische en narratieve 
benadering is niet scherp te trekken (Pijnenburg, 2004: 31). Evenmin 
sluiten de benaderingen elkaar uit. Wel moet opgemerkt worden dat in 
navolging van Alvesson en Karreman (2000), Chia (2000), Grant et al. 
(2004), Grant en Iedema (2005), Hardy et al. (2000), Keenoy et al. (2000) 
en Oswick et al. (2000) in deze studie de nadruk wordt gelegd op de 
narratieve benadering.  
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De keuze voor de narratieve benadering van corporate governance heeft 
consequenties voor de bestudering van corporate governance in deze 
studie. Er is een conceptueel framework nodig om de praktijken van 
corporate governance beter te kunnen begrijpen. Het conceptueel 
framework van deze studie berust op twee pijlers die aan elkaar worden 
gekoppeld. De eerste pijler bestaat uit de narratieve lens die wordt 
gekenmerkt door verhalen en verhaallijnen. Deze verhalen vormen niet 
alleen de data van analyse maar vooral de kern van het theoretische deel. 
In deze studie zijn de basisverhalen, varianten en counterverhalen van 
corporate governance een middel om te kijken naar hoe actoren in en 
rondom het bestuur betekenis geven aan corporate governance en 
welke spanningsvelden daarbij een rol spelen. De tweede pijler die 
gericht is om meer inzicht te krijgen in de betekenisgeving en zingeving 
van corporate governance is het gebruik van drie narratieve concepten 
te weten worldview, institutional framework en mode of practice. Om de 
narratieve concepten te operationaliseren is gebruik gemaakt van het 
begrip ideaaltypen. Door gebruik te maken van ideaaltypen kan de 
onderzoeker de spanningsvelden in kaart brengen en een theoretische 
meetlat verschaffen. Zo is er bij het concept worldview gebruik gemaakt 
van het ideaaltypische Newtoniaanse worldview en het ideaaltypische 
holistische worldview. Bij het concept institutional framework gaat het 
over regulatieve, cognitieve en normatieve karakteristieken van 
instituties (Scott, 2001: 33 en tabel 2.3.1). En de mode of practice is 
gebaseerd op het gedachtegoed van Habermas waarbij hij onderscheid 
maakt tussen twee ideaaltypen (paragraaf 2.3.1) van verantwoord 
handelen, te weten strategisch handelen in de systeemwereld en 
communicatief handelen in de leefwereld. Door de koppeling van de 
narratieve lens aan de narratieve concepten ontstaat een narratieve 
tabel die als theoretisch uitgangspunt dient voor de analyse (figuur 2.4).  
 
Hoofdstuk 3: Onderzoeksmethodologie  
In dit hoofdstuk worden de filosofische en methodologische 
overwegingen van deze studie geschetst. Het eerste filosofische 
standpunt om naar de wetenschap te kijken is de ontologie. Wanneer de 
beschrijving van de drie posities van de ontologie (tabel 3.1.1) in relatie 
wordt gebracht met de centrale onderwerpen van dit onderzoek 
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namelijk betekenisgeving, zingeving en interactie wordt duidelijk dat 
idealisme de ontologische positie is om binnen dit onderzoek naar de 
werkelijkheid te kijken. De ontologische vooronderstellingen zijn nauw 
verwant met de epistemologische vooronderstellingen. Het sociaal 
constructivistische perspectief van dit onderzoek heeft een directe link 
met het interpretivisme. De aanhangers van de interpretatieve 
benadering delen een waardering voor de rol van taal. Zo’n focus op taal 
verhoogt ook de interesse in het narratieve perspectief door de 
aanhangers van de interpretatieve benadering. In navolging van het 
idealisme en het interpretivisme als filosofisch standpunt is het 
onderzoek kwalitatief van karakter. Om inzicht te krijgen op welke wijze 
de bestuurders invulling en betekenis geven aan corporate governance is 
gekozen voor een organisatieantropologische benadering. In 
tegenstelling tot andere wetenschappelijke disciplines is bij de 
organisatieantropologische benadering veel aandacht voor historie, 
context en processen (Bate, 1997). Naast een holistische manier van 
kijken kent de antropologie twee manieren van kijken naar de te 
onderzoeken werkelijkheid, namelijk vanuit een emic en een etic 
perspectief (Martin, 2002). In de stappen van het onderzoeksproces 
(tabel 3.2) van deze studie wordt zowel het emic als het etic perspectief 
toegepast. De onderzoeker beweert dat nooit sprake kan zijn van een 
complete insider of outsider perspectief. Er is sprake van verstrengeling 
maar ook kunnen op hetzelfde moment beide perspectieven voorkomen. 
Verder worden tijdens deze studie de principes van de gedragscode van 
de Vereniging van Samenwerkende Nederlandse Universiteiten zoals 
zorgvuldigheid, betrouwbaarheid, controleerbaarheid, onpartijdigheid en 
onafhankelijkheid toegepast (VSNU, 2012).  
 
Het ontologische en het epistemologische standpunt en de 
organisatieantropologische benadering hebben gevolgen voor de 
onderzoeksmethodologie. Deze studie naar de betekenisgeving van 
spanningsvelden binnen corporate governance volgt een 
organisatieantropologische benadering en is hiermee explorerend 
kwalitatief van karakter. Het gaat erom leidende principes van corporate 
governance op te sporen en werkelijkheidsconstructie over corporate 
governance beter te leren begrijpen. Het veldwerk is opgesplitst in twee 
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fasen. De eerste fase is een verkennende contextstudie en de tweede 
fase bestaat uit het uitvoeren van twee casestudies, namelijk BPF en 
Florabank. Beide fases vonden grotendeels naast elkaar plaats in de 
periode tussen maart 2007 en augustus 2011. De contextstudie is 
verkennend van aard. Er wordt getracht via deze contextstudie kennis en 
inzicht te verkrijgen in de betekenisgeving van corporate governance in 
de financiële sector. Bij het uitvoeren van de contextstudie is gebruik 
gemaakt van de volgende onderzoeksmethodieken: interviews, 
observaties en een documentenonderzoek. Fase twee van het 
veldonderzoek stelt de bestuurders en actoren in en rondom het bestuur 
in een specifieke organisatiecontext centraal. Gezien het belang van de 
context in sociaal constructivistisch onderzoek is gekozen om gebruik te 
maken van een casestudybenadering. Bij de bestudering van de 
casestudies is gebruik gemaakt van twee dataverzamelingsmethodieken, 
namelijk diepte-interviews en documentenonderzoek. Om de data-
analyse van zowel de contextstudie als de casestudy te structureren zijn 
de zes stappen voor het analyseren en interpreteren van kwalitatieve 
gegevens van Creswell (2008) gebruikt.  
 
Schets van de context van de financiële sector: een kort overzicht 
Dit gedeelte schetst de context die domineert in beide casestudies. De 
financiële crisis, hebzucht en bonuscultuur zijn kernbegrippen van deze 
context. Een korte bespreking van deze kernbegrippen dient ter 
introductie van de twee casestudies (BPF en Florabank).  
  
Hoofdstuk 4: BPF  
Dit hoofdstuk presenteert de bevindingen van de casestudy van 
Bedrijfstakpensioenfonds (BPF). Hiermee wordt getracht antwoord 
gegeven op de tweede deelvraag, namelijk hoe gaan actoren in en 
rondom de boards of governance van BPF en Florabank om met 
spanningsvelden binnen corporate governance? Deze bevindingen 
worden in dit hoofdstuk gepresenteerd met behulp van het concept 
logica’s. Grofweg zijn er drie soorten logica’s te onderscheiden, namelijk 
logica van de agent, het instituut en de praktijk. Deze drie verschillende 
logica’s zijn te beschouwen als drie afzonderlijke concepten die aan de 
hand van citaten uit de interviews of verhalen uit de casestudy worden 
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ingevuld. In paragraaf 4.1 staat de logica van de hoofdrolspelers ofwel de 
actoren centraal. Hoewel de actoren in en rondom het bestuur erg divers 
zijn blijken de actoren van BPF bijna allemaal vertegenwoordigers te zijn 
van hun achterban of organisatie. Ze denken vanuit hun achterban of 
organisatie. En door hun economische en juridische opleiding en 
achtergrond denken ze nutsgericht en rationeel. De resultaten laten zien 
dat alle respondenten corporate governance zien als wet- en 
regelgeving. Tevens komt uit de bevindingen naar voren dat de actoren 
in en rondom het bestuur zich door de financiële crisis druk en onzeker 
voelen. In paragraaf 4.2 staat de logica van het instituut centraal. Aan de 
hand van verhalen over de oorspronkelijke waarden, het 
organisatiemodel, de zeggenschap en de wijze van besturen wordt 
duidelijk welke geschreven en ongeschreven regels in de organisatie van 
belang zijn. Achtereenvolgens kunnen de volgende drie vaste vuistregels 
worden geformuleerd die in de verhalen zijn terug te vinden: Je moet 
namelijk trouw zijn aan je achterban, het bestuur is degene die 
uiteindelijk het besluit neemt en je moet de formele rol spelen die van je 
verwacht wordt dat je speelt. Deze regels kunnen ook wel omschreven 
worden als de institutionele logica. Paragraaf 4.3 laat zien dat er door 
middel van verhalen van de praktijk inzichtelijk wordt dat men in de 
praktijk te maken heeft met verschillende logica die in strijd zijn met 
elkaar. Het verhaal over de dubbele petten laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat je 
trouw moet zijn aan je achterban maar aan de andere kant ook moet 
voldoen aan het volbrengen van de gezamenlijke opdracht (de formele 
rol). En het spanningsveld van de grijze ruimte bij de wet- en regelgeving 
en de omgang met DNB laat zien dat er ruimte is binnen de 
spanningsvelden om te handelen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5: Florabank  
Net als in het vorige hoofdstuk is in dit hoofdstuk antwoord gegeven op 
de tweede deelvraag en worden de bevindingen van Florabank 
gepresenteerd met behulp van het concept logica’s. Het doel ervan is 
niet om beide casestudies te vergelijken maar om inzicht te krijgen in de 
betekenisgeving van corporate governance. De onderwerpen in de 
paragrafen zijn daarom ook niet allemaal hetzelfde als de onderwerpen 
in het vorige hoofdstuk. Wel wordt net als in het vorige hoofdstuk de drie 
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verschillende logica’s, te weten actorlogica, institutionele logica en 
praktische logica gebruikt om de verhalen uit de casestudy in te vullen. In 
paragraaf 5.1 staat de logica van de actoren centraal. De groep 
respondenten van Florabank wordt gekenmerkt door een homogene 
groep die bestaat uit Nederlandse mannen van middelbare leeftijd met 
een economische of juridische achtergrond. De mannen hebben 
nevenfuncties in stichtingen en verenigingen op het gebied van 
duurzaamheid of in het verlengde van het oorspronkelijke gedachtegoed 
van de Florabank. Deze achtergrond weerspiegelt het rationele en 
nutsgerichte denken maar ook de betrokkenheid bij de idealen van de 
bank. Verder laat paragraaf 5.1 zien dat de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de 
bank tot de dag van vandaag nog een grote rol blijkt te spelen. Met name 
de betrokkenheid ten aanzien van het duurzame karakter en het 
oorspronkelijke gedachtegoed van de bank zijn kenmerkend voor de 
organisatie. Deze affiniteit met duurzaamheid is ook te zien bij de CEO. 
Naast wereldverbeteraar is de CEO ook een visionair, ondernemer en 
pionier. Hij is gewend om oplossingsgericht te werk te gaan en uit de 
verhalen over hoe hij over besturen denkt komt de logica van het denken 
in termen van controle houden dominant naar voren. In paragraaf 5.2 
staat de logica van het instituut centraal. Aan de hand van verhalen over 
de wet- en regelgeving, cultuur, statuten, zeggenschap en informele 
structuren wordt duidelijk welke vuistregels in de organisatie van belang 
zijn. Men volgt de wet- en regelgeving terwijl dit wettelijk niet verplicht 
is, maar men vindt dat het zo hoort. De statuten zorgen ervoor dat 
actoren in en rondom het bestuur van Florabank weten welke formele rol 
ze moeten spelen en wat er van hun verwacht wordt. Naast de formele 
wereld laat deze studie ook een informele wereld zien. In die informele 
wereld speelt de CEO een regisserende en controlerende rol. Een andere 
belangrijke ongeschreven regel is dat je je verbonden moet voelen met 
de missie van de bank. Paragraaf 5.3 laat zien dat door middel van 
verhalen inzichtelijk wordt dat men in de praktijk te maken heeft met 
verschillende logica die in strijd zijn met elkaar. Het verhaal over de 
kritiek op de wet- en regelgeving laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat de 
respondenten de uitvoering van de wet- en regelgeving als zeer 
belastend ervaren. Uit de resultaten van het onderzoek komt naar voren 
dat de respondenten het grijze gebied in de wet- en regelgeving 
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opzoeken. Het verhaal over de informaliteit en formaliteit geeft aan dat 
er ruimte is om te kiezen hoe men handelt maar dat men tegelijkertijd 
gevangen is in het systeem van formele en informele regels. Het laatste 
verhaal over het balanceren tussen idealen laat zien dat actoren 
verschillende ideeën hebben over de uitvoering van hun idealen. Deze 
verschillende zienswijze zorgt voor spanningsvelden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6: Een narratieve analyse 
Dit hoofdstuk geeft de analyse van deze studie weer. Uitgangspunt voor 
deze analyse is de narratieve tabel van het theoretische hoofdstuk (tabel 
2.4). Door in te zoomen op de tekst en uit te zoomen op de omgeving en 
door micro- en macroniveaus met elkaar te verbinden (Fairclough, 1992) 
is voor beide casestudies de narratieve tabel van het theoretisch 
hoofdstuk ingevuld. De bevindingen uit de casestudies zijn te 
omschrijven als een narratieve soep (Boje, 2001). Er zijn drie 
basisverhalen over corporate governance te onderscheiden, namelijk 
corporate governance is het voldoen aan wet- en regelgeving (paragraaf 
6.1.1), corporate governance is het waarde hechten aan geschreven 
regels (paragraaf 6.1.2) en het evenwicht houden tussen belangen 
(paragraaf 6.1.3).  
 
Deze studie toont drie verschillende spanningsvelden aan. Ten eerste is 
er een spanningsveld tussen de grand narratives en de counter narratives 
(Paragraaf 6.2.1). Bij het eerste narratief heeft men hoewel men wil 
voldoen aan de wet- en regelgeving tegelijkertijd ook te maken met 
praktische redenen waarom dit niet kan en het feit dat men ook een 
bedrijf of organisatie runt en afgerekend wordt op de financiële 
resultaten. Het spanningsveld in de tweede narratief over corporate 
governance zit hem in het spanningsveld tussen de formele en de 
informele wereld. En bij het derde basisverhaal acteert men tussen ene 
kant het evenwicht houden tussen de belangen en aan de andere kant 
het nastreven van het gezamenlijk belang (BPF) of het organisatiebelang 
(Florabank). Aan de hand van voorbeelden uit de casestudies zijn de 
spanningsvelden toegelicht.  
Ten tweede is er sprake van een verscheidenheid aan spanningen tussen 
individueel, organisationeel en maatschappelijk niveau van corporate 
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governance (paragraaf 6.2.2). Een voorbeeld van een spanningsveld 
tussen het individuele en het organisationele niveau is die van de strijd 
over de praktische uitvoerbaarheid van de idealen van de bank. Er is een 
interne discussie binnen de bank over hoe de idealen vormgegeven 
moeten worden. In paragraaf 5.3.4 is aangegeven hoe dit kan leiden tot 
spanningsvelden. Tevens laat paragraaf 4.3.5 zien hoe het spanningsveld 
tussen het organisationele en sociale niveau van corporate governance 
de handelingen binnen een organisatie beïnvloedt. Door de druk van de 
media en het maatschappelijke debat over het investeren in 
clusterbommen herzien zowel BPF als Florabank hun beleid ten aanzien 
van de beleggingsportefeuilles.  
Ten derde laat de analyse zien dat er spanningsvelden plaats vinden 
binnen en tussen de narratieve concepten. In paragraaf 6.2.1 wordt 
duidelijk dat bij actoren in en rondom het bestuur van zowel BPF als 
Florabank het newtoniaans denken dominant is. Ook de persoonlijke 
eigenschappen blijken bepalend zijn voor het handelen in en rondom het 
bestuur. Zo hebben de eigenschappen van de CEO gevolgen voor het 
handelen in en rondom het bestuur. Tevens kan de neoliberale context 
van deze tijd bepalend zijn voor het worldview van actoren in en rondom 
het bestuur. Opgemerkt moet worden dat zowel uit de interviews van 
Florabank als BPF blijkt dat er ontwikkelingen gaande zijn die niet met 
het newtoniaanse gedachtegoed zijn op te lossen. Bijvoorbeeld hoe men 
omgaat met de journalisten en vrije denkers die belangrijke opiniepeilers 
zijn in het maatschappelijke debat. In paragraaf 6.2.2. is naar voren 
gekomen dat de regulatieve en cultuur-cognitieve ankers dominant zijn. 
De historische verhalen blijken een grote rol in te spelen. Opvallend is dat 
de normatieve ankers een ondergeschikte rol spelen. Ook laten de 
regulatieve, cultureel-cognitieve en normatieve ankers zien dat 
gewoontes, zeden en belangen als onbedoelde neveneffecten, ongelijke 
verhoudingen produceren en transformeren. In paragraaf 6.2.3 wordt 
duidelijk dat er zowel strategisch als communicatief wordt gehandeld bij 
zowel BPF als Florabank. Uit beide casestudies komt naar voren dat het 
communicatief handelen bij zowel de bestuurder als de andere actor 
voor positieve ervaringen zorgt. Tevens komt uit het onderzoek naar 
voren dat persoonlijkheid en de samenstelling van het bestuur bepalend 
zijn voor het communicatief of strategisch handelen.  
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De derde deelvraag luidt: “Welke verklarende factoren binnen en 
rondom the boards of governance in de financiële sector kunnen de 
spanningsvelden van corporate governance uitleggen?”. Deze deelvraag 
wordt tevens beantwoord in dit hoofdstuk. Uit de analyse komen drie 
factoren die de spanningsvelden binnen corporate governance kunnen 
uitleggen: scene, space for improvisation and conflicting plotlines 
(paragraaf 6.3).  
 
Hoofdstuk 7: Conclusies  
De algemene conclusie van deze studie is dat de spanningsvelden van 
corporate governance gaan over het zoeken naar machtsevenwicht. Dit 
komt overeen met de bewering van Cools (2005) dat corporate 
governance gaat over machtsevenwicht. Deze algemene conclusies kan 
op drie manieren worden uitgelegd. Ten eerste komt uit de analyse naar 
voren dat de spanningsvelden tussen de grand narratives en de counter 
narratives altijd gaan over conflicterende belangen en dubbelrollen. Ten 
tweede gaan de spanningsvelden van corporate governance over het 
spanningsveld tussen het individuele en het organisationele niveau van 
corporate governance en het maatschappelijke en organisationele 
niveau. Hierbij komt uit het onderzoek naar voren dat er een kloof is 
tussen de alledaagse praktijk, het individu en de maatschappij waarbij 
een machtsstrijd tussen economische en sociale waarden plaats vindt. En 
ten derde worden de actoren in en rondom het bestuur van beide 
casestudies geconfronteerd met een nieuw tijdperk welke zich kenmerkt 
door machtsverschuivingen, waarbij men worstelt met termen als 
democratie en institutionalisering.  
 
De theoretische bijdrage van deze studie is gelegen in de narratieve 
bijdrage. Deze narratieve benadering heeft bijgedragen aan inzichten 
omtrent het begrip corporate governance en heeft aangetoond dat 
corporate governance een breed, dynamisch, complex en krachtig 
concept is. Het narratieve model over being, valuing and acting (figuur 
2.3) geeft inzicht in hoe theoretisch gekeken kan worden de praktijk van 
corporate governance. Tevens biedt dit onderzoek een conceptueel 
framework waarbij men ook eventueel andere studies kan verrichten. 
Daarnaast zijn er nog een aantal theoretische inzichten gekomen zoals de 
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verklarende factoren voor de spanningsvelden van corporate 
governance. De studie levert een bijdrage aan de praktijk op drie 
verschillende niveaus, namelijk het individuele niveau, het 
organisationele niveau en het maatschappelijke niveau. In paragraaf 7.2 
zijn deze praktische inzichten weergegeven.  
 
De laatste paragraaf van deze studie sluit af met een aantal reflecties en 
vooruitzichten op het concept corporate governance. Dit onderzoek laat 
zien dat het concept corporate governance wordt gezien als een 
antwoord op de problemen van de financiële sector maar dat het 
concept corporate governance dwaalt in de boardroom. Het begrip 
dwalen verwijst naar het vergissen in de weg die men moet inslaan. Het 
verwijst naar die ene verkeerde daad doen of die ene onjuiste gedachte 
koesteren terwijl men meent goed te handelen. Corporate governance 
verschijnt daarmee eerder als een narratieve versterking van de 
problemen dan als een effectieve oplossing.  
Een van de belangrijkste reden dat dit gebeurd is dat alle narratives laten 
zien dat corporate governance instrumenteel wordt benaderd en dat er 
nauwelijks vanuit een normatieve benadering naar corporate governance 
wordt gekeken. Een term die hierbij wordt genoemd is de term bounded 
morality (Beitz, 1979; Torsello, 2015). Een tweede closing thoughts is dat 
deze studie heeft aangetoond dat wet- en regelgeving alleen deel van de 
oplossing is maar dat er ruimte is voor de actoren in en rondom the 
boards of governance. Deze constatering dat wet- en regelgeving niet 
altijd bij alle organisaties helpt tot fatsoenlijk gedrag leidt bij mij tot de 
gedachtegang dat ook hier het morele perspectief ontbreekt. Deze 
constatering is niet nieuw in de sociale wetenschappen. Acker (2006), een 
wetenschapper in de genderstudies, gaf met de term inequality regimes al 
aan dat vaststaande praktijken en processen leiden tot een aanhoudende 
ongelijkheid in alle arbeidsorganisaties.  
 
Mijn laatste closing thought gaat over de toekomst van corporate 
governance. Om hier antwoord op te geven is niet eenvoudig. Hiervoor is 
gebruik gemaakt van twee verschillende visies. De eerste visie is 
gebaseerd op de wetenschapsfilosoof Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn (1962) is ervan 
overtuigd dat verandering optreedt door middel van plotselinge 
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paradigma verschuivingen. Het bestaande wereldbeeld zal worden 
vervangen, omdat de bijbehorende generatie zal uitsterven en het 
nieuwe wereldbeeld zal ontstaan door nieuwe generaties. Tegenover de 
visie van Kuhn staat een andere visie waarbij de overtuiging is dat de 
mens zelf kan zorgen voor verandering. Een voorbeeld is het change 
management model van Lewin (1951) en het 8 stappen model van Kotter 
(1996). Er zit de visie achter dat de mensen kunnen leren van goede 
ervaringen en afzien van andere ervaringen ten gunste van betere 
ervaringen wat leidt dat verandering. De studie maakt duidelijk dat beide 
bovenstaande visies geloofwaardig zijn en dat in beide verhalen sprake is 
van een verandering van corporate governance. Opvallend is het dat in 
beide verhalen geen urgentie is voor verandering wordt gevoeld. Het 
ontbreken van een moreel perspectief zou hier wellicht ook een rol in 
kunnen spelen. 
 
Volgens de onderzoeker moet corporate governance vanuit een breder 
perspectief bekeken worden. Het Newtonian worldview zal verschuiven 
naar een breder perspectief, namelijk het holitische worldview. Men zal 
vanuit het individu en de omgeving (being) moeten kijken naar corporate 
governance. Wanneer er zich veranderingen voordoen zoals dat de 
investering in clusterbommen niet meer maatschappelijk geaccepteerd 
wordt zal men niet alleen moeten kijken naar clusterbommen maar ook 
(breder) naar andere zaken die wellicht in de toekomst niet meer 
geaccepteerd gaan worden zoals het investeren in fossiele energie.  
Bij het institutional framework zal de nadruk niet zozeer moeten liggen 
op de regulatieve kenmerken zoals strengere wet-en regelgeving, maar 
ook dit moet in een breder perspectief geplaatst worden. Actoren in en 
rondom the boards of governance zullen meer aandacht moeten hebben 
voor de culturele aspecten. Men zou moeten reflecteren op de huidige 
spanningsvelden om vervolgens de gevestigde interactie-, 
gedragspatronen en zeggenschapsstructuren ter discussie te stellen. 
Opvallend in deze studie is dat veel spanningsvelden rondom corporate 
governance eigenlijk te maken hebben met het gebrek aan aandacht 
voor normatieve kenmerken. Binnen organisaties zou men zich meer en 
vaker essentiële vragen moeten stellen zoals hoe is de functie van de 
organisatie geïnterpreteerd? Hoe worden de morele en filosofische 
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richtlijnen voor de uitvoering en het beheer van de organisatie 
toegepast? Zijn de sociale waarden, zoals vrijheid en eigenwaarde 
toegepast voor iedereen? Is er overeenstemming tussen de waarden die 
uitgedragen worden door het bestuur en de sociale waarden van de hele 
maatschappij?  
Ook de mode of practice voor actoren in en rondom the boards of 
governance vraagt om een breder perspectief namelijk reflectie op actie. 
Tenslotte een overdenking: Wat zou er gebeuren wanneer men niet meer 
uitgaat dat de executive board verantwoordelijk is voor de resultaten van 
een organisatie maar wanneer de executive board wordt afgerekend op 
de het proces waarbij overeenstemming belangrijk is? Deze nieuwe 
zienswijze zou volgens de onderzoeker kunnen betekenen dat er veel 
meer vanuit een breder perspectief gekeken wordt waarin het morele 
denken naast het instrumentele meer aandacht gaat krijgen.  
 
Er zullen in de toekomst altijd spanningen blijven bestaan en ze kunnen 
zelfs toenemen, maar door corporate governance vanuit een breder 
perspectief te bezien zullen actoren in en rondom the boards of 
governance beter uitgerust zijn om te gaan met tensions in the 
boardroom. 
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